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ARTICLES
THE CASE AGAINST SUPPLEMENTAL
BANKRUPTCY JURISDICTION: A
CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY, AND
POLICY ANALYSIS
SUSAN BLOCK-LIEB *
In this Article Professor Block-Lieb critically examines the power of a federal
district or bankruptcy court to adjudicate jurisdictionally insufficient claims
which arise out of a common nucleus of operative fact with a proceeding which
"'arises under" the Bankruptcy Code, or "'arises in" or "relates to" a bankruptcy
case. After considering Article III of the United States Constitution, relevant
statutory provisions-including the newly enacted supplemental jurisdictional
provision (28 U.S. C. § 1367)-and the conflicting policy objectives of these statu-
tory provisions, the Article concludes that a district court's adjudication of supple-
mental claims related to a "related to" proceeding may be unconstitutional.
unauthorized by statute, and inconsistent with the primary purpose of bankruptcy
jurisdiction-the efficient administration of a bankruptcy estate. As to a district
court's exercise of jurisdiction over supplemental claims related to an "arising
under" or "arising in" proceeding, it proposes that a balancing approach be
adopted It also contends that additional constitutional concerns are raised when
a non-Article III bankruptcy court exercises any form of supplemental bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction, and advocates limiting the power of bankruptcy courts
accordingly.
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INTRODUCTION
( OMPLEX bankruptcy cases' breed complex litigation-proceed-
ings2 involving multiple claims3 among multiple parties. As to each
1. The terminology used to refer to litigation that occurs in the context of bank-
ruptcy differs from that used to refer to general civil litigation. This inconsistency of
defined terms can be quite confusing. In a bankruptcy context, for example, a "'[c]ase'
comprises the entire Chapter 7, 9, 11, [12], or 13 case that is commenced pursuant to
section 301, 302, or 303 ... by the filing of a 'petition.'" Lawrence P. King, Jurisdiction
and Procedure Under the Bankruptcy Amendments of 1984, 38 Vand. L. Rev. 675, 676-77
(1985). On the other hand, a constitutional "case or controversy" refers to the litigation
unit over which Congress is constitutionally empowered to confer jurisdiction upon the
federal courts. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. Article III, Section 2, Clause I of the Consti-
tution states:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors,
other public Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime
Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-to
Controversies between two or more States;--between a State and Citizens of
another State;-between Citizens of different States;--between Citizens of the
same State claiming Lands under the Grants of different States, and between a
State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. I.
2. "Disputes often arise during the pendency of a ... case that require judicial reso-
lution. Section 1334(b) refers to these disputes as 'proceedings.' There may, therefore, be
numerous proceedings within a case." King, supra note 1, at 676-77 & n.8 (citing Fed. R.
Bankr. P. 1002 for the distinction between "case" and "proceeding").
3. The term "claim" has different meanings in the bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy
1994]
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claim and party, subject matter jurisdiction must exist for a court to have
the power to adjudicate the proceeding. Although the scope of bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction4 is broad, it is not without limits. A creature of stat-
ute,5 bankruptcy jurisdiction is defined to include6 civil proceedings
contexts. Moreover, the term "claim" appears to have two meanings in bankruptcy, de-
pending upon whether the reference is intended as substantive or procedural.
Outside of bankruptcy, the term "claim" refers to a "claim for relief" and includes "an
original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
Together, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure refer to factually related claims permitted
to be, and actually, joined together as a "civil action." See Fed. R. Civ. P. 2 ("There shall
be one form of action to be known as 'civil action.' "); Fed. R. Civ. P. 3 ("A civil action is
commenced by filing a complaint with the court.").
By contrast, the Bankruptcy Code defines "claim" to mean "right to payment, whether
or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, ma-
tured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured." 11
U.S.C. § 101(5) (Supp. IV 1992). The term "claim" appears to have a second meaning
when used in a procedural context in bankruptcy, however. The Federal Rules of Bank-
ruptcy Procedure refer generally to "adversary proceedings" and "contested matters" as
the litigation units which occur in the context of a title 11 case. See Fed. R. Bankr. P.
7001 (defining adversary proceeding); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9014 (defining contested mat-
ters). Although the bankruptcy procedural rules do not explicitly state whether "adver-
sary proceedings" or "contested matters" are intended to parallel the terms "civil action"
or "claim" used in a non-bankruptcy context, they impliedly correlate bankruptcy "pro-
ceedings"-whether "adversary proceedings" or "contested matters"--with non-bank-
ruptcy "civil actions." First, they do not incorporate Fed. R. Civ. P. 2 to bankruptcy
procedure. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7002 (containing no reference to Fed. R. Civ. P. 2,
although other rules in Part VII incorporate civil procedural rules having same number
as last digit of bankruptcy procedural rule). Second, they do incorporate Fed. R. Civ. P.
8 to bankruptcy procedure, including the distinction drawn between an "[original] com-
plaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party complaint." Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7008 (in-
corporating Rule 8 with additions not relevant here).
To avoid confusion, this Article uses "claim" in its procedural context to refer to units
of litigation existing within a "civil action" (in a non-bankruptcy context) or "proceed-
ing" (in a bankruptcy context). When referring to "a right of payment," this Article
either uses the phrase "proof of claim," see infra note 19 (defining "proof of claim"), or
characterizes the "claim" as being either unsecured or secured.
4. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Throughout this Article, "bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction" is referred to as the jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases and the litiga-
tion they involve which Congress has granted by statute to the federal courts. See 28
U.S.C. § 1334 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (conferring bankruptcy jurisdiction in district
courts). Intertwined with, but distinct from, any discussion of the scope of bankruptcy
jurisdiction, is the issue of which federal court is empowered to exercise this jurisdic-
tion-most recently, whether bankruptcy jurisdiction is to be exercised by Article III
district courts or non-Article III bankruptcy courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 157 (1988); see also
infra part III.A.2 (describing allocation of jurisdiction between non-Article III bank-
ruptcy courts and Article III district courts under § 157).
5. Like all federal jurisdiction, bankruptcy jurisdiction is limited by its statutory
grant, found in 28 U.S.C. § 1334. See, e.g., FDIC v. Majestic Energy Corp. (In re Majes-
tic Energy Corp.), 835 F.2d 87, 89 (5th Cir. 1988) ("Bankruptcy courts are courts of
limited jurisdiction, with their scope defined by statute.").
6. In addition to the grant of bankruptcy jurisdiction over proceedings "arising
under title 11," and "arising in and related to cases under title 11," found in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1334(b), § 1334(a) also grants "exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under title 11," and
§ 1334(d) grants "exclusive jurisdiction of all the property, wherever located, of the
debtor as of the commencement of such case, and of property of the estate." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1334(a), (b), (d) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
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which either "arise under" title 11,' or "arise in ' or are "related to" a
title 11 case.9
What of proceedings which neither "arise under title 11" nor "arise
in" or "relate to" a title 11 case, but which arise out of the same nucleus
of facts as a proceeding over which bankruptcy jurisdiction clearly ex-
ists? Do either district courts or bankruptcy courts have the power to
adjudicate a jurisdictionally insufficient proceeding which is factually re-
lated to an "arising under," "arising in," or "related to" proceeding?' If
so, under what circumstances should this power be exercised?
As an example," consider first an avoidance action brought by the
trustee in bankruptcy' 2 against several defendants alleged to have re-
ceived fraudulent13 and preferential transfers.' 4 The trustee's suit "arises
7. For a proceeding to "arise under" title 11, the proceeding must derive from a
provision of the Bankruptcy Code, which comprises title II of the United States Code.
See infra notes 66-74 and accompanying text.
8. A proceeding "arises in" a title I 1 case if it could not have been brought had the
liquidation or reorganization case not been commenced. See infra notes 75-84 and ac-
companying text.
9. A proceeding is sufficiently "related to" a title 11 case for purposes of satisfying
the bankruptcy jurisdictional requirements if it "affects the amount of property available
for distribution or the allocation of property among creditors." Elscint, Inc. v. First Wis.
Fin. Corp. (In re Xonics, Inc.), 813 F.2d 127, 131 (7th Cir. 1987). See infra notes 85-98
and accompanying text.
10. The power to adjudicate jurisdictionally insufficient state law claims or proceed-
ings factually related to jurisdictionally sufficient claims or proceedings refers to the doc-
trine of supplemental jurisdiction. Supplemental jurisdiction is the term currently used to
describe the doctrines of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction. See infra notes 102-38 and
accompanying text (discussing historical development of ancillary, pendent-claim, and
pendent-party jurisdiction, and codification of these doctrines by supplemental jurisdic-
tional provision-28 U.S.C. § 1367).
11. For a case involving similar allegations, see Wieboldt Stores, Inc. v. Schottenstein,
111 B.R. 162 (N.D. Ill. 1990); see also infra notes 149-51 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing Wieboldt in detail); Spaulding & Co. v. Buchanan (In re Spaulding & Co.), 131 B.R.
84 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (with similar facts, district court held that third-party action did not
"relate to" chapter 11 case, but did not address possibility of exercise of supplemental
jurisdiction).
12. A bankruptcy trustee is appointed in each chapter 7, 12, and 13 case. See Il
U.S.C. §§ 701, 702, 703, 1202(a), 1302(a) (1988). A trustee may be appointed in a chap-
ter 11 case, but only "for cause, including fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross mis-
management of the affairs of the debtor by current management," or "if such
appointment is in the interests of creditors, any equity security holders, and other inter-
ests of the estate." 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1), (2) (1988). The duties of a trustee include an
"investigat[ion of] the financial affairs of the debtor." 11 U.S.C. § 704(4) (1988). See also
11 U.S.C § 1106(a)(3) (1988) (incorporating similar duties of investigation "except to the
extent that the court orders otherwise"); § 1202(b)(2) (1988) (incorporating similar duties
of investigation but only if, after requested by a party in interest, the court so orders "for
cause"); § 1302(b)(1) (1988) (generally incorporating duty of investigation).
13. See 11 U.S.C. § 548 (a) (1988) (permitting trustee to avoid transfer made, or obli-
gation incurred, by debtor within year before date of filing of petition if (1) transfer was
made, or obligation incurred, "with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any entity
to which the debtor was or became... indebted" or (2)(A) debtor "received less than a
reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such transfer or obligation" and (B) was
insolvent, insufficiently capitalized or intended to incur debts beyond its ability to repay
either at the time of the transfer or as a result of the transfer).
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under" 11 U.S.C. §§ 548 and 547, and thus bankruptcy jurisdiction
clearly exists.15 Assume further that the defendants bring a third-party
complaint in which they seek contribution from their former lawyers and
accountants. They claim that if their transaction with the debtor is
avoidable as a preference or fraudulent transfer, then these professionals
committed malpractice and are liable to the defendants to the extent of
the defendant's liability to the trustee. Because the third-party action is
predicated solely on state law, it does not "arise under title 11. ' ' 16 Nor is
it likely that the defendants' malpractice action "arose in" the debtor's
bankruptcy case. 17 Finally, resolution of the third-party suit may not be
"related to" the bankruptcy case as it may have no conceivable effect on
distributions to creditors in, or the administration of, the debtor's bank-
ruptcy estate. Thus, if there is jurisdiction over the third-party action it
must exist only because it shares "a common nucleus of operative fact"'I8
with the trustee's avoidance action sufficient to create supplemental
bankruptcy jurisdiction.
Consider a different scenario in which a creditor files a proof of claim 9
against the debtor's bankruptcy estate.2° In the claim, the creditor seeks
a distribution from the estate based on an alleged loan agreement with
the debtor. The debtor timely objects to the claim and defends 2' against
contractual liability on the grounds that the loan agreement violated
14. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988) (permitting trustee to avoid transfers of "an interest
of the debtor in property" made "to or for the benefit of a creditor" and "on account of
an antecedent debt;" debtor must have been insolvent at time of transfer, and transfer
must have occurred within 90 days before filing of bankruptcy petition, unless transferee
is an insider, in which case, a one year reach back period applies; transfer must enable
creditor to receive more than it would have if the "case were a case under chapter 7 of
this title," transfer had not been made and "creditor [had] received payment of such debt
to the extent provided by the provisions of this title").
15. The question of which court-the district or bankruptcy court-will hear and
determine the proceeding is a distinct one, governed by 28 U.S.C. § 157 (1988). See supra
note 4; infra notes 416-24 and accompanying text. Under this statute, the trustee's avoid-
ance action clearly constitutes a "core proceeding," 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(F) and
157(b)(2)(H), which the non-Article III bankruptcy judge can "hear and determine." 28
U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) (1988).
16. See infra notes 66-74 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 75-84 and accompanying text.
18. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966); see also infra notes 116-
18 and accompanying text (discussing Gibbs's common nucleus of fact standard).
19. See 11 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1988) (enabling creditor or indenture trustee to file proof
of claim); see also Fed. R. Bankr. P.3001 (a) (defining proof of claim as "written statement
setting forth a creditor's claim"); Official Forms No. 19 (general proof of claim); Official
Forms No. 20 (proof of claim for wages, salary, or commissions); Official Forms No. 21
(proof of multiple claims for wages, salary, or commissions); see generally, 11 U.S.C.
§ 101(5) (Supp. IV 1992) (defining "claim" as "right to payment," irrespective of form or
nature).
20. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1988) (providing that commencement of a case creates an
estate comprised of all "legal or equitable interests of debtor in property as of" such
commencement).
21. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 (setting forth procedure for objections to a claim and
providing that "[i]f an objection to a claim is joined with a demand for relief of the kind
specified in Rule 7001, it becomes an adversary proceeding").
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state usury law.22 Although the merits of the creditor's claim will be
determined solely with respect to state contract and usury laws, the liti-
gation between the debtor and creditor on the proof of claim is a pro-
ceeding that "arises in the title 11 case," and thus bankruptcy
jurisdiction exists to resolve the dispute in federal court.23 Assume fur-
ther that the creditor brings a third-party complaint against its attorneys,
alleging that if the debtor's usury objections to its claim are upheld then
its attorneys are liable to it in an equal amount in malpractice. The mal-
practice action neither "arises under title 1 1, '24 nor "arises in"'  or "re-
lates to" the title 11 case.26 Thus, federal jurisdiction exists, if it exists at
all, because the malpractice action arises out of "a common nucleus of
operative fact"27 with the proof of claim litigation.
Consider a final example involving litigation between two creditors-
Bank A and Bank B-who both claim a first priority security in the same
collateral.28 Because the collateral is not valuable enough to repay both
creditors and leave something for the holders of unsecured creditors or
the debtor, the trustee in bankruptcy has abandoned it.29 As a result of
the abandonment, the property is no longer property of the estate. 30 De-
spite this seeming lack of connection between the estate and the credi-
tors' litigation, bankruptcy jurisdiction exists over this proceeding if one
of the creditors is undersecured on the theory that it is "related to" the
22. See I I U.S.C. § 502(b)(1) (1988) (providing that a claim shall be disallowed to the
extent that the claim is unenforceable under "applicable law for a reason other than be-
cause such claim is contingent or unmatured").
23. Even if the debtor's usury contentions are structured as a counterclaim to the
proof of claim, the debtor's counterclaim will likely be viewed as "arising in" the title 11
case. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C) (1988) (defining "core proceedings" as including
"counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims against the estate"); see also
infra notes 75-84 and accompanying text (discussing "arising in" jurisdiction in greater
detail).
24. The malpractice action does not "arise under" title I 1 because it derives from
state law, rather than federal bankruptcy law. See infra notes 66-74 and accompanying
text.
25. The malpractice action does not "arise in" the bankruptcy case because the lender
might have brought a malpractice action outside the context of the debtor's bankruptcy
case. See infra notes 75-84 and accompanying text.
26. The malpractice action does not "relate to" the debtor's bankruptcy case because
it will have no conceivable effect on distributions to creditors or the administration of the
bankruptcy estate. See infra notes 85-98 and accompanying text. Whether the creditor's
attorneys committed malpractice or not, the estate's liability to the creditor will turn
solely on the validity of the lending agreement in light of state usury laws.
27. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966); see also infra notes 116-
18 and accompanying text (discussing Gibbs's common nucleus of fact standard).
28. This hypothetical is loosely based on the facts of Elscint, Inc. v. First Wis. Fin.
Corp. (In re Xonics, Inc.), 813 F.2d 127 (7th Cir. 1987). In Xonics, however, neither
lender brought a third-party malpractice action.
29. See 11 U.S.C. § 554 (1988) (permitting trustee to "abandon any property of the
estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential value and benefit to
the estate").
30. See, eg., Killebrew v. Brewer (In re Killebrew), 888 F.2d 1516, 1520 (5th Cir.
1989) (defining abandonment as "irrevocable removal of property from the estate").
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bankruptcy case.3 Where either Bank A or Bank B is undersecured, the
result of the litigation between them will "affect[ ] the amount of prop-
erty available for distribution or the allocation of property among credi-
tors"32 because a determination that the undersecured creditor holds a
first priority security interest in the collateral will reduce the unsecured
portion of its claim against the estate and, as a result, increase distribu-
tions to other creditors of the debtor.33 Assume further that Bank A
brings a third-party complaint against its attorneys, alleging that if it is
found not to hold a first priority security interest in the collateral then its
attorneys have committed malpractice in documenting and recording the
financing transaction. This malpractice action neither "arises under title
11,'' 4 nor "arises in"" or "relates to"36 the debtor's bankruptcy case.
Federal jurisdiction exists over the malpractice action, if it exists at all,
because the creditors' priority dispute and the malpractice action arise
out of "a common nucleus of operative fact."'37
There exists ample precedent for the assertion of jurisdiction supple-
mental to other grants of federal jurisdiction in general non-bankruptcy
civil litigation.38 Further, with its enactment of the Judicial Improve-
ments Act of 1990, Congress expressly provided in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)
for a broad grant of supplemental jurisdiction "over all other claims that
are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that
they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the
United States Constitution. ' 39 But did Congress intend that § 1367(a)
31. The term "undersecured" is used to refer to a claim secured by collateral insuffi-
cient in value to repay the claim in full. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988) (defining "claim of
a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the estate has an interest" as secured "to
the extent of the value of such creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such property"
and unsecured "to the extent that the value of such creditor's interest ... is less than the
amount of such allowed claim").
32. Elscint, Inc. v. First Wis. Fin. Corp. (In re Xonics), Inc., 813 F.2d 127, 131 (7th
Cir. 1987).
33. See id.
34. See infra notes 66-74 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 75-84 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 85-98 and accompanying text.
37. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966); see also infra notes
116-18 and accompanying text (discussing Gibbs's common nucleus of fact standard).
38. See infra notes 102-38 and accompanying text.
39. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (Supp. IV. 1992). Section 1367 provides in its entirety as
follows:
(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly provided other-
wise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which the district courts have
original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction
over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such
original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under
Article III of the United States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction
shall include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional
parties.
(b) In any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction
founded solely on section 1332 of this title, the district courts shall not have
supplemental jurisdiction under subsection (a) over claims by plaintiffs against
B4NKR UPTCY JURISDICTION
would apply in the bankruptcy context and support an assertion of juris-
diction supplemental to a proceeding "arising under" title 11, or "arising
in" or "related to" a title 11 case?
Courts of appeal," district courts,4 ' and bankruptcy courts4 2 have
nearly uniformly43 concluded that there exists jurisdiction supplemental
to bankruptcy jurisdiction. This uniformity of decision exists whether
the decision involved former Bankruptcy Acts" or the current Bank-
ruptcy Code,45 and whether or not the decision pre-dated enactment of
28 U.S.C. § 1367, the supplemental jurisdiction provision enacted with
the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990.41
This Article contends that neither 28 U.S.C. § 1367 nor Article III of
the United States Constitution authorize the exercise of jurisdiction sup-
plemental to the grant of bankruptcy jurisdiction granted by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1334(b).4' It also argues that because courts have exceeded these limi-
persons made parties under Rule 14, 19, 20, or 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, or over claims by persons proposed to be joined as plaintiffs under
Rule 19 of such rules, or seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24 of such
rules, when exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be in-
consistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332.
(c) The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a
claim under subsection (a) if -
(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,
(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over
which the district court has original jurisdiction,
(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction, or
(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for
declining jurisdiction.
(d) The period of limitations for any claim asserted under subsection (a), and
for any other claim in the same action that is voluntarily dismissed at the same
time as or after the dismissal of the claim under subsection (a), shall be tolled
while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless
State law provides for a longer tolling period.
(e) As used in this section, the term "State" includes the District of Columbia,
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any territory or possession of the
United States.
40. See infra notes 141-48, 346-47 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 149-51 and accompanying text; see also Ram Const. Co. v. Port
Authority, 49 B.R. 363, 365-66 (W.D. Pa. 1985) (analogy to pendent jurisdiction drawn
in upholding constitutionality of assertion of bankruptcy jurisdiction over state law
claim).
42. See infra part II.A.3; see also Sonnyco Coal, Inc. v. Bartley (In re Sonnyco Coal,
Inc.), 89 B.R. 658, 665-68 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988) (supporting constitutionality of exer-
cise of "related to" jurisdiction by non-Article III bankruptcy court with analogy to doc-
trines of supplemental jurisdiction).
43. See infra notes 217-31 and accompanying text.
44. See infra notes 346-47 and accompanying text.
45. See infra part II.A.
46. See infra note 234 and accompanying text.
47. See infra note 240 and accompanying text (noting that Supreme Court has long
required two things "to create [federal] jurisdiction .... The Constitution must have
given to the court the capacity to take it, and an act of Congress must have supplied
it .. ") (quoting Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 548 (1989)).
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tations, Congress should enact express limitations to the exercise of sup-
plemental bankruptcy jurisdiction.
Part I of this Article begins with general discussions of the historical
development of both bankruptcy jurisdiction and supplemental jurisdic-
tion. Part II analyzes the decisions in which courts have found supple-
mental bankruptcy jurisdiction under the current Bankruptcy Code.48
Part III criticizes this case law, presenting constitutional and statutory
arguments against the exercise of supplemental bankruptcy jurisdiction
by federal district courts. This section concludes, first, that where juris-
dictionally deficient proceedings have "a common nucleus of operative
fact" 49 with state law proceedings50 between non-diverse citizens5 that
merely "arise in" or "relate to" a title 11 case,52 an exercise of supple-
mental jurisdiction may exceed the limits of Article III of the United
States Constitution.53 Moreover, irrespective of the nature of the pri-
mary claim,54 where a non-Article III bankruptcy judge exercises supple-
mental bankruptcy jurisdiction, additional constitutional concerns
exist." Second, § 1367(a) is ambiguous as to its application to bank-
ruptcy proceedings. Ambiguities in the bankruptcy56 and supplemental'
jurisdictional provisions should be resolved, if at all possible, to avoid
reaching these constitutional questions. 8
Even assuming that supplemental bankruptcy jurisdiction is both con-
stitutionally and statutorily authorized, part IV argues on policy grounds
that Congress should amend either 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (the bankruptcy
jurisdictional provision), or 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (the supplemental jurisdic-
48. For cases in which courts have exercised supplemental bankruptcy jurisdiction
under the former Bankruptcy Acts, see infra notes 346-47.
49. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966); see also infra notes 116-
18 and accompanying text (discussing Gibbs's common nucleus of fact standard).
50. By "state law proceedings," this Article means proceedings which are predicated
on state law and which do not "arise under" any federal law sufficient to satisfy the
requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
51. The citizenship of the parties determines whether the requirements of diversity
jurisdiction have been fulfilled. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (diversity
jurisdiction provision).
52. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
53. U.S. Const. art. III. See infra part III.A (constitutional analysis of supplemental
bankruptcy jurisdiction).
54. The phrase "primary claim" is used throughout this Article to refer to the non-
supplemental claim in a civil action. In United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715
(1966), the Court referred to the primary claim as the "federal claim," probably because
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (statutory grant of federal question jurisdiction) provided the jurisdic-
tion for the primary claim.
55. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87
(1982) (holding bankruptcy jurisdictional provision enacted with Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978 unconstitutional because it delegated "essential attributes of the judicial
power" to bankruptcy judges who did not enjoy life-tenure as required by Article III,
§ 1); see also infra notes 398-415 and accompanying text (extensive discussion of
Marathon).
56. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
57. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (Supp. IV. 1992).
58. See infra note 239 (discussing this rule of statutory construction).
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tional provision), or both, to preclude the exercise of supplemental bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction except when necessary to expedite resolution of a
bankruptcy case.59
I. OVERVIEW
A. Bankruptcy Jurisdiction
The scope of bankruptcy jurisdiction was expanded with the enact-
ment of the current bankruptcy jurisdictional provisions first enacted in
1978' and reenacted in 1984.61 This section discusses the breadth of
these bankruptcy jurisdictional provisions.
1. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984
Currently, 28 U.S.C. § 1334 provides three distinct grants of bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction.62 First, "district courts... have original and exclu-
59. See infra part IV.
60. See 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b) (repealed). For quotation of former § 1471 in its entirety,
see infra note 100.
61. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). In its entirety, 28 U.S.C. § 1334
provides as follows:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the district courts shall
have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under title 11.(b) Notwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers exclusive jurisdiction on
a court or courts other than the district courts, the district courts shall have
original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title
11, or arising in or related to cases under title 11.
(c)(1) Nothing in this section prevents a district court in the interest of justice,
or in the interest of comity with State courts or respect for State law, from
abstaining from hearing a particular proceeding arising under title I I or arising
in or related to a case under title 11.
(2) Upon timely motion of a party in a proceeding based upon a State law
claim or State law cause of action, related to a case under title 11 but not arising
under title 11 or arising in a case under title 11, wvith respect to which an action
could not have been commenced in a court of the United States absent jurisdic-
tion under this section, the district court shall abstain from hearing such pro-
ceeding if an action is commenced, and can be timely adjudicated, in a State
forum of appropriate jurisdiction. Any decision to abstain or not to abstain
made under this subsection is not reviewable by appeal or otherwise by the
court of appeals under section 158(d), 1291, or 1292 of this title or by the
Supreme Court of the United States under section 1254 of this title. This sub-
section shall not be construed to limit the applicability of the stay provided for
by section 362 of title 11, United States Code, as such section applies to an
action affecting the property of the estate in bankruptcy.(d) The district court in which a case under title 11 is commenced or is pending
shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all of the property, wherever located, of the
debtor as of the commencement of such case, and of property of the estate.
28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
62. Which court exercises bankruptcy jurisdiction is a question distinct from the
scope of bankruptcy jurisdiction, and is governed by a separate statute. Compare 28
U.S.C. § 1334 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (granting bankruptcy jurisdiction to district
courts) with 28 U.S.C. § 157 (1988) (authorizing referral of bankruptcy jurisdiction from
district courts to bankruptcy courts); see also infra notes 416-24 and accompanying text.
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sive jurisdiction of all cases under title 11. " 63 It also provides that
district courts have "exclusive jurisdiction" over all of the debtor's prop-
erty, "wherever located.., and.., of the estate."'6 Finally, it provides
that "district courts ... have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all
civil proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or related to cases
under title 11.,,65
"Arising under" jurisdiction 66 is the narrowest form of bankruptcy ju-
risdiction.67  Legislative history defines "arising under" bankruptcy ju-
risdiction as extending to
any matter under which a claim is made under a provision of title 11.
For example, a claim of exemptions under 11 U.S.C. 522 would be
cognizable by the bankruptcy court, as would a claim of discrimination
in violation of 11 U.S.C. 525. Any action by the trustee under an
avoiding power would be a proceeding arising under title 11, because
the trustee would be claiming based on a right given by one of the
sections in ... title 11.68
Courts have interpreted "arising under" jurisdiction as extending to mat-
ters based solely on rights created under title 11.69 Examples of "arising
under" jurisdiction include proceedings to avoid transfers pursuant to
the federal preference or fraudulent transfer provisions,70 to enforce or
request relief from the automatic stay,71 to object to the grant of a dis-
63. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). For a definition of a "title 11 case,"
see supra note 1.
64. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(d) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
65. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). For a definition of "proceedings,"
see supra note 2.
66. The concept of "arising under" bankruptcy jurisdiction is derived from "arising
under" Constitutional, statutory, and treaty jurisdiction. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b)
(1988 & Supp. IV 1992) with 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988 & Supp. IV. 1992) (28 U.S.C.
1334(b) refers to jurisdiction under title 11, and 28 U.S.C. 1331 refers to jurisdiction
under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States). Indeed, legislative his-
tory indicates Congress' understanding that "arising under" bankruptcy jurisdiction
would be easy to identify because "[t]he phrase 'arising under' has a well defined and
broad meaning in the jurisdictional context." H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
445 (1977).
67. See Wood v. Wood (In re Wood), 825 F.2d 90, 96, 97 (5th Cir. 1987) (narrowly
defining "arising under" jurisdiction, and comparing it to other broader grants of bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction).
68. H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 445 (1977).
69. See In re Wood, 825 F.2d at 96-97 (stating that, for example, a suit to avoid a
preferential transfer "arises under" title 11 because the suit is based solely on 11 U.S.C.
§ 547).
70. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 547, 548 (1988); see also supra notes 13, 14 (defining preference
and fraudulent transfers).
71. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Courts have found that motions,
under 11 U.S.C. §§ 105 or 362, for injunctive relief are "core" proceedings within the
meaning of subsections (A) and (0). See, e.g., National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Titan
Energy, Inc. (In re Titan Energy, Inc.), 837 F.2d 325, 328-29 (8th Cir. 1988) (proceeding
by debtor's insurer to enjoin, pursuant to §§ 105 and 362, state court action is "core"
proceeding because product liability insurance policy between insurer and debtor is prop-
erty of estate); Manville Corp. v. Equity Security Holders Comm., A.F. (In re Johns-
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charge to the debtor or to the dischargeability of a particular debt,"2 to
resolve the scope of property of the estate," or to request authority to
reject or assume an executory contract or unexpired lease.' 4
Courts have defined "arising in" bankruptcy jurisdiction by applying a
"but for" test.75 According to this test, proceedings are said to "arise in"
a title 11 case "if it is a proceeding that, by its nature, could arise only in
the context of a bankruptcy case[,]'" even though it is not based on any
right expressly created under title 11. 7 Some examples of "arising in"
proceedings include administrative matters,'8 determinations as to the
validity and amount of claims asserted against the estate,' 9 "counter-
Manville Corp.), 801 F.2d 60, 63-64 (2d Cir. 1986) (proceeding brought by debtor-in-
possession to enjoin Equity Committee and its members from pursuing state court action
to compel m'eeting of debtor's shareholders was "core" proceeding because meeting
might interfere with debtor's reorganization).
72. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 523 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), 727 (1988) (objections to dis-
chargeability of certain debts and objections to discharge respectively).
73. See I1 U.S.C. § 541 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); see also, e.g., Plaza at Latham As-
socs. v. Citicorp N.A., 150 B.R. 507, 513-14 (N.D.N.Y. 1993) (characterizing order as
resolving claims to proceeds of debtor's insurance policy which constituted property of
estate and concluding that order approving settlement providing that debtor's insurer be
released from liability to any entity relating to claims arising out of fire at debtor's prem-
ises was "core proceeding").
74. See 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
75. A leading treatise defines "arising in" jurisdiction as "the residual category of
civil proceedings, including those which do not arise under title 11, and those which are
not related to title 11 cases." I Collier on Bankruptcy § 3.01[l][c][v], at 3-32 (Lawrence
P. King ed., 15th ed. 1993).
76. Wood v. Wood (In re Wood), 825 F.2d 90, 97 (5th Cir. 1987). Accord Silverman
v. General Ry. Signal Co. (In re Leco Enters., Inc.), 144 B.R. 244, 248-49 (S.D.N.Y.
1992); Acolyte Elect. Corp. v. City of New York, 69 B.R. 155, 173 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1986) ("To be a core proceeding, an action must have as its foundation the creation,
recognition, or adjudication of rights which would not exist independent of a bankrupt;:y
environment .... ").
77. See In re Wood, 825 F.2d at 97 (noting that litigation surrounding creditor's proof
of claim filed in bankruptcy case as example of "arising in" jurisdiction, although claim
based on state law).
78. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A), (0) (1988) (including, among definition of "core
proceedings," those "matters concerning the administration of the estate" and "other
proceedings affecting the liquidation of the assets of the estate or the adjustment of the
debtor-creditor or the equity security holder relationship"). Courts have held a wide
variety of proceedings to be "core" proceedings within the scope of § 157(b)(2)(A) and
(0). See generally Bankruptcy Litigation Manual 83-84 (Michael L. Cook ed., 1992-93)
(describing the following as "core" proceedings within scope of catch-all provisions: pro-
ceedings to establish administrative priority; motions for substantive consolidation; mo-
tions for change of venue, remand, or abstention; proceedings for violation of § 362
automatic stay; motions to disqualify counsel for debtor;, estimations of personal injury
claims in order to confirm chapter 11 plan; counterclaims for bad faith filing of creditor's
petition; fixing attorneys' fees under § 506(b); and appointment of additional creditors'
committees); 10 Norton Bankruptcy Law and Practice 2d § 5.16, at 108 (1993) (describ-
ing disputes concerning employment of attorneys and award of professional compensa-
tion out of estate as "core" within meaning of subsection (A), as well as questions
concerning eligibility and qualification of bankruptcy trustee and compensation of
trustees).
79. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B) (1988) (defining "core proceedings" as including
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claims by the estate against persons filing claims against the estate,""s
"orders to turn over property of the estate,""1 "determinations of the
validity, extent, or priority of liens," 2 proceedings to enforce prior or-
ders of the bankruptcy court,8 3 and proceedings involving the post-peti-
"allowance or disallowance of claims against the estate"); see also Canal Corp. v.
Finnman (In re Johnson), 960 F.2d 396, 401 (4th Cir. 1992)(adversary proceeding seek-
ing distribution of funds held by debtor in constructive trust held "core" as either involv-
ing turnover of property of estate, validity and priority of liens, or sale, use or lease of
property); In re Parque Forestal, Inc., 949 F.2d 504, 510 (1st Cir. 1991)(estoppel claim
brought by residents in debtor's housing development held "core" because district court
affirmed bankruptcy court's decision based on 11 U.S.C. § 506(c), thus, action "arose
under" title 11 or "arose in" title 11 case); Southeastern Sprinkler Co. v. Meyertech
Corp. (In re Meyertech Corp.), 831 F.2d 410, 418 (3d Cir. 1987)(creditor's breach of
warranty action against debtor was "core" proceeding because it fell within Code defini-
tion of "claim").
Not all actions against the debtor are "core proceedings." At least one court has held
that, in order to constitute a "core" determination on a claim, the proceeding must in-
volve the question of allowance or disallowance of the claim and not merely the existence
of the right to payment under state law. See Christensen v. Tucson Estates, Inc. (In re
Tucson Estates, Inc.), 912 F.2d 1162, 1168 (9th Cir. 1990).
Expressly excepted from this definition of "core," however, are proceedings for "the
liquidation or estimation of contingent or unliquidated personal injury tort or wrongful
death claims against the estate for purposes of distribution in a case under title 11." 28
U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B) (1988). This exception has been narrowly construed. See, e.g., In
re UNR Industries, Inc., 45 B.R. 322, 326 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (subsection (B) "does not
exclude from the definition of core proceedings estimation of personal injury and wrong-
ful death claims for all purposes, but only 'for purposes of distribution.' Estimation of
such claims for other purposes, such as 'confirming a plan'... apparently remains a core
proceeding for the bankruptcy judge.").
80. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C) (1988) (including within definition of "core proceed-
ings" those "counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims against the estate");
see also infra note 526 (discussing division among courts in interpreting breadth of this
provision).
81. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(E) (1988) (defining "core proceedings" as including
"orders to turn over property of the estate"). Courts differ as to whether actions by a
trustee or debtor-in-possession to enforce disputed obligations are "core" proceedings or
not, such as an action to collect on an account owed to the debtor, although these actions
are framed as proceedings to turn over property of the estate. Compare Craig v. McCarty
Ranch Trust (In re Cassidy Land & Cattle Co.), 836 F.2d 1130, 1132-33 (8th Cir. 1988)
(proceeding to foreclose on note secured by mortgage, constituting sole asset of estate,
was "core" proceeding because proceeding amounted to action to turn over matured debt
that was property of estate), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 1033 (1988) with F&L Plumbing &
Heating Co. v. New York University (In re F&L Plumbing & Heating Co.), 114 B.R.
370, 376-77 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (proceeding merely "related to" the debtor's bankruptcy
case) and Howison v. Country Hills Assocs. (In re W.G.M.C., Inc.), 96 B.R. 5, 6 (Bankr.
D. Me. 1989) (same); see also I Collier on Bankruptcy § 3.01[2][b][iv], at 3-51 (Lawrence
P. King ed., 15th ed. 1993) ("[A]ctions to collect pre-petition accounts receivable are
straightforward Marathon-type contract actions, and are thus not core proceedings.");
but see Galucci v. Grant (In re Galucci), 931 F.2d 738, 744 (11th Cir. 1991) (trustee's
action for turnover of property which had never belonged to debtor but which third party
had quitelaimed to trustee to compromise trustee's concededly baseless claim against him
was non-core, unrelated matter over which no bankruptcy jurisdiction existed).
82. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(K) (11 th Cir. 1988) (defining "core proceedings" as
including "determinations of the validity, extent, or priority of liens").
83. See, e.g., In re Memorial Estates, Inc., 950 F.2d 1364, 1369-70 (7th Cir. 1991)
(order sanctioning attorney and client under bankruptcy equivalent of Rule 11 is "core
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tion operation of the estate. 4
"Related to" jurisdiction is the broadest of the three types granted by
28 U.S.C. § 1334(b), 5 yet appellate courts disagree as to the breadth of
the test for determining whether a proceeding is "related to" the bank-
ruptcy case. The First, 6 Second,8 7 Third,88 Seventh, 9 and Tenth90 Cir-
proceeding," even though sanctions relate to actions in hearing on proceeding as to which
bankruptcy court enjoyed only "related to" jurisdiction and even though bankruptcy case
had already been dismissed), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct 2969 (1992); Mountain Am. Credit
Union v. Skinner (In re Skinner), 917 F.2d 444, 448 (10th Cir. 1990) (civil contempt
proceedings arising out of core matters are themselves core matters); Budget Serv. Co. v.
Better Homes of Virginia, Inc., 804 F.2d 289, 292 (4th Cir. 1986) (sanction of punitive
damages for violation of automatic stay under § 362(h) is core proceeding); TCL Inves-
tors v. Brookside Sav. & Loan Ass'n (In re TCL Investors), 775 F.2d 1516, 1517 (11th
Cir. 1985) (proceeding by purchaser of property of estate to compel debtor to comply
with sale agreement that had been approved and authorized by bankruptcy court held
"core"); but see Gower v. Farmers Home Administration (In re Davis), 899 F.2d 1136,
1138-40 (1990) (trustee's request for attorney's fees under the EAJA not a "core" pro-
ceeding); I.R.S. v. Brickell Inv. Corp. (In re Brickell Inv. Corp.), 922 F.2d 696, 701 (1Ith
Cir. 1991) (debtor's motion to assess costs and attorney's fees against IRS pursuant to 26
U.S.C. § 7430 is not "core," even if action arises out of core proceeding to determine
debtor's tax liability); Plastiras v. Idell (In re Sequoia Auto Brokers, Ltd.), 827 F.2d
1281, 1289 (9th Cir. 1987) (civil contempt action not core even if it arises out of core
proceeding).
84. The Eleventh, Second, and First Circuits expansively define "core" jurisdiction to
exist whenever the state law claim arises out of a contract entered into after the petition
has been filed. See, e.g., Olympia & York Fla. Equity Corp. v. Bank of N.Y. (In re
Holywell Corp.), 913 F.2d 873, 881 (11th Cir. 1990) ("[T]his is a 'core proceeding' under
28 U.S.C. § 157(b), as it is a 'matter concerning the administration of the estate.' ") (cit-
ing 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A) (1988)); In re Ben Cooper, 896 F.2d 1394, 1400 (2d Cir.),
vacated and remanded, 111 S. Ct. 425 (1990) (holding that bankruptcy court has core
jurisdiction over state law contract claims when contract was entered into post-petition,
as adjudication of such claims is essential part of administering estate), reinstated, 924
F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1991), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 2041 (1992); Arnold Print Works, Inc. v.
Apkin (In re Arnold Print Works, Inc.), 815 F.2d 165, 166 (Ist Cir. 1987) (action by
debtor-in-possession to collect account receivable arising out of a post-petition contract is
"'core proceeding"); but see Wood v. Wood (In re Wood) 825 F.2d 90, 97 (5th Cir. 1987)
(cause of action under state law is not core although it arose out of post-petition dispute).
85. See, e.g., Michigan Employment Sec. Comm'n v. Wolverine Radio Co. (In re
Wolverine Radio Co.), 930 F.2d 1132, 1141 (6th Cir. 1991) ("related to" jurisdiction is
broadest grant of bankruptcy jurisdiction); In re Wood, 825 F.2d at 93 (same); F.D.I.C. v.
Majestic Energy Corp. (In re Majestic Oil Corp.), 835 F.2d 87, 90 (5th Cir. 1988) (same).
86. See In re G.S.F. Corp., 938 F.2d 1467, 1475 (1st Cir. 1991) (adopting narrow
standard of "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction); Austin v. Unarco Indus., Inc., 705
F.2d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 1983) (implying that it would narrowly construe "related to" juris-
diction over non-debtor third parties), cert dismissed, 463 U.S. 1247 (1983).
87. See Turner v. Ermiger (In re Turner), 724 F.2d 338, 341 (2d Cir. 1983) (requiring
"significant connection" to debtor's bankruptcy).
88. See Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir. 1984) (initially defining
"related to" jurisdiction as existing over bankruptcy proceeding if "the outcome of that
proceeding could conceivably have any effect on the estate being administered in bank-
ruptcy" and later qualifying this standard by stating that "related to" jurisdiction exists
"if the outcome [of the proceeding] could alter the debtor's rights, liabilities, options, or
freedom of action (either positively or negatively) and which in any way impacts upon the
handling and administration of the bankrupt estate") (emphasis deleted).
89. See Elscint, Inc. v. First Wis. Fin. Corp. (In re Xonics, Inc.), 813 F.2d 127, 131
(7th Cir. 1987) (holding that "related to" jurisdiction encompasses only disputes that
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cuits limit "related to" jurisdiction to those proceedings having a direct
legal effect upon administration of the bankruptcy estate. 91 Alterna-
tively, the Fifth,92 Sixth,93 Ninth,94 and Eleventh95 Circuits have adopted
affect the payments to the bankrupt's other creditors or the administration of the bank-
rupt's estate; it exists only when the outcome of the proceeding "affects the amount of
property available for distribution or the allocation of property among creditors"); see
also Home Ins. Co. v. Cooper & Cooper, Ltd., 889 F.2d 746, 749 (7th Cir. 1989) ("Over-
lap between the bankrupt's affairs and another dispute is insufficient unless its resolution
also affects the bankrupt's estate or the allocation of its assets among creditors. Although
the [proceeding at issue on appeal] has a nexus with the bankruptcy-in the sense that it
would be convenient, and promote consistency, to resolve all questions concerning the[insurance] policy at one go-it does not necessarily have a financial effect on the estate
(or the apportionment among its creditors).").
90. See Gardner v. United States (In re Gardner), 913 F.2d 1515, 1518 (10th Cir.
1990) (holding that "bankruptcy court lacks related jurisdiction to resolve controversies
between third party creditors which do not involve the debtor or his property unless the
court cannot complete administrative duties without resolving the controversy") (citation
omitted).
91. Some courts have expanded upon the statement that bankruptcy jurisdiction ex-
ists where the proceeding would affect the administration of the estate, to conclude that
"related to" jurisdiction exists where the proceeding would "affect the estate." See, e.g.,
Otero Mills, Inc. v. Security Bank & Trust (In re Otero Mills, Inc.), 21 B.R. 777, 778(Bankr. D. N.M.) (test for "related to" jurisdiction is whether "failure to enjoin would
affect the bankruptcy estate"), afl'd, 25 B.R. 1018 (D. N.M. 1982); In re Sondra, Inc., 44
B.R. 205, 207 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984) (same); Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp. v. Wechter(In re General Oil Distribs., Inc.), 21 B.R. 888, 892 n.13 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982) (same).
The latter standard is clearly much broader than the former, and possibly exceeds the
statutory mandates of 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). See, e.g., Holland Indus., Inc. v. United
States (In re Holland Indus., Inc.), 103 B.R. 461, 466 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("The
desires of every Chapter 11 debtor are affected by a myriad of external indirect effects
created by the circumstances in which it operates. Whether they arise from the ebbs and
flows of commerce, the effects of governmental action or the acts of third parties with
respect to property of non-debtors, their impact on a debtor's attempt to reorganize does
not afford the bankruptcy courts with jurisdiction to determine the dispute merely be-
cause of that impact."); see also Howard C. Buschman III & Sean P. Madden, The Power
and Propriety of Bankruptcy Court Intervention in Actions Between Nondebtors, 47 Bus.
Law. 913, 944 (1992) ("Otero Mills and its progeny, for example, would conclude thatjurisdiction exists over actions that merely could 'pressure' the debtor. Any number of
actions, however, may have the effect of pressuring or distracting the individuals that
manage the debtor. Consequently, courts should require debtors to make a strong show-
ing that the effect upon the estate from such actions is potentially devastating.").
92. See e.g., Wood v. Wood (In re Wood), 825 F.2d 90, 93 (5th Cir. 1987) (determin-
ing that "related to" jurisdiction turns on "'whether the outcome of that proceeding
could conceivably have any effect on the estate being administered in bankruptcy' ") (ci-
tation omitted).
93. Compare In re Salem Mortgage Co., 783 F.2d 626, 634-35 (6th Cir. 1986) (criti-
cizing Pacor test as too strict in that it may be read to limit "related to" jurisdiction to
circumstances in which debtor would be bound by res judicata or collateral estoppel) with
Robinson v. Michigan Consol. Gas Co., 918 F.2d 579, 583-84 (6th Cir. 1990) (embracing
Pacor, without rejecting standard articulated in Salem Mortgage, because it read Pacor as
adopting a more liberal test than the Salem Mortgage court thought Pacor had done); see
also Michigan Employment Sec. Comm'n v. Wolverine Radio Co. (In re Wolverine Ra-
dio Co.), 930 F.2d 1132, 1143 (6th Cir. 1991) (distinguishing Pacor on grounds that Wol-
verine was contractually obligated to indemnify non-debtor third party, whereas in Pacor
Manville would not have been automatically liable).
94. See American Hardwoods, Inc. v. Deutsche Credit Corp. (In re American Hard-
[Vol. 62
BANKRUPTCY JURISDICTION
a broader standard of "related to" jurisdiction9 6 -a standard that re-
quires only "that the activity have some conceivable impact on the bank-
ruptcy reorganization or estate"9 7 and does not require that this impact
be either direct or legal.98
"Related to .... arising under," and "arising in" jurisdiction are three
distinct bases for bankruptcy jurisdiction. These jurisdictional bases
overlap and are not mutually exclusive. 99 If any one test is satisfied,
bankruptcy jurisdiction exists.
2. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
The jurisdictional provisions enacted in 1984 are substantially identi-
cal with those of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, differing only as to
woods, Inc.), 885 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1989) (adopting Pacor's "any conceivable ef-
fect" language without Pacor's subsequent reference to alteration of debtor's options or to
impact upon administration of bankruptcy estate); In re Fietz, 852 F.2d 455, 457 (9th
Cir. 1988) (same).
95. See Miller v. Kemira, Inc. (In re Lemco Gypsum, Inc.), 910 F.2d 784, 788 & n.19
(1 1th Cir. 1990) (adopting Pacor court's "conceivable effect" standard as definitive of
"related to" jurisdiction without reference to qualifying language that appears in next
sentence of Pacor).
96. See also 1 Collier on Bankruptcy § 3.01[1][c][iv] (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed.
1993) (noting that some courts interpret the "related to" standard as "whether the out-
come of the proceeding could conceivably have any effect on the bankruptcy estate").
97. Cardinal Indus., Inc. v. Buckeye Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n (In re Cardinal Indus.,
Inc.), 109 B.R. 743, 746 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989) (citation omitted).
98. See Buschman & Madden, supra note 91, at 946-47 (criticizing "some courts'
virtually limitless standards for defining the scope of the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction"
as creating "potential for abuse"). Buschman and Madden argue that "related to" juris-
diction should be determined to exist only when the proceeding could:
(1) increase or decrease the debtor's liabilities or distributable assets, (2) impair
the integrity of the automatic stay, (3) affect the debtor's options or freedom of
action (eg., through the effect of collateral estoppel), or (4) interfere with the
bankruptcy court's 'handling and administration of the estate.' This latter fac-
tor includes substantial threats to estate administration posed by diverting the
debtor's principals from reorganization efforts and can justify only limited in-
junctive relief, carefully tailored to account for both the perceived threat to the
estate and the court's jurisdictional limitations. Issuing an injunction or exer-
cising related jurisdiction simply to enhance or preserve the value of an estate
asset is an illegitimate exercise of the bankruptcy court's power.
Id. at 947. For an example of a case in which bankruptcy jurisdiction was held to permit
the injunction of non-debtor third parties from taking actions to control property of es-
tate in violation of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3), see Old Orchard Inv. Co. v. A.D.I. Distrib.,
Inc. (In re Old Orchard Inv. Co.), 31 B.R. 599, 602-03 (W.D. Mich. 1983). For broader
examples of bankruptcy jurisdiction to enjoin third party nondebtors, see Menard-San-
ford v. Mabey (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 880 F.2d 694, 701-02 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 110
S. Ct. 376 (1989) (explaining that bankruptcy jurisdiction exists to approve plan of reor-
ganization permanently enjoining nondebtors from bringing actions against debtor's in-
surers as a part of settlement between debtor and insurers by which insurers agreed to
contribute fund for distribution to debtor's tort claimants); MacArthur Co. v. Johns-
Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 837 F.2d 89, 94 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 109
S. Ct. 176 (1988) (same).
99. See H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong. Ist Sess. 445 (1977) ("[B]ecause title 11, the
bankruptcy code, only applies once a bankruptcy case is commenced, any proceeding
arising under title 11 will be in some way 'related to' a case under title I I.").
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the scope of bankruptcy jurisdiction that the non-Article III bankruptcy
courts can exercise." With the enactment of the jurisdictional provi-
sions of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, Congress hoped to create a single
forum for the resolution of all matters and proceedings related to a bank-
ruptcy case, and to avoid the endless jurisdictional disputes that had
characterized litigation under the former Bankruptcy Act.10
100. See infra notes 397-415 and accompanying text. Former 28 U.S.C. § 1471, which
governed bankruptcy jurisdiction until the Supreme Court held in Northern Pipeline
Constr. Co., v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982), that its broad delegation
of jurisdiction to non-Article III bankruptcy courts violated Article III of the Constitu-
tion, defined bankruptcy jurisdiction as follows:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the district courts shall
have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under title 11.
(b) Notwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers exclusive jurisdiction on
a court or courts other than the district courts, the district courts shall have
original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title
11 or arising in or related to cases under title 11.
(c) The bankruptcy court for the district in which a case under title 11 is com-
menced shall exercise all of the jurisdiction conferred by this section on the
district courts.
(d) Subsection (b) or (c) of this section does not prevent a district court or a
bankruptcy court, in the interest of justice, from abstaining from hearing a par-
ticular proceeding arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under
title 11. Such abstention, or a decision not to abstain, is not reviewable by ap-
peal or otherwise.
(e) The bankruptcy court in which a case under title 11 is commenced shall
have exclusive jurisdiction of all of the property, wherever located, of the
debtor, as of the commencement of such case.
28 U.S.C. § 1471 (repealed).
101. For a discussion of this legislative history, see infra notes 496-503 and accompa-
nying text. Prior to enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act in 1978, parties often
squandered scarce estate assets litigating jurisdictional issues because the Bankruptcy Act
of 1898 divided bankruptcy jurisdiction among state and federal courts.
Section 2a of the former Act broadly granted district courts "with such jurisdiction at
law and in equity as will enable them to exercise original jurisdiction in proceedings
under this Act." 1898 Act, § 2a. The Act appeared to limit this broad grant of federal
bankruptcy jurisdiction by listing specific proceedings over which this jurisdiction ex-
isted. See id. Some of these enumerated proceedings were narrow, while others were
broad. The broadest permitted district courts to "[clause the estates of bankrupts to be
collected, reduced to money, and distributed, and determine controversies in relation
thereto, except as herein otherwise provided." Id. § 2a(7). The proviso in this section
referred to § 23 of the 1898 Act, which severely qualified this broad grant of bankruptcy
jurisdiction to district courts. It limited the plenary jurisdiction that they could exercise
by providing in the clause governing the district courts that generally, absent the consent
of the defendant, "suits by the receiver and the trustee shall be brought or prosecuted
only in the courts where the bankrupt might have brought or prosecuted them if proceed-
ings under this Act had not been instituted." Id. § 23. This section was amended to
permit plenary suits under §§ 67e, 60b, and 70e to be brought in district courts without
regard to the defendant's consent or other ground for federal jurisdiction. See Williams
v. Austrian, 331 U.S. 642, 649 (1947). This provision, even as amended, severely limited
the plenary bankruptcy jurisdiction that district courts could exercise, and, except in the
context of a Chapter X reorganization, directed most of these suits to the state courts.
See id.
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B. Supplemental Jurisdiction
Supplemental jurisdiction is the phrase currently used to describe the
doctrines of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction."0 2 These doctrines are
relied upon by federal courts, for reasons of federalism, judicial economy
and fairness, to adjudicate jurisdictionally insufficient state law claims
related to claims over which federal jurisdiction exists.
1. Ancillary Jurisdiction
Ancillary jurisdiction finds its origins in the notion that, once property
comes within the jurisdiction of a court of equity, the court has jurisdic-
tion to resolve all claims related to the property. "Under the doctrine of
ancillary jurisdiction, defendants, intervenors as of right and, under cer-
tain limited circumstances, plaintiffs [are] allowed to assert related claims
in an ongoing lawsuit, even though no independent basis for federal sub-
ject matter jurisdiction existed as to these claims."'0 3 Early Supreme
Court decisions limited the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction to instances
in which the federal court was in possession of property.0'4 Ancillary
jurisdiction has since been expanded to apply to compulsory counter-
claims,105 cross-claims, claims against additional parties joined to a com-
102. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (Supp. IV. 1992) (entitled "supplemental jurisdiction"); see
also Richard D. Freer, A Principled Statutory Approach to Supplemental Jurisdiction,
1987 Duke L.J. 34, 34 [hereinafter Freer, Principled Statutory Approach]; Richard D.
Freer, Compounding Confusion and Hampering Diversity: Life After Finley and the Sup-
plemental Jurisdiction Statute, 40 Emory L.J. 445, 447 (1991) [hereinafter Freer, Life
After Finley]; Richard A. Matasar, A Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction Primer The
Scope and Limits of Supplemental Jurisdiction, 17 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 103, 104 (1983)
[hereinafter Matasar, Jurisdiction Primer]; Richard A. Matasar, Rediscovering "One Con-
stitutional Case'" Procedural Rules and the Rejection of the Gibbs Test for Supplemental
Jurisdiction, 71 Cal. L. Rev. 1399, 1401 (1983) [hereinafter Matasar, One Constitutional
Case]; Denis F. McLaughlin, The Federal Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute-A Constitu-
tional and Statutory Analysis, 24 Ariz. St. L.J. 849, 852 (1992); Thomas M. Mengler, The
Demise of Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction, 1990 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 247, 247 n.3; David
D. Siegel, Changes in Federal Jurisdiction and Practice Under the New (Dec. 1. 1990)
Judicial Improvements Act, 133 F.R.D. 61, 61 (1991); Arthur D. Wolf, Codification of
Supplemental Jurisdiction: Anatomy of a Legislative Proposal, 14 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 1,
3 (1992).
103. McLaughlin, supra note 102, at 874.
104. See Fulton Nat'l Bank v. Hozier, 267 U.S. 276, 280 (1925) ("The general rule is
that when a federal court has properly acquired jurisdiction over a cause it may entertain,
by intervention, dependent or ancillary controversies; but no controversy can be regarded
as dependent or ancillary unless it has direct relation to property or assets actually or
constructively drawn into the court's possession or control by the principal suit.") (cita-
tion omitted); Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. 450, 460 (1860) ("[A] bill filed on the equity
side of the court to restrain or regulate judgments or suits at law in the same court, and
thereby prevent injustice, or an inequitable advantage under mesne or final process, is not
an original suit, but ancillary and dependent, supplementary merely to the original suit,
out of which it had arisen, and is maintained without reference to the citizenship or
residence of the parties.").
105. See Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 609-10 (1926) (relying on
Equity Rule 30, a predecessor to Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a), which now governs compulsory
counterclaims).
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pulsory counterclaim or cross-claim, third party impleader claims and
claims by intervenors as of right, 0 6 that arose out of the same transac-
tion as the plaintiff's primary claim.'07 In addition, "transaction" was
defined flexibly to "comprehend a series of many occurrences, depending
not so much upon the immediateness of their connection as upon their
logical relationship."' ' Under this "same transaction" test, the doctrine
of ancillary jurisdiction was broad, applying not only to a defendant's
jurisdictionally deficient claims against the plaintiff (or co-defendants)
but also to jurisdictionally deficient claims against additional parties
joined by a defendant or intervenor of right.10 9
2. Pendent-Claim Jurisdiction
The doctrine of pendent jurisdiction similarly derives from notions of
judicial economy, those peculiar to our federal system. "Under the doc-
trine of pendent-claim jurisdiction, a plaintiff asserting a 'federal law' or
'federal question' claim could join with it a related state law claim against
the same defendant, even though the state law claim was itself jurisdic-
tionally insufficient."'110
The first Supreme Court decision to embrace the doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction, Osborn v. Bank of United States,"' rejected the argument
that the presence of issues of state law destroyed federal question juris-
diction since "[t]here is scarcely any case, every part of which depends on
the constitution, laws or treaties of the United States." 1 2 In Siler v. Lou-
isville & Nashville R.R.,I 3 the Court held that whenever the assertion of
federal question jurisdiction was "colorable" a court had the "right to
decide all the questions in the case, even [where] it decided the Federal
questions adversely to the party raising them, or even if it omitted to
decide them at all, but decided the case on local or state questions
only."", 14
Neither Osborn nor Siler, however, determined the extent to which the
106. See McLaughlin, supra note 102, at 876; see also Owen Equipment & Erection Co.
v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 375 (1978) (stating in dictum "that the exercise of ancillary
jurisdiction over non-federal claims has often been upheld in situations involving im-
pleader, cross-claims or counterclaims").
107. Unlike the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, for purposes of ancillary jurisdiction,
the primary claim can rely on any grant of federal jurisdiction. See infra notes 110-36
and accompanying text (discussing pendent-claim and pendent-party jurisdiction).
108. Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 610 (1926).
109. Cf. Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 714-15 (1973) (acknowledging in
dictum the "well established doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction" permitting defendants tojoin additional parties to ongoing lawsuits pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a), 13(h), and
14(a), despite lack of independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction over additional
parties).
110. McLaughlin, supra note 102, at 868-69.
111. See 22 U.S. 738 (1824) (Marshall, C.J.); see also infra notes 280-334 and accompa-
nying text (discussing Osborn in greater detail).
112. Osborn, 22 U.S. at 820.
113. 213 U.S. 175 (1909).
114. Id. at 191.
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state and federal claims were required to be related. Initially, the
Supreme Court adopted a "single cause of action" test,"' but in United
Mine Workers v. Gibbs" 6 the Court rejected this "unnecessarily grudg-
ing" standard in favor of a three-part test for pendent-claim jurisdic-
tion. 117 It held that
[p]endent jurisdiction, in the sense of judicial power, exists whenever
there is a claim "arising under [the] Constitution, the Laws of the
United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
Authority .. . " and the relationship between that claim and the state
claim permits the conclusion that the entire action before the court
comprises but one constitutional "case." The federal claim must have
substance sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court.
The state and federal claims must derive from a common nucleus of
operative fact. But if, considered without regard to their federal or
state character, a plaintiff's claims are such that he will ordinarily be
expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding, then, assuming sub-
stantiality of the federal issues, their is power in federal courts to hear
the whole."1
8
3. Pendent-Party or Ancillary Jurisdiction for Claims by Plaintiffs
In a trilogy of opinions, the Supreme Court declined to find that plain-
tiffs were authorized to join jurisdictionally deficient parties under either
the doctrines of ancillary or pendent jurisdiction." 9
115. See Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, 242-45 (1933).
116. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
117. See id at 725-27.
118. Id at 725 (alterations in original) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). Ac-
cording to Denis F. McLaughlin:
The first requirement of Gibbs, that the federal law claims be of sufficient sub-
stance to confer subject matter jurisdiction, is the same jurisdictional require-
ment that applies generally to all federal question claims. The substantiality
doctrine requires that the federal court dismiss a federal law claim for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction if the claim is "obviously without merit or if 'previ-
ous decisions of this court... foreclose the subject or leave no room for the
inference that the question sought to be raised can be the subject of controversy
.... '" The second requirement of Gibbs, that the federal law claims and state
law claims "derive from a common nucleus of operative fact," is the heart of the
Gibbs test ....
. [C]ourts have generally held that the "common nucleus of operative fact"
test is satisfied if the federal and state law claims bear a "loose factual connec-
tion" to one another. The final requirement of Gibbs is that the plaintiff's fed-
eral and state law claims "are such that [the plaintiff] would ordinarily be
expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding."... Although some com-
mentators have viewed this final requirement as an independent test linked to
the rules of res judicata, most courts tend to treat this requirement as a restate-
ment of the "common nucleus of operative fact" test.
McLaughlin, supra note 102, at 871-73 (citations omitted).
119. See Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989); Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v.
Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978); Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
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In Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger,120 the Court rejected a
plaintiff's attempt to assert a claim against a non-diverse third-party de-
fendant. Although the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction clearly would
permit the defendant to implead a third-party defendant whose residence
is not diverse from that of the plaintiff and defendant,1 21 the Court de-
clined to extend this doctrine to permit a similar joinder by the plaintiff,
reasoning that the statute rather than the Constitution prohibited the ex-
tension. The Court concluded that the diversity jurisdiction provision,
28 U.S.C. § 1332, requires complete diversity between the parties and
that the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction should not permit a plaintiff to
evade the requirement "by the simple expedient of suing only those de-
fendants who were of diverse citizenship and waiting for them to implead
non-diverse defendants."' 122
In Aldinger v. Howard,123 the Court rejected a similar request to ex-
tend the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction to permit a plaintiff to assert
non-federal claims against a party as to whom federal jurisdiction did not
otherwise exist, again concluding, for statutory rather than constitutional
reasons, that the doctrine should not be extended. In this case, the plain-
tiff brought a § 1983 civil rights action 24 against several individual de-
fendants. Despite having no right to bring a federal civil rights action
against a municipal corporation, 25 the plaintiff sought to join a related
state law claim against the County of Alameda. The Court noted that
the federal question jurisdiction'26 derived from 42 U.S.C. § 1983(b), and
that § 1983 prohibited direct suit against the County. As a result, it con-
cluded that the plaintiff should not be able "indirectly" to reach the same
result through the use of the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. Yet, the
Court expressly limited its holding to the peculiar facts of the case, not-
ing that "[o]ther statutory grants and other alignments of parties and
claims might call for a different result."' 27 The Court noted, for example,
that a grant of exclusive federal subject matter jurisdiction, "as in the
prosecution of tort claims against the United States under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346,"' 128 might produce a different result because claims related to the
grant of exclusive jurisdiction must either be tried together in a federal
court or divided between the state and federal courts.129
Despite this invitation to find pendent-party jurisdiction in certain cir-
120. 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
121. See supra notes 103-09 and accompanying text.
122. Owen Equip., 437 U.S. at 374.
123. 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
124. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) (Civil Rights Act of 1871).
125. At the time Aldinger was decided, municipal entities such as the County of Ala-
meda were not viewed as "persons" for purposes of the Civil Rights Act. See Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187-91 (1961). This precedent was overruled, two years after Aid-
inger, by Monell v. Dep't of Social Sers., 436 U.S. 658, 690-95 (1978).
126. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
127. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 18 (1976).
128. Id.
129. See McLaughlin, supra note 102, at 863-64.
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cumstances, which many courts of appeals accepted after Aldinger by
permitting the joinder of jurisdictionally deficient parties, 30 the Supreme
Court in Finley v. United States' 31 held that an assertion of pendent-
party jurisdiction is inappropriate absent express congressional authori-
zation. In Finley, the plaintiff filed a complaint under the Federal Torts
Claims Act, claiming that the Federal Aviation Administration had been
negligent in its "operation and maintenance of the runway lights and
performance of air traffic control functions."1 32 The complaint under the
FTCA was later amended to include state law negligence claims against
the city of San Diego and the San Diego Gas and Electric Company.
133
There existed no independent basis for federal jurisdiction as to the
claims added with the amendment. The Court declined to extend Gibbs
to permit the assertion of pendent-party jurisdiction absent explicit con-
gressional direction.' 34 The Court noted that the FTCA permits the fed-
eral government to be sued only in a federal court. Further, the court
acknowledged that its holding that private parties to claims related to a
claim under the FTCA could not be joined to the federal action absent an
independent basis for federal jurisdiction "means that the efficiency and
convenience of a consolidated action will sometimes have to be foregone
in favor of separate actions in state and federal courts."'135 Nonetheless,
the Court found this hardship and circuity "of no consequence since
'neither the convenience of the litigants nor considerations of judicial
economy can suffice to justify extension of the doctrine[s] of ancillary
[and pendent] jurisdiction.' "136
4. The Judicial Improvements Act of 1990
With its enactment of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Con-
gress fulfilled the directive in Finley that Congress expressly permit an
assertion of pendent-party jurisdiction and, more generally, codified the
judicially-created doctrines of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction, which
together it referred to as "supplemental jurisdiction." Section 1367(a)
provides for "supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so
related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they
form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United
States Constitution."'' 37 In neither the statute nor its legislative history
does Congress attempt to define the constitutional limits of this grant of
130. See Wendy C. Perdue, Finley v. United States: Unstringing Pendent Jurisdiction,
76 U. Va. L. Rev. 539, 550 nn.76-77 (1990) (citing circuit decisions construing Aldinger,
all but the Ninth Circuit permit pendent-party jurisdiction in some form); see also Mc-
Laughlin, supra note 102, at 884 (same).
131. 490 U.S. 545 (1989).
132. Id at 546.
133. Id
134. See id at 549-51.
135. Id. at 555.
136. Id at 552.
137. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (Supp. IV. 1992).
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supplemental jurisdiction-a task that Congress felt the courts were bet-
ter able to fulfill. The legislative history indicates that Congress' refer-
ence in § 1367(a) to the constitutional limits of the doctrine was intended
to codify "the scope of supplemental jurisdiction first articulated by the
Supreme Court in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs." 3'
II. THE EXERCISE OF SUPPLEMENTAL BANKRUPTCY JURISDICTION
UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
Although 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) limits bankruptcy jurisdiction to pro-
ceedings "arising under title 11, or arising in or related to cases under
title 11,,' 13 numerous courts have found that they also have jurisdiction
either ancillary, pendent, or, since enactment of the Judicial Improve-
ments Act, supplemental to this grant of bankruptcy jurisdiction. 140
A. A Review of the Case Law Supporting Supplemental
Bankruptcy Jurisdiction
1. Courts of Appeals
In Publicker Industries v. United States (In re Cuyahoga Equip.
Corp.), 41 the Second Circuit held that a federal district court1 42 had ju-
risdiction supplemental to its bankruptcy jurisdiction. The court was
therefore able to approve an agreement dividing among several claim-
ants14 3 the proceeds received in a sale of real property by the consoli-
dated chapter 11 estate and agreeing to hold harmless a lender" from
138. H.R. Rep. No. 734, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. at 28-29 & n.15 (1990); see supra notes
116-18 and accompanying text (discussing Gibbs's three-part test).
139. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). The bankruptcy jurisdictional pro-
vision enacted in 1978 under 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b) contained a nearly identical grant of
bankruptcy jurisdiction. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
140. See infra part II.A (discussing this case law in detail).
141. 980 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1992).
142. Cuyahoga addresses the bankruptcy jurisdiction of the district court because, in
that case, the district court had withdrawn the reference of the proceeding from the bank-
ruptcy court. See id. at 113; see also 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) (1988) (permitting district court
to withdraw reference "for cause").
143. These claimants included: the United States on behalf of the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, the debtor's lender, Freedom Savings & Loan Association, the Penn-
sylvania Department of Environmental Resources, the National Oceanographic and
Atmospheric Administration, the Department of the Interior, and the trustee in bank-
ruptcy. See Cuyahoga, 980 F.2d at 112-13. The basis for these claims differed. The EPA
had claimed an entitlement to the proceeds of the sale under CERCLA § 9607(a)(2) and
11 U.S.C. § 506(c). See id. Freedom Savings' claim to the proceeds of the sale followed
from its mortgage against the real property and security interest in the personal property
sold in the debtors' bankruptcy case. See id. at 113. The PDEP's claim related to costs it
incurred by cleaning up the site. See id. The claim of the Department of Interior and the
National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration arose out of liability for natu-
ral resource damage. See id. NOAA and the Interior also agreed to release Freedom
Savings from liabilities under these laws. See id. The trustee claimed a portion of the
proceeds of the sale pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(c). See id.
144. In the settlement agreement, the EPA, the Department of the Interior, the Na-
tional Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration, and the Pennsylvania Depart-
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further environmental liability related to the property. The debtor's
predecessor in ownership appealed from the order approving the settle-
ment on the grounds that the district court did not have subject matter
jurisdiction, and that the terms of the settlement were neither fair nor
reasonable. 4 s
The Second Circuit stated that the district court had "related to" juris-
diction over the respective claims of the EPA, the debtors' lender, and
the bankruptcy trustee to the proceeds of the sale. '6 It then stated that
the environmental claims asserted against the debtors and their lender
were supplemental to these "related to" proceedings.' 47 The court had
ment of Environmental Protection agreed to release not only Freedom Savings from
further environmental liability related to the site, but also Freedoms Savings' receiver and
its related federal banking regulatory agencies. See i
145. As a practical matter, Publicker objected to the settlement because it was left as
the only remaining responsible party for clean-up costs. See id. at 118.
146. See id at 114. The court of appeals stated that the district court had "related to"
jurisdiction, but the implication of its decision was that the district court had "arising in"
jurisdiction over the settlement agreement. See id Although the court did not explicitly
assert that these proceedings arose under title 11 or arose in a title I 1 case, the court did
state that "[b]eyond merely having any 'conceivable effect,' or 'any significant connection'
with the bankrupt estate-either of which would establish § 1334(b) jurisdiction-these
claims bring into question the very distribution of the estate's property and its allocation
between a party asserting the status of constructive trustee and a first priority secured
creditor." Id (citations omitted). Moreover, the court cited In re Parque Forestal, Inc.,
949 F.2d 504, 510 (Ist Cir. 1991), in support of its conclusion that there existed "related
to" jurisdiction over the claims against the sale proceeds. See Cuyahoga, 980 F.2d at 114.
But the court in Parque Forestal held that an action to enforce 11 U.S.C. § 506(c) "arises
under" title 11, leaving undecided the difficult question of whether a state law estoppel
claim would constitute a "core proceeding." 949 F.2d at 510.
The court's holding in Cuyahoga that these claims were "related to" proceedings is not
technically wrong, however, in that "related to" jurisdiction is broader than "arising
under" or "arising in" jurisdiction; any proceeding "arising under" title 11 or "arising
in" a title 11 case usually is also "related to" the title I 1 case. See supra note 99 and
accompanying text. In addition, the distinction between these grants of jurisdiction may
have seemed to be only of academic interest to the court of appeals, since courts have
referred to the differences among the several grants of bankruptcy jurisdiction as relevant
only when a non-Article III bankruptcy court is asserting subject matter jurisdiction over
the proceeding. Here, the Article III district court had withdrawn the reference and
entered the order approving the settlement agreement as an exercise of its original juris-
diction. But where a district court is also asserting supplemental bankruptcy jurisdiction
over claims related to the proceeding, the propriety of this assertion may well depend
upon whether the supplemental jurisdiction is related to an "arising under" or "arising
in" proceeding on one hand or related to a "related to" proceeding on the other. See
infra parts III-IV (discussing constitutional, statutory, and policy based arguments relat-
ing to this distinction).
147. See Cuyahoga, 980 F.2d at 115. The court's statement that supplemental bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction existed sufficient to enable the district court to order the release of
liability between non-debtor third parties was dictum, however, in that the court of ap-
peals went on to note that "[t]he district court did not need to rely solely on its supple-
mental jurisdiction to approve the settlement, because additional authority arises from
CERCLA's jurisdictional grant vesting the power in all district courts to approve agree-
ments compromising potential CERCLA claims asserted by the government." Id. See
42 U.S.C. § 9613(b) (1988) ("[T]he United States district courts shall have exclusive orig-
inal jurisdiction over all controversies arising under [CERCLA].").
19941
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62
little difficulty in concluding that 28 U.S.C. § 1367, the supplemental ju-
risdictional provision, applied to proceedings "related to" a title 11 case,
and that there existed a sufficient nexus between the bankruptcy claims
and the environmental claims to support an exercise of supplemental
jurisdiction. 14
2. District Courts
A recent district court decision, Wieboldt Stores, Inc. v. Schotten-
stein,149 found ancillary jurisdiction over a third-party complaint brought
by the defendants in a fraudulent transfer suit which had been com-
menced by the trustee in bankruptcy. 5 ° In Wiebolt, the court stated that
it need not determine whether the claims against the third-party defend-
ants were "related to" the debtor's chapter 11 case because the negligent
misrepresentation and breach of contract claims asserted in the third-
party complaint were sufficiently related to the bankruptcy trustee's
fraudulent transfer claims in the primary complaint. The court, how-
ever, did not otherwise address the third-party defendants' contention
that § 1334(b) "provides the sole basis for this court's ancillary jurisdic-
tion and does not confer jurisdiction here."''
3. Bankruptcy Courts
Numerous bankruptcy courts also have found jurisdiction supplemen-
tal to their bankruptcy jurisdiction.1 52
148. See Cuyahoga, 980 F.2d at 115 ("In the case at hand, the environmental causes
form part of the same case with the bankruptcy claims because all of them, resolved in
the settlement agreement, concern the government's attempts to remedy hazardous sub-
stance releases at the Publicker site and they remain intertwined in the competing parties'
efforts to secure a share of the proceeds of the option sale.").
149. 111 B.R. 162, 164 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (district court sat as trial court, rather than as
appellate tribunal). See also 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) (1988) (permitting district court to with-
draw a reference of jurisdiction in non-Article III bankruptcy cases "for cause"); see also
infra note 424 (discussing withdrawal of reference provision).
150. See Wieboldt, 111 B.R. at 164. The fraudulent transfer suit arose out of a lever-
aged-buyout ("LBO") through which WSI Acquisition Corporation acquired Wieboldt
Stores, Inc. See id. For a detailed discussion of the facts of the Wieboldt LBO, see
Wieboldt Stores, Inc. v. Schottenstein, 94 B.R. 488, 493-496 (N.D. Ill. 1988). See also
Laganella v. Braen (In re Braen), Case No. 86-06421 DV, Adv. No. 86-0286, 1991 WL
7701 at *8 (D. N.J., Jan. 23, 1991) (upholding dismissal of counterclaim and third-party
complaint on grounds that bankruptcy court had not abused discretion in declining to
exercise pendent jurisdiction over these claims: "This Court concurs with Judge
Tuohey's analysis of the lack of factual overlap of the fraudulent conveyance action on
the one hand and [counterclaim and third-party complaint alleging] . . . '[p]laintiffs'
wrongful and malicious actions in the course of obtaining the execution levies.' ").
151. See Wieboldt, 111 B.R. at 166.
152. See, e.g., Official Creditors' Comm. of Prods. Liab. & Personal Injury Claimants
v. International Ins. Co. (In re Pettibone Corp.), 135 B.R. 847, 849-50 (Bankr. N.D. Il1.
1992) (factual connection between cross claims and underlying adversary proceeding in-
sufficient to create supplemental jurisdiction). Whether § 1367-which on its face gov-
erns the supplemental jurisdiction of district courts-should govern the exercise of
supplemental jurisdiction by bankruptcy courts at all is subject to question. See infra
part III.B.4 (discussing statutory construction issues). Moreover, the exercise of supple-
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a. Ancillary Jurisdiction
Several bankruptcy courts have found ancillary bankruptcy jurisdic-
tion. In Hawkins v. Eads (In re Eads),53 the bankruptcy court held, in
the alternative, that it had supplemental jurisdictionII to consider third-
party malpractice actions'55 brought by the non-debtor defendants 56
against their counsel and financial planner because they arose out of the
same "common nucleus of operative facts" as the trustee's avoidance ac-
tion157 against the debtor and non-debtor defendants.' 58 Similarly, in
Jones v. Woody (In re WJ. Services, Inc.), 159 the court found supplemen-
tal jurisdiction over a legal malpractice action brought by former chapter
11 debtors against their former attorneys in state court and removed to
the bankruptcy court." ° The court reasoned that the removed action
arose out of a common nucleus of operative facts with an interim fee
application that had been granted by the bankruptcy court prior to the
dismissal of the debtors' chapter 11 cases.' 61 The bankruptcy court went
mental jurisdiction by a non-Article III bankruptcy court raises distinct constitutional
concerns. See infra part III.A.2 (discussing these constitutional issues).
153. 135 B.R. 387 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1991).
154. The court also found that it had "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction over the
third-party claims because, "the possibility of recovery on the third-party complaint en-
hances the collectability of any judgment against the [non-debtor] defendants." Id. at
393. It went on to note, however, that its assertion of "related to" jurisdiction over
"[indemnity claims between nondebtors, one of whom is indebted to the estate," was a
conclusion as to which courts have disagreed. See id. at 393 n.9 (citing Scott v. Equitable
Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc. (In re German), 97 B.R. 373, 375 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989), to
the contrary); accord Spaulding & Co. v. Buchanan (In re Spaulding & Co.) 131 B.1L 84,
88-89 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (holding that "related to" jurisdiction does not exist over a claim
which has only a remote possibility of effecting the allocation of the estate).
155. The third-party complaint alleged not only malpractice, but also indemnification,
breach of contract and fraud. See Hawkins, 135 B.R. at 391 & n.6.
156. The non-debtor defendants were purchasers of assets from the debtors' chapter 11
estate in a scheme alleged to have been fraudulent. See id. at 390-91.
157. The primary complaint brought by the trustee in bankruptcy against the debtor
and third parties alleged "an age-old fraud-that defendants siphoned a secret profit by
selling property of the bankruptcy estate through a strawman at a fictitiously low price."
Id. at 390 (footnote omitted).
158. The court held that it had "arising under" bankruptcy jurisdiction over the
trustee's avoidance action. See id. at 392 ("proceedings based on causes of action created
by sections 363(n), 549, and 550 'arise under' title 11").
159. 139 B.R. 824 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1992).
160. See id at 826.
161. See id Peculiarly, in WJ. Services, the malpractice action was found to have been
ancillary to the fee application although the malpractice action was not brought as a
counterclaim to the fee application and indeed was not even commenced until after the
fee application had been granted and the chapter I 1 cases dismissed. See id. "As a gen-
eral rule, the dismissal of a bankruptcy case should result in the dismissal of 'related
proceedings' because the court's jurisdiction of the latter depends, in the first instance,
upon the nexus between the underlying bankruptcy case and the related proceedings."
Smith v. Commercial Banking Corp. (In re Smith), 866 F.2d 576, 580 (3d Cir. 1989); see
also, American Hardwoods, Inc. v. Deutsche Credit Corp. (In re American Hardwoods,
Inc.), 885 F.2d 621, 624-27 (9th Cir. 1989) (bankruptcy court lacked power to enjoin
enforcement of guarantee after confirmation of reorganization plan); Tsafaroff v. Taylor
(In re Taylor), 884 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1989) (bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to
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on to conclude, however, that the malpractice action was barred by res
judicata because the fee award implicitly included a finding that malprac-
tice had not occurred. The award was also rendered final by dismissal of
the case.
162
Bankruptcy courts' findings of ancillary jurisdiction have not been lim-
ited to malpractice actions. National Westminster Bancorp N.J. v. ICS
Cybernetics, Inc. (In re ICS Cybernetics, Inc.)16 3 involved compulsory
counterclaims and cross-claims brought in an interpleader action. 164 The
court held that the interpleader action was a core proceeding 6 that
"arose under" title 11 because the action invoked various provisions of
title 11 for a declaration as to whether escrowed proceeds were property
of the estate,1 66 and thus, involved "causes of action created and deter-
mined by Title 1 l's statutory provisions." 167 The court also held that the
lender's compulsory counterclaims and cross-claims, which alleged a per-
fected security interest in the rental proceeds, and, alternatively, entitle-
ment to the proceeds pursuant to a "hell or high water" clause, were
grant request for relief from automatic stay after entry of order dismissing petition);
Cimo v. Petty (In re Petty), 848 F.2d 655 (5th Cir. 1988) (after dismissal of petition,
bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction over motion under § 365(d)(4)). Although three
courts of appeals have held that a bankruptcy court may in its discretion retain jurisdic-
tion over related proceedings after termination of the bankruptcy case, they all held that
jurisdiction was only proper if retention would further judicial economy, would be fair
and convenient to the litigants, and was merited by the degree of difficulty of the related
legal issues involved. See Carraher v. Morgan Elects., Inc. (In re Carraher), 971 F.2d
327, 328 (9th Cir. 1992); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Morris (In re Morris), 950 F.2d 1531,
1535 (1 1th Cir. 1992); Smith v. Commercial Banking Corp. (In re Smith), 866 F.2d 576,
580 (3d Cir. 1989). The court in W.J. Services made no such determination. Moreover,
IVJ. Services ancillary jurisdiction holding would be strange even if the chapter 11 cases
had been pending at the time the malpractice action was brought because the fee applica-
tion and malpractice action were independently commenced causes of action. Under the
W.J. Services test for ancillary jurisdiction, the bankruptcy court would be free to peruse
the entirety of the docket in a given title 11 case in the hopes of finding an action that
involves the same factual nexus. Of course, if a chapter 11 case had not been dismissed,
and possibly even after the dismissal of the case, the malpractice action probably could
have been viewed as "arising in" the title 11 case because but for the debtors' chapter 11
case their attorneys would not have committed malpractice.
162. See In re W.J. Servs., Inc., 139 B.R. at 826-27.
163. 123 B.R. 467 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1989).
164. The debtor-lessor had assigned its interests in the equipment schedules to a
master lease to two separate lenders, both of whom claimed rental proceeds which ac-
crued post-petition. After placing the rental proceeds in escrow, the lessee of the debtor-
equipment lessor brought the interpleader action and named the debtor, the creditors'
committee, and the two lenders as defendants. 123 B.R. at 469-470.
165. The phrase "core proceeding" is a term of art to bankruptcy jurisdiction that
refers to jurisdiction that the non-Article III bankruptcy judge is authorized both to
"hear and determine." See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) (1988) ("Bankruptcy judges may hear
and determine all case under title 11 and all core proceedings arising under title 11, or
arising in a case under title 11, referred under subsection (a) of this section, and may
enter appropriate orders and judgments, subject to review under section 158 of this
title.").
166. The provisions invoked are 11 U.S.C. §§ 362, 541, 542, 544, 547, 548, 549, and
550. See ICS Cybernetics, 123 B.R. at 471.
167. Id. at 471.
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themselves core. 168 The court reasoned that "under the doctrine of ancil-
lary jurisdiction... [these claims were] logically dependent on the origi-
nal complaint."' 169
In Aerni v. Columbus Federal Savings (In re Aerni), "I the court found
that a lender's counterclaim for determination of the non-dis-
chargeability of a debt1 7' and entry of a judgment as to the amount of the
loans was, in the case of the non-dischargeability action, a core proceed-
ing,172 and, in the case of the request for a judgment, a proceeding ancil-
lary173 to the debtor's adversary proceeding for a declaration to
determine the dischargeability of her student loans. In rejecting the
debtor's contention that the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction ought not
apply to adversary proceedings in bankruptcy, the court noted that the
Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure
7014 explicitly leaves this question open.' 74 It concluded that it had an-
cillary jurisdiction on policy grounds:
The absence of ancillary jurisdiction would make it virtually impossi-
ble for bankruptcy courts to implement a modem system of procedural
rules. Absent ancillary jurisdiction, the court could not adjudicate
compulsory counterclaims, cross-claims, third party claims, and other
claims permitted to be asserted under the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, unless each claim independently qualified for adjudication in fed-
eral court. The interest of judicial economy and principles of res
168. See id By calling a proceeding core because it satisfies the test for ancillary juris-
diction, the court seems to mix metaphors. If the court is relying on the doctrine of
ancillary jurisdiction, by definition it admits there exists no statutory grant of original
jurisdiction. If there exists no grant of original jurisdiction, then the proceeding cannot
be a "core proceeding."
169. ka at 472. The court's reference to ancillary jurisdiction seems unnecessary here.
The lender's counterclaims and cross-claims amounted, in effect, to a request for a decla-
ration of the perfection and validity of its security interest, an action which either "arises
under" I 1 U.S.C. § 506, or "arises in" a bankruptcy case as "but for" the case the lender
would not be seeking such a determination. Moreover, the lenders had previously filed
proofs of claim in the case asserting claims substantially similar to those presented by the
counterclaims and cross-claims. See id. at 473 n.4. Litigation involving a proof of claim
also "arises in" a bankruptcy case. See also supra notes 75-84 and accompanying text
(discussing "arising in" jurisdiction in greater detail).
170. 86 B.R. 203 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1988).
171. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(c) (1988) (permitting party in interest to object to discharge
of particular debt on grounds listed therein).
172. The non-dischargeability action was a core proceeding because it "arose under"
11 U.S.C. § 523. SeeAerni, 86 B.R. at 206. Moreover, 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B) and (I)
explicitly refer to proceedings involving the "allowance or disallowance of claims against
the estate" and "determinations as to the dischargeability of particular debts" as core
proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B), (I) (1988).
173. The counterclaim that sought a declaration as to the enforceability of the underly-
ing debt would not have been "related to" the debtor's bankruptcy case if the debt were
non-dischargeable and if the creditor sought to collect the obligation only against prop-
erty that is not property of the estate. Under this limited circumstance, the result of the
declaratory judgment action would have no conceivable effect on the estate. See supra
notes 85-98 (discussing definition of "related to" jurisdiction).
174. See Aerni, 86 B.R. at 207.
19941
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judicata and collateral estoppel mandate that the bankruptcy and dis-
trict courts have ancillary and pendent jurisdiction .... l75
Aerni was decided before the Supreme Court's decision in Finley v.
United States 17 6 and thus did not benefit from the Court's remarks that
hardship and circuity were "of no consequence" to a determination of
the scope of statutory authority to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. 177
According to the Court, " 'neither the convenience of the litigants nor
considerations of judicial economy can suffice to justify extension of the
doctrine[s] of ancillary [and pendent] jurisdiction.' "178 Interests of judi-
cial economy alone are not determinative as to the scope of a federal
court's power to adjudicate otherwise jurisdictionally insufficient state
law claims.
The bankruptcy court in Cook v. United States (In re Earl Roggenbuck
Farms, Inc.)179 found supplemental jurisdiction over both a cross-claim
for tortious misrepresentation brought by the Commodity Credit Corpo-
ration ("CCC") against the debtor's principal shareholder and a counter-
claim which attempted to establish a constructive trust over collateral
used by the debtor's principal shareholder to secure its loan from the
CCC. 18° The court determined that both the cross-claim and counter-
claim involved the same common nucleus of facts as the trustee's avoid-
ance action against the CCC. 8' Furthermore, the court concluded that
it was empowered to exercise ancillary jurisdiction on several grounds. 18 2
First, it noted that in the order of reference 83 the district court referred
"all of its jurisdiction but for that which it explicitly withheld and that
which it may not constitutionally delegate." 84 Since the reference order
did not specifically exclude ancillary jurisdiction, the court concluded
that ancillary jurisdiction had been referred.185 Moreover, the court con-
sidered whether its exercise of ancillary jurisdiction was constitutional.
175. Id.
176. 490 U.S. 545 (1989).
177. Id. at 552.
178. Id. (quoting Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 376-77).
179. 51 B.R. 913 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985).
180. See id. at 925-26.
181. See id.
182. The court's discussion of its authority to exercise ancillary jurisdiction is probably
dicta since it found an independent ground for subject matter jurisdiction:
The district courts of the United States have "exclusive original jurisdiction,
without regard to the amount in controversy, of all suits brought by or against
the Corporation [CCC.. ." 15 U.S.C. § 714(b). Thus the federal district court
for this district clearly has subject matter jurisdiction over the cross-claim. As
stated earlier, the mere delegation of that authority to the bankruptcy court
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(c) is proper, and therefore, the motion to dismiss
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction would have been denied had summaryjudgment not been granted to the plaintiff.
Earl Roggenbuck Farms, 51 B.R. at 926.
183. See id. at 925.
184. Id.
185. See id.
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It opined that 28 U.S.C. § 157(c) "is, in effect, a statutory grant of ancil-
lary jurisdiction,"1"6 which extends to all controversies having "some
reasonable nexus" to the title 11 case.'8  It then asserted that a sufficient
nexus existed between the cross-claim and the bankruptcy case.'
In In re Wood,'" 9 the Alabama Surface Mining Commission filed a
proof of claim for a civil penalty that had been assessed against the vari-
ous coal companies in which the debtor was part owner. The trustee in
bankruptcy objected to the Commission's proof of claim and asserted a
counterclaim to it.'9 0 Partners in the coal companies in which the debtor
was part owner intervened in the trustee's action, seeking a declaration
that the debtor's share of certain partnership tax indebtedness was non-
dischargeable. 9' The bankruptcy court found core jurisdiction over the
Commission's proof of claim and the trustee's objection and counter-
claim. The court also found that the intervenors' actions were not
"core" proceedings,' 92 but were non-core "related to" proceedings be-
cause "the claims of the Intervenors [were] so entertwined [sic] with
those of the Trustee and because the Intervenors propose[d] to use the
collateral fund, when released, to pay a partnership tax indebtedness."' 93
In the alternative, the court held that it had ancillary jurisdiction over
the intervenors' claims because of the factual nexus between those claims
and the trustee's actions. 94 It found support for its assertion of ancillary
jurisdiction in legislative history. The court noted that during congres-
sional debate of the current jurisdictional provisions, Senator Dole gener-
ally expressed doubts as to the constitutionality of a non-Article III court
hearing state law claims, but qualified his remarks as follows:
Ancillary jurisdiction questions are unrelated to this issue. Federal
courts certainly retain authority to adjudicate a State claim arising out
of the same facts giving rise to the Federal claim. 195
186. Ik at 926.
187. See id
188. See id The court's conclusion that there existed a sufficient nexus between the
title 11 case and the cross-claim is confusing because that nexus should have been suffi-
cient to find that the cross-claim constituted a "related to" proceeding, making the dis-
cussion of supplemental jurisdiction irrelevant.
189. 52 B.R. 513 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1985).
190. See id at 514. In this counterclaim, the trustee requested that the bankruptcy
court "order the Commission to discharge the sureties of certain reclamation bonds so
that these sureties will in turn release an escrow fund of approximately S100,000.00
which they hold to secure their obligations under the reclamation bonds." Id. He
claimed that a portion of the escrow constituted property of the estate. See id.
191. See id
192. See id. at 522.
193. Id. Presumably, the court found that the intervenors' actions were "related to"
the debtor's chapter 7 case because their effect upon the debtor's partnership tax indebt-
edness would affect the administration of the estate and possibly distributions from the
estate as well.
194. See id. at 523 ("Because of the partnership context of this dispute, the same aggre-
gate of operative facts serves as the basis of both the claims of the Intervenors and of the
Trustee.").
195. Id. at 524 (quoting Bankruptcy Court Reform Conference Report, 98th Cong. 2d
1994]
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Despite the court's reference in Wood to Senator Dole's remarks, they
were probably not persuasive.1 96 Although such references are not un-
precedented, courts generally have given little credence to remarks made
by a single legislator.1 97
b. Pendent-Party Jurisdiction
Although bankruptcy courts have relied most frequently on the doc-
trine of ancillary jurisdiction to permit defendants to assert jurisdiction-
ally insufficient claims against the plaintiff or third-parties, at times they
also have permitted the plaintiff or defendant to assert jurisdictionally
insufficient claims under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. In Goger v.
Merchants Bank of Atlanta (In re Feifer Industries),19 the bankruptcy
court assumed that it was empowered to exercise supplemental jurisdic-
tion in appropriate circumstances pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.199 In
this case, however, the court declined to exercise pendent-party jurisdic-
tion over the third-party complaint, 2° not because it thought it did not
have the power, but rather because it found that the third-party com-
plaint did not arise out of the same factual nexus as the primary action
which "arose under" title 11. 201
Sess., 130 Cong. Rec. S8887 (June 29, 1984)(statement of Sen. Dole)). Senator Dole,
however was probably referring to pendent, and not ancillary, jurisdiction.
196. Courts of appeals, at times, have relied upon the remarks of individual members
of Congress to determine congressional intent. See, e.g., Citibank, N.A. v. White Motor
Corp. (In re White Motor Corp.), 761 F.2d 270, 271-73 (6th Cir. 1985) (relying on re-
marks of Sen. Dole to support conclusion that Congress impliedly incorporated discre-
tionary abstention provision-29 U.S.C. § 133(c)(l)--as exception to requirement in 28
U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) that "personal injury tort and wrongful death claims [in pending
bankruptcy case] shall be tried in the district court in which the bankruptcy case is pend-
ing, or in the district court in which the claim arose"). Most courts, however, have found
the remarks of individual legislators unhelpful in construing a statute. See infra note 197
(reviewing this case law).
197. See, e.g., Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984); see also Susan Block-
Lieb, Using Legislative History to Interpret Bankruptcy Statutes, in Bankruptcy Practice
and Strategy 2-1, 2.02[6], [7] (A. Resnick ed., 1987).
198. 141 B.R. 450 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1991).
199. See id. at 452. Because resolution of the third-party complaint would have had no
conceivable effect on the administration of the estate, and thus was not "related to" the
chapter 11 case, the court found that bankruptcy jurisdiction did not exist. See id. at 453.
200. See id. In Feifer Industries, the debtor granted Standard Chartered and First
Georgia Bank a joint security interest in substantially all its assets. See id. at 451. The
banks jointly filed a UCC-1 financing statement. Nearly a year later, First Union (First
Georgia's successor in interest) filed a UCC-3 termination statement relating to this
transaction. See id. The debtor's trustee brought a declaratory action in the bankruptcy
court seeking a determination that Standard Chartered's security interest was terminated
by First Union's filing. See id. In response, Standard Chartered not only answered the
trustee's complaint, but also filed a third-party complaint against First Union alleging
that First Union intentionally or negligently terminated the financing statement to its
detriment. See id.
201. See id. at 453. The court stated that
[t]he termination of the financing statement and its affect upon Standard
Chartered's security interest are issues of fact common to the Trustee's adver-
sary proceeding and Standard Chartered's third-party claim. However, the
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By contrast, in Dechert Price & Rhoads v. Direct Satellite Communica-
tions, Inc (In re Direct Satellite Communications, Ina.),"'2 the bank-
ruptcy court exercised pendent-party jurisdiction over a third-party
claim.2"3 After stating that it could "perceive no reason why a bank-
ruptcy court can not exercise pendent jurisdiction and hear non-federal
claims raised in a proceeding before it, in the same fashion as any other
federal court[,]" the court adopted the Gibbs three-part test.20- It first
found that the "substantiality test" was satisfied in this instance because
"the federal claim is a core proceeding over which we unquestionably
have jurisdiction. ' 20 5 It next found that the core proceeding and third-
party action "'derive from a common nucleus of operative fact,' and
[are] of the sort normally triable in the same proceeding as the federal
claim. '2 0 6  The court cited Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure
7014"' in support of this conclusion, although the Advisory Committee
Note to the rule explicitly "does not purport to deal with questions of
jurisdiction." ' 8 Finally, the court concluded that the exercise of its ju-
risdiction over the pendent-party claim would be appropriate in light of
"judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to litigants. ' 209
crux of Standard Chartered's claim is First Union's alleged liability for negli-
gently or intentionally releasing Standard Chartered's security interest. Resolu-
tion of this issue will require consideration of evidence concerning the basis for
First Union's actions, agreements between these parties, and applicable state
law. The bulk of such evidence and applicable state law would not be relevant
to the Trustee's adversary claims.
Id
202. 91 B.R. 5 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988).
203. See id at 6-7. The decision provides no factual discussion. The only indication of
the circumstances of the suit is a reference to the "primary claim in this proceeding [as]
core, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C)." See id. at 6. Title 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C)
provides that "counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims against the estate"
are "core proceedings." 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C) (1988).
204. See Direct Satellite, 91 B.R. at 6.
205. Id. (quoting United Mineworkers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966)).
206. Id at 7 (quoting Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725).
207. See id; Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7014 ("Rule 14 F[ed]. R. Civ. P. applies in adversary
proceedings."); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 14 (prescribing circumstances under which de-
fendant and plaintiff may bring in third party).
208. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7014 Advisory Committee's Note ("This rule does not purport
to deal with questions of jurisdiction. The scope of the jurisdictional grant under 28
U.S.C. § [1334] and whether the doctrines of pendent or ancillary jurisdiction are appli-
cable to adversary proceedings will be determined by the courts.").
209. Direct Satellite, 91 B.R. 5, 7 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (citations omitted). The
court found this exercise of discretion was appropriate because
[tlhe third-party defendants would be compelled to appear as witnesses and
claims against them ... would be an aspect of Decher's [sic] defense irrespective
of whether they are joined as parties to this proceeding. Carpenter would be
here as a party in any event, as he has not moved for dismissal. It appears
grossly unfair to Dechert and to Carpenter to make them engage in litigation in
a different forum which would be identical to that here if they do not wish to do
SO.
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In Petrolia Corp. v. Elam (In re Petrolia Corp.),21 the bankruptcy
court found supplemental jurisdiction over claims brought by the
debtor's principal and the corporation with which the debtor was to have
merged because the debtor's identical causes of action were "related to"
its reorganization case.21 1 In Total Petroleum, Inc. v. Coral Petroleum,
Inc. (In re Coral Petroleum, Inc. ),212 the bankruptcy court held that set-
tlement of claims against the debtor-defendants did not mandate dismis-
sal of the remaining claims against the non-debtor-defendant. 2 '
Although the court held that the claims against the non-debtor-defend-
ant would not "necessarily" affect the administration of the estate or dis-
tributions to creditors, 214 it found pendent-party jurisdiction over the
claims that may have been time-barred if dismissed.21 5 The court went
on to conclude that judicial economy did not require it to retain jurisdic-
tion; it recommended that the reference of this proceeding be withdrawn,
with consideration of the proper venue to be determined after
withdrawal.21 6
B. A Review of the Case Law Rejecting Supplemental
Bankruptcy Jurisdiction
Not all courts that have considered the issue have concluded that sup-
210. 79 B.R. 686 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987).
211. See id. at 692-95. The claims of the debtor's principal and the corporation with
which the debtor was to have merged were probably not "related to" the debtor's chapter
II case because recovery from these nondebtors' suits would not have been property of
the estate, but rather property of the principal and corporation. It is hard to conceive of
any other relationship which these claims might have had upon administration of the
debtor's estate.
212. 62 B.R. 699 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986).
213. See id. at 707-08. In this case, the plaintiff, an oil producer, commenced an action
seeking an injunction against one debtor-defendant from shipping oil to another debtor-
defendant which it had purchased from a third debtor-defendant. See id. at 700. It later
amended its complaint to add a non-debtor-defendant and seek either possession of the
oil or payment for it. See id. The producer then settled its claims against the debtor-
defendants. See id. at 701. Although the plaintiff originally brought the action in federal
court on diversity grounds, the debtor-defendants' chapter 11 filings meant that bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction also existed at least as to the claims against the debtor-defendants. See
id. at 700.
214. See id. at 702-03.
215. See id. at 708. Decided in 1986, the bankruptcy court applied Aldinger v. How-
ard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976), as Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989), had not yet been
decided. See 62 B.R. at 705-07.
216. See id. at 708; see also Berg v. TM Carlton House Partners, Ltd. (In re TM Carl-
ton House Partners, Ltd.), Adv. No. 89-1088S, 1990 WL 179737 at *3 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1990) (declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over "controversy between two
non-debtors which promises to have negligible, if any, impact upon the Debtor[,]"
although acknowledging "the presence of the concept of pendent jurisdiction which al-
lows a federal bankruptcy court to hear non-federal claims raised in a proceeding before
it[ ]"; the court supported this exercise of discretion by noting that it is a court of limited
jurisdiction "confined to adjudication of matters arising under the Bankruptcy Code or
pertaining to the affairs of the debtors").
BANKRUPTCY JURISDICTION
plemental bankruptcy jurisdiction exists. The following cases reject the
exercise of supplemental bankruptcy jurisdiction for a variety of reasons.
In Southtrust Bank of Dothan v. Alpha Steel Co. (In re Alpha Steel
Co.),217 a district court declined to find that the bankruptcy court below
was entitled to exercise either ancillary or pendent jurisdiction over a
creditor's state law counterclaims to another creditor's declaratory ac-
tion filed in the bankruptcy court. Noting that "[j]udicial economy itself
does not justify federal jurisdiction[,]" '218 the court contended in dicta219
that the breadth of the bankruptcy jurisdictional provision limits applica-
tion of the supplemental jurisdiction doctrine to bankruptcy courts.
First, the exercise of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction by bankruptcy
courts could subsume the more restrictive "relate to" and "arising in"jurisdiction, such that the latter would be rendered substantially, if not
entirely, superfluous. Second, to the extent that ancillary and pendentjurisdiction could be viewed as supplementing rather than supplanting
"related to" and "arising in" jurisdiction, a bankruptcy court exercis-
ing the former could hear claims which, in effect, merely relate to
claims which themselves have only a relate-to connection with the pri-
mary case. Finally, the recent Congressional amendments codifying
and merging the doctrines of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction ex-
pressly apply only to district courts. 220
Alpha Steel did not explicitly limit statutory analysis of 28 U.S.C.§ 1334(b) to the power of a non-Article III bankruptcy court to exercise
supplemental bankruptcy jurisdiction, and thus is equally applicable to
Article III district courts. 22 1
In Marine Iron & Shipbuilding Co. v. City of Duluth (In re Marine Iron
& Shipbuilding Co.),222 a district court declined to exercise pendent-party
jurisdiction over a state law breach of contract action brought by the
holder of a right of first refusal granted by the debtor against an alleged
contracting party.223 That the debtor was co-plaintiff in the suit was not
persuasive to the court because the non-debtor's claim was, in practical
effect, the main claim.224 Because this case predated the effective date of
the Judicial Improvements Act, the court turned to Finley v. United
217. 142 B.R. 465 (M.D. Ala. 1992).
218. See id at 470-71 (quoting Matter of Lemco Gypsum, Inc., 910 F.2d 784, 789
(lth Cir. 1990)).
219. The district court specifically stated it "need not address these difficult arguments
because, assuming that bankruptcy courts have the supplemental authority to exercise
ancillary and pendent jurisdiction, the bankruptcy court here still properly refused to
exercise such jurisdiction over [the] two fraud claims." Id. at 471.
220. Id. (citations omitted).
221. The Alpha Steel analysis of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), however, applies only to an asser-
tion of supplemental jurisdiction in a non-Article III bankruptcy court. Id.
222. 104 B.R. 976 (D. Minn. 1989).
223. See id at 988.
224. See id at 986 ("For the purposes of pendent jurisdiction, this is definitely a case of
'the tail wagging the dog.' ").
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States225 as the governing law, noting that the Supreme Court cautioned
district courts that they should "not assume that the full constitutional
power has been congressionally authorized [in the case of pendent-party
jurisdiction], and [should] not read jurisdictional statutes broadly. ' 226
Thus, the Marine Iron court reviewed the bankruptcy jurisdictional pro-
vision and concluded that it neither explicitly nor implicitly suggested
Congress' intent to confer pendent-party jurisdiction in the context of a
bankruptcy case.227
The bankruptcy court in Official Creditors' Committee of Products Lia-
bility & Personal Injury Claimants v. International Insurance Co. (In re
Pettibone Corp.)228 found the factual connection between the cross-claims
and the underlying adversary proceeding insufficient to create supple-
mental jurisdiction.229 Moreover, the court stated in dicta that, "except
to enter a dollar judgment in actions to bar dischargeability, ' 23 0 it
doubted that it had "general ancillary jurisdiction under United Mine
Workers v. Gibbs, and its progeny."'231
In sum, the majority of courts that have addressed the issue have con-
cluded that both district courts and non-Article III bankruptcy courts
are empowered to exercise supplemental bankruptcy jurisdiction. In
these decisions, courts have not addressed the substantial constitutional
issues surrounding the exercise of federal jurisdiction over state law sup-
plemental claims sharing a factual nexus with state law "arising in" or
"related to" proceedings 232 or the distinct constitutional concern raised
by the exercise of such jurisdiction by a non-Article III bankruptcy
court.2 3 3 In addition, very few of these decisions post-date the enactment
of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 and none addresses the language of that statute in
any detail.234 Moreover, much of the language in the case law discussing
the power of a district or bankruptcy court to exercise supplemental
225. 490 U.S. 545 (1989) (first alteration in original).
226. Marine Iron, 104 B.R. at 986 (quoting Finley, 490 U.S. at 549).
227. See Marine Iron, 104 B.R. at 986-87.
228. 135 B.R. 847 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1991).
229. See id. at 852. The adversary proceedings at issue in Pettibone had been brought
by the Official Creditors' Committee of Products Liability and Personal Injury Claim-
ants, claiming that several of the debtor's insurers violated the debtor's confirmed plan of
reorganization by paying $3 million directly to personal injury claimants rather than to
the estate for pro rata distribution to all personal injury claimants pursuant to the plan.
See id. at 848. The excess insurer cross-claimed against the secondary insurer for failure
to defend or settle personal injury litigation in good faith, breach of contract, reimburse-
ment, and equitable contribution. See id. at 849.
230. See id. at 852. For a case that found jurisdiction supplemental to a dis-
chargeabilty action, see Aerni v. Columbus Fed. Say. (In re Aerni), 86 B.R. 203 (Bankr.
D. Neb. 1988) and also supra notes 170-78 and accompanying text (discussing Aerni).
231. Pettibone, 135 B.R. at 852 (citation omitted).
232. See infra part III.A. 1 (discussing these constitutional issues).
233. See infra part III.A.2 (discussing these distinct constitutional issues).
234. See, e.g., Publicker Indus., Inc. v. United States (In re Cuyahoga Equip. Corp.),
980 F.2d 110, 115 (2d Cir. 1992) (asserting, without discussion, that district court had
power to adjudicate jurisdictionally insufficient state law claims factually related to "re-
lated to" proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367); Goger v. Merchants Bank (In re
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bankruptcy jurisdiction is dicta-the conclusion that supplemental bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction exists is often an alternative ground upon which the
court justifies an exercise of federal jurisdiction." And in several of
these statements of dicta, the court would not have needed to address the
issue of supplemental jurisdiction if it had applied more expansively the
"related to" jurisdictional standard." 6
III. THE CASE AGAINST SUPPLEMENTAL
BANKRUPTCY JURISDICTION
This part considers the interplay of §§ 1334(b) and 1367(a) from con-
stitutional and statutory perspectives. It first contends that the exercise
of supplemental jurisdiction by a federal district court over claims related
to237 an "arising in" or a "related to" proceeding" 8 may exceed Article
III of the Constitution. It next argues that any exercise of supplemental
bankruptcy jurisdiction by a non-Article III bankruptcy court also may
exceed constitutional limitations.
Feifer Indus.), 141 B.R. 450, 451 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1991) (same); Hawkins v. Eads (In re
Eads), 135 B.R. 387 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1991) (same).
235. See, e.g., Publicker Indus., 980 F.2d at 115 (concluding that exercise of supple-
mental bankruptcy jurisdiction was justified was dicta in that court went on to find alter-
nate basis for federal jurisdiction over same claims under CERCLA); Wieboldt Stores,
Inc. v. Schottenstein, 111 B.R. 162, 166-67 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (concluding that exercise of
supplemental bankruptcy jurisdiction was justified was dicta in that court stated that it
need not determine whether third-party claims were "related to" chapter I 1 case); Haw-
kins, 135 B.R. at 393 (finding in the alternative that it had supplemental jurisdiction over
third-party claims, and that it had "related to" jurisdiction over third-party claims be-
cause they "enhance[ ] the collectability of any judgment against the [non-debtor] defend-
ants"); Jones v. Woody (In re W.J. Servs., Inc.), 139 B.R. 824, 826-27 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
1992) (concluding first that it had supplemental bankruptcy jurisdiction over state law
malpractice action brought by former chapter 11 debtors against former counsel; the
bankruptcy court then held the action barred by res judicata without any discussion as to
why action involving post-petition actions of professionals, hired by and compensated out
of estate, did not "arise in" or "relate to" chapter I case); National Westminster
Bancorp N.J. v. ICS Cybernetics, Inc. (In re ICS Cybernetics, Inc.), 123 B.R. 467, 472
(Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1989) (inexplicably holding that cross-claims and counterclaims were
core proceedings "under the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction" without discussion of
whether these cross-claims and counterclaims "related to" debtor's bankruptcy case,
which they probably did); Cook v. United State (In re Earl Roggenbuck Farms, Inc.), 51
B.R. 913, 926 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985) (concluding in the alternative that it had juris-
diction over state law cross-claim brought by Commodity Credit Corporation against
debtor's principal pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 714(b), which provides to district courts exclu-
sive federal jurisdiction over "all suits brought by or against the (CCC]"); In re Wood, 52
B.R. 513, 522 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1985) (concluding in the alternative that state law
claims raised by non-debtor intervenors were "related to" proceedings).
236. For example, in Hawkins the court held that third-party claims were "related to"
the bankruptcy case, but noted that other courts had reached contrary conclusions. See
Hawkins, 135 B.R. at 393 & n.9. It then went on to conclude in dicta that, even if it did
not have "related to" jurisdiction over the third party claims, it had supplemental bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction over them. See ia at 397; see also supra notes 153-58 and accompany-
ing text (discussing Hawkins).
237. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (Supp. IV. 1992).
238. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
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As a result of these substantial constitutional concerns, this part con-
tends that these statutes should not be read together to authorize the
exercise of supplemental bankruptcy jurisdiction by either district or
bankruptcy courts.239
A. The Constitutional Questions
The Supreme Court has long held that "two things are necessary to
create [federal] jurisdiction .... The Constitution must have given to
the court the capacity to take it, and an act of Congress must have sup-
plied it ... ."" If 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and 1367 are construed to grant
supplemental bankruptcy jurisdiction, they may contravene Article III of
the Constitution. The exercise of jurisdiction over claims related to an
"arising in" or a "related to" bankruptcy proceeding by a federal district
court may be inconsistent with the requirement that it hear only an Arti-
cle III "case or controversy." Further, any exercise of supplemental
bankruptcy jurisdiction by a bankruptcy court may violate Article III's
requirement that such a case be heard by a life-tenured federal judge.
1. Constitutional Questions Surrounding the Exercise of
Supplemental Bankruptcy Jurisdiction by a District Court
Perhaps the best place to start a constitutional analysis of an exercise
of supplemental bankruptcy jurisdiction by a district court is, as sug-
gested by the legislative history of § 1367,241 the three-part test set forth
in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs:242 (i) the federal claim must be suffi-
ciently substantial as to confer subject matter jurisdiction; (ii) the federal
and state law claims must "derive from a common nucleus of operative
fact;" '24 3 and (iii) the plaintiff's federal and state law claims must be such
that the plaintiff "would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one
judicial proceeding." 2" Nevertheless, application of a Gibbs-type analy-
sis to an exercise of supplemental bankruptcy jurisdiction does not pro-
vide a district court with any clear guidance.245
239. Implicit in this analysis is the notion that statutory ambiguity should be resolved
to avoid a finding of constitutional infirmity. See, e.g., United States v. Security Indus.
Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 78 (1982) (referring to "cardinal principle that this Court will first
ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the constitu-
tional question may be avoided") (quoting Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 577 (1978);
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)).
240. Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 548 (1989) (emphasis omitted) (citing The
Mayor v. Cooper, 6 Wall. 247, 252 (1868)). Prior to Finley, this test applied to original
jurisdiction. Finley extended the test to supplemental jurisdiction. See id. at 549-50.
241. See H.R. Rep. No. 734, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 29 n.15 (1990) (explaining that
§ 1367 "codifies the scope of supplemental jurisdiction first articulated by the Supreme
Court in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966)").
242. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725. See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text (discussing
Gibbs).
243. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725.
244. Id.
245. For a discussion of the inapplicability of a Gibbs-type analysis to an "atypical
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a. Supplemental Jurisdiction, Rather Than Pendent Jurisdiction
While, Gibbs involved an assessment of the constitutionality of an ex-
ercise of pendent jurisdiction, § 1367 applies to pendent-claim, pendent-
party and ancillary jurisdiction.' Assertions of supplemental bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction may be any of these three types of supplemental juris-
diction, depending upon the circumstances of the assertion, and are least
likely to be an assertion of pendent-claim jurisdiction.247 Where pen-
dent-claim jurisdiction is not involved, a question remains as to how re-
lated the primary claim 248 must be to the supplemental claim. 249
Extension of Gibbs's constitutional analysis from its pendent-claim
context to other types of supplemental jurisdiction is not an issue pecu-
liar to bankruptcy, however, and commentators have wrestled with this
issue outside the bankruptcy context. These commentators note that
case law had developed distinct standards for the proper scope of pen-
dent-claim and ancillary jurisdiction.2"' With respect to ancillary juris-
diction, the Supreme Court, in Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange,11
did not consider whether claims arose out of "a common nucleus of oper-
ative fact." '252 Instead, it validated an assertion of ancillary jurisdiction
where the jurisdictionally deficient claims arose out of the same transac-
tion or occurrence2 53 as the primary claim," although it did not make
clear whether the source of this standard was constitutionally based.1 5
federal case[ such as bankruptcy," see John T. Cross, Congressional Power to Extend
Federal Jurisdiction to Disputes Outside Article III A Critical Analysis From the Perspec-
tive of Bankruptcy, 87 N.W. U.L. Rev. 1188, 1242 (1993) ("Although the Gibbs test
works quite well when the elements of a cause of action are facts, it is of little use when
the elements are not facts. Therefore, an analysis that applies the Gibbs test to bank-
ruptcy [jurisdiction] is doomed to failure.").
246. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (Supp. IV. 1992). For a discussion of the doctrine of pen-
dent-claim jurisdiction, see supra notes 110-18 and accompanying text. For a discussion
of the doctrine of pendent-party jurisdiction, see supra notes 119-36 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction, see supra notes 103-09 and
accompanying text.
247. See supra part II.A.
248. For a definition of the phrase "primary claim," see supra note 54.
249. The phrase "supplemental claims" is used to refer to those claims for which, but
for some doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction, there exists no relevant grant of federal
jurisdiction.
250. See supra notes 103-18 and accompanying text (discussing the standards for ancil-
lary and pendent-claim jurisdiction).
251. 270 U.S. 593, 609-10 (1926).
252. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
253. See 270 U.S. at 609-610.
254. The Federal Courts Study Committee had initially recommended that the supple-
mental jurisdiction provision codify Moore's "transaction or occurrence" test as the stan-
dard. See Federal Courts Study Committee, Report of the Federal Courts Study
Committee 47 (1990). Congress ultimately determined to equate the statutory standard
with Article III more explicitly. Legislative history, thus, refers to Gibbs as the control-
ling standard because it is the only Supreme Court precedent explicitly considering the
constitutional dimensions of supplemental jurisdiction. See H.R. Rep. 734, 101st Cong.,
2nd Sess. at 29 n.15 (1990).
255. See 270 U.S. at 609-610; see also McLaughlin, supra note 102, at 896 ("In estab-
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Despite the semantic differences in these standards, courts 256 and com-
mentators257 have suggested that § 1367(a) should be interpreted as ap-
plying a single standard for the assertion of supplemental jurisdiction, for
there would appear to be no constitutional basis for applying distinct
standards to the various forms of supplemental jurisdiction. These com-
mentators disagree as to what that standard ought to be, however.
Denis McLaughlin argues in this context that the Court should "hold
that a constitutional 'case or controversy' under Article III consists of all
claims that bear some 'logical relationship' to the original jurisdiction
claim sufficient to justify joinder of the claims in a single action, irrespec-
tive of the precise nature of the nexus that establishes the logical relation-
ship."25 He criticizes a broader constitutional test proposed prior to the
lishing the transaction standard, however, the Moore court never indicated whether this
standard was constitutionally based, and expressed no opinion whether the standard was
intended to define the constitutional limit of ancillary jurisdiction.").
256. See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 370 n.8 (1978) (declin-
ing to decide whether there exist "any 'principled' differences between pendent and ancil-
lary jurisdiction; or, if there are, what effect Gibbs had on such differences"); Aldinger v.
Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 13 (1976) (same); see also infra notes 261-62 and accompanying text
(discussing cases interpreting "relatedness" standard applicable to § 1367).
257. See Freer, Life After Finley, supra note 102, at 473 (1991) ("The drafters properly
did not attempt to define the reach of the statute in section 1367(a) by anything other
than reference to the Constitution. Although that limit has been defined in Gibbs to
involve claims sharing a 'common nucleus of operative fact' with the jurisdiction-invok-
ing claim, it probably was wise to eschew a statement of the constitutional limit, because
that limit may evolve over time. The statute thus may avoid imposing an artificial restric-
tion on the reach of supplemental jurisdiction.") (footnotes omitted); McLaughlin, supra
note 102, at 897-98 ("Whatever distinctions were thought to exist between the 'transac-
tion or occurrence' test of ancillary jurisdiction and the 'common nucleus of operative
fact' test of pendent jurisdiction, however, should now be discarded. The statute's exten-
sion of supplemental jurisdiction to the full constitutional 'case' limit leaves but one rele-
vant inquiry-whether the Constitution distinguishes among the various forms of
supplemental jurisdiction and requires a different test of relatedness for the various
claims. Certainly, the Constitution does not."); Siegel, supra note 102, at 65 ("By using
the 'case or controversy' standard found in the Constitution's own statement of the outer
limits of federal jurisdiction, Congress also indicates that it wants supplemental jurisdic-
tion ... to go the constitutional limit, to which it appeared to be carried in the Gibbs
case."); Wolf, supra note 102, at 23 ("[Section 1367(a)] eliminates any gap that may exist
between 'the same transaction or occurrence' formulation and the constitutional limits of
Article III."); Ellen S. Mouchawar, Note, The Congressional Resurrection of the Supple-
mental Jurisdiction in the Post-Finley Era, 42 Hastings L. J. 1611, 1613 (1991) ("Thus,
section 1367 establishes a uniform standard that allows a federal court to determine when
it may adjudicate a nonfederal claim as an adjunct to its jurisdiction over the federal
claim, regardless of whether the nonfederal claim comes within the doctrine of pendent
or ancillary jurisdiction."). Prior to enactment of § 1367(a), commentators had argued
there existed a single constitutional standard for the exercise of ancillary and pendent
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Matasar, Jurisdiction Primer, supra note 102, at 155 (1983) ("Nojustification exists for separate tests for ancillary and pendent jurisdiction at the constitu-
tional level.") (footnote omitted).
258. McLaughlin, supra note 102, at 910; see also Matasar, Jurisdiction Primer, supra
note 102, at 155-56 ("Since Gibbs, the trend in pendent cases has been toward a transac-
tional test similar to that in ancillary jurisdiction. Both doctrines have edged toward a
logical relationship test."); Mouchawar, supra note 257, at 1656 (stating that "[t]o allevi-
ate confusion, the 'transaction or occurrence' language in the Federal Rules should be
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enactment of § 1367 by Richard Matasar.2 5 9 Matasar had argued that
supplemental jurisdiction fulfills Article III of the Constitution "when-
ever the rules governing federal procedure permit the joinder in one ac-
tion of jurisdictionally insufficient nonfederal claims or parties with a
jurisdictionally sufficient federal claim.""
Notwithstanding this academic debate, courts have interpreted
§ 1367(a) to require application of Gibbs's "common nucleus of operative
fact" test when deciding whether supplemental bankruptcy jurisdiction
exists and should be exercised, irrespective of whether, prior to the enact-
ment of § 1367, the supplemental claim would have been viewed as an
assertion of ancillary or pendent jurisdiction.261 Outside the context of
bankruptcy, courts have similarly interpreted § 1367(a) and applied a
Gibbs test.262
b. Bankruptcy Jurisdiction, Rather Than Federal Question Jurisdiction
Reference to Gibbs may not resolve the constitutionality of an exercise
of supplemental bankruptcy jurisdiction by a district court for another
reason. In Gibbs, the "primary claim" was a "federal claim" which
"arose under" federal labor law. 263 The primary claim in a bankruptcy
context may be either a "federal claim" or a "state law claim," depend-
ing upon whether the proceeding "arises under" title 11, or "arises in" or
interpreted consistently with the 'logical relationship' approach") (footnotes omitted); cf
Cross, supra note 245, at 1233-50 (justifying "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction as con-
stitutional because it satisfies expanded view of ancillary jurisdiction; his expanded view
of ancillary jurisdiction adopts a logical relationship, rather than factual relationship, test
to define scope of ancillary jurisdiction).
259. McLaughlin, supra note 102, at 912 n.358 ("Although well-reasoned and
presented within an historical framework, I do not share Professor Matasar's view. At
any particular point in time, the Federal Rules can be either over or underinclusive in
terms of the joinder of constitutionally permissible claims .... Further, because Con-
gress has the ultimate power to enact the Federal Rules, . . . equating the constitutional
'case' limit of supplemental jurisdiction with the Federal Rules makes Congress the final
arbiter of this constitutional limitation. Although Congress has the recognized right to
establish the statutory limit of federal subject matter jurisdiction. ... the determination of
the constitutional limit is properly reserved for the Supreme Court."). For Professor
Matasar's position, see Matasar, One Constitutional Case, supra note 102, at 1478.
260. Matasar, One Constitutional Case, supra note 102, at 1479.
261. See supra part II.A (discussing cases exercising supplemental bankruptcy
jurisdiction).
262. See Wolf, supra note 102, at 46. In surveying case law applying § 1367, Wolf
notes that "district judges have typically relied on section 1367, with little or no analy-
sis," and that those judges who have articulated their basis for exercising supplemental
jurisdiction vary in that "[s]ome courts apply a three-factor Gibbs test[, while o]ther
judges apply a two-factor [Gibbs] test. Id. Further, Wolf points out that
[i]n one case, the court referred to these two Gibbs factors in interpreting sec-
tion 1367, but applied only the common nucleus test to determine whether sup-
plemental jurisdiction in fact existed. Finally, in another case, the court made
reference only to the "common nucleus" factor to determine whether it had the
power to entertain the supplemental claims.
Id. (citations omitted).
263. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
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"relates to" a title 11 case. Only "arising under" proceedings can un-
equivocally be termed "federal claims" in the sense used in Gibbs.2" 4
Where the primary claim involves either an "arising in" or a "related to"
proceeding, however, the primary claim may not be a "federal claim," in
the sense that the cause of action may derive from state law.2 65 These
distinctions create uncertainty as to the constitutionality of an exercise of
jurisdiction supplemental to a "related to" or "arising in" proceeding.
This uncertainty pertains to both the "substantiality" and "relatedness"
tests set forth in Gibbs.26"
264. The "federal claim" at issue in Gibbs involved an assertion of statutory federal
question jurisdiction. See id. at 725; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)
(granting federal question jurisdiction). The grant of original jurisdiction over proceed-
ings "arising under title 11" amounts to no more than a statutory grant of specialized
federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), not dissimilar
to other statutory grants of specialized federal question jurisdiction. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C.
§ 1337 (commerce and antitrust regulations), 1338(a) (patent, plant variety protection,
copyright, mask works, trademarks, and unfair competition); § 1339 (postal matters);
§ 1340 (1988) (internal revenue; custom duties). The grant of original jurisdiction over
proceedings "arising in" and "related to" a title 11 case is distinct from the other statu-
tory grants of bankruptcy jurisdiction.
265. "Arising in" or "related to" proceedings derive, not from federal bankruptcy law,
but from federal non-bankruptcy or state law. Cf, e.g., Butner v. U.S., 440 U.S. 48, 54-
55 (1979) (looking to state law to determine rights of mortgagee claiming lien against
rental income; decided under 1898 Bankruptcy Act, but proceeding would have been
characterized as "arising in" title 11 case if decided under current Bankruptcy Code).
Where the "arising in" or "related to" proceeding derives from non-bankruptcy federal
law, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 may provide an alternative statutory grant of federal jurisdiction.
Cf. National City Bank v. Coopers & Lybrand, 802 F.2d 990, 993-94 (8th Cir. 1986)
(concluding that no bankruptcy jurisdiction existed over malpractice action removed to
federal district court; the court of appeals declined to rule on whether federal question
jurisdiction existed since review of remand order precluded by relevant statute).
266. Courts and commentators nearly uniformly agree that the third prong of the
Gibbs test, the so-called "common expectations of trial test," not only is not a constitu-
tional requirement, but also does not add anything to the other two prongs of the stan-
dard. See Matasar, One Constitutional Case, supra note 102, at 1455-56 and nn. 263-65
("A review of the court decisions interpreting Gibbs does not resolve these problems [of
interpretation of the 'ordinary expectation' test], since most cases ignore the 'ordinarily
be expected to try' phrase, cite it without analysis, or subsume it under the more easily
applied 'common nucleus' phrase.") (citations omitted); see also id. at 1455-56 (arguing
that the "ordinarily expected to try" prong of Gibbs test is not constitutionally required);
McLaughlin, supra note 102, at 914-18 (same); see also Joan Baker, Toward a Relaxed
View of Federal Ancillary and Pendent Jurisdiction, 33 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 759, 765 (1972)
(broadly interpreting Gibbs's "expected to try" standard: "[I]n general, Gibbs says that a
court has jurisdiction (power) to hear a whole 'case'-a 'case' within the ordinary expec-
tations of litigants as measured by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."); but see 13B C.
Wright, et al. Federal Practice & Procedure § 3567.1, at 116 (1982) (contending that
"ordinary expectation" test refers "to what res judicata would require if the claims were
all federally created or all state created"); Matasar, One Constitutional Case, supra note
102, at 1455 & n.261 ("A few courts and influential commentators have suggested that
the 'ordinarily be expected to try' test is an independent barrier to assertion of supple-
mental jurisdiction.") (citations omitted); id. at 1457 (criticizing Wright & Miller's con-
tention as likely to "emasculate Gibbs and reinstate the Hum test") (citation omitted).
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(i) Substantiality
Outside the context of bankruptcy, commentators have argued that the
first prong of Gibbs, the so-called "substantiality test," does not state an
independent standard for determining the constitutionality of an asser-
tion of supplemental jurisdiction, but rather involves no more than a re-
statement of the requirement that the court indeed must have subject
matter jurisdiction over the primary claim, a determination that involves
a statutory analysis. 267 Courts that have considered the issue appear to
have concluded that this insight is equally applicable to the bankruptcy
context. For example, one court applied the "substantiality" test to an
assertion of supplemental bankruptcy jurisdiction, and concluded that
the test was satisfied because "the federal claim [was] a core proceeding
over which [it] unquestionably ha[d] jurisdiction. 261
Application of this first prong of Gibbs to an exercise by a district
court of jurisdiction supplemental to an "arising in" or "related to" pro-
ceeding is more complex, however. Does it require a determination that
the "arising in" or "related to" proceeding is itself substantial?2 69 Or
does it require a determination that the federal element, the whole title
11 case, is substantial?270 Or, finally, does it require a determination that
the nexus between the "related to" proceeding and the title 11 filing is
substantial? And, if the latter construction is to be favored, how substan-
tial must this relationship be? Is this requirement distinct from the re-
quirement that the primary claim and the supplemental claim enjoy
either "a common nucleus of operative fact" or a "logical
relationship"? 271
267. See Matasar, One Constitutional Case, supra note 102, at 1417-1446 (arguing that
"substantiality" test is not grounded in Constitution); McLaughlin, supra note 102, at
913-14 (same).
268. Dechert Price & Rhodes v. Direct Satellite Communications., (In re Direct Satel-
lite Communications., Inc.), 91 B.R. 5, 6 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988). This application of
Gibbs's "substantiality test" to an assertion of supplemental bankruptcy jurisdiction was
garbled somewhat by the district court in Laganella v. Braen (In re Braen), 1991 WL
7701 at *6 (D. N.J. 1991), when it stated that the Direct Satellite court would find that
the "substantiality test" was satisfied "because it was a core proceeding[,]" implying that
assertions of supplemental jurisdiction related to a "related to" proceeding can never
satisfy this prong of Gibbs.
269. Does it require a determination that, for example, the proof of claim brought by a
creditor is "substantial" so that analysis of the constitutionality of an assertion of juris-
diction supplemental to this "arising in" proceeding can next determine whether there
exists a common nucleus of fact between the proof of claim and the supplemental claim?
Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) (1988) (limiting grant of supplemental jurisdiction to those
claims of unfair competition "joined with a substantial and related claim under the copy-
right, patent, plant variety protection or trade-mark laws") (emphasis added).
270. For example, this type of "substantiality" analysis might consider whether the
debtor is eligible for relief under title 11, 11 U.S.C. § 109 (1988), and whether the filing
was made in good faith by the debtor, see, eg., Elmwood Dev. Co. v. General Elect.
Pension Trust (In re Elmwood Dev. Co.), 964 F.2d 508, 513 (5th Cir. 1992) (dismissing
chapter I1 petition as having been filed in bad faith), in determining whether the title I 1
case is "substantial."
271. See Matasar, One Constitutional Case, supra note 102, at 1417-47 (articulating, on
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Application of the "substantiality" test to an assertion of jurisdiction
supplemental to an "arising in" or "related to" proceeding is complicated
because the federal interest in these proceedings is indirect. With a pri-
mary claim involving federal question jurisdiction, the substantiality of
the federal ingredient in the primary claim follows naturally. Even with
a primary claim involving diversity or alienage jurisdiction, the federal
ingredient follows easily from its inclusion among the categories of
"cases or controversies" enumerated in Article III of the Constitution.
With a primary claim involving bankruptcy jurisdiction, however, the
substantiality of the federal ingredient is less clear because the sources of
bankruptcy jurisdiction are less clear.
Except in dicta, the Supreme Court has had little occasion to explain
why Article III empowers Congress to confer to district courts bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction over "arising in" '272 and "related to" 27 3 proceedings,
similar grounds, general criticism of characterization of first-prong of Gibbs test as
constitutional).
272. In Schumacher v. Beeler, the Supreme Court opined in dicta that § 23(b) of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was constitutional stating that "[t]he Congress, by virtue of its
constitutional authority over bankruptcies, could confer or withhold jurisdiction to enter-
tain such suits and could prescribe the conditions upon which the federal courts should
have jurisdiction." 293 U.S. 367, 374 (1934) (citing Shearman v. Bingham, 21 F. 1270
(C.C.D. Mass. 1872) (No. 12,762)). This language is confusing, however, for it appears
to justify § 23(b) as constitutionally authorized by the Bankruptcy Clause of Article I of
the United States Constitution, art. I, § 8, rather than Article III of the Constitution.
Similarly, in Taubel-Scott-Kitzmiller Co., Inc. v. Fox, the Court indicated, again in dicta,
that Congress had broad power to grant federal jurisdiction in "matters relating to bank-
ruptcy," but went on to conclude that Congress had not enacted a provision to "confer
generally such broad jurisdiction over claims by a trustee against third persons." 264
U.S. 426, 430-31 (1924) (footnote omitted). According to the court:
Congress has, of course, power to confer upon the bankruptcy court jurisdiction
to adjudicate the rights of trustees to property adversely claimed. In matters
relating to bankruptcy its power is paramount. Hence, even if the property is
not within the possession of the bankruptcy court, Congress can confer upon it,
as upon any other lower federal court, jurisdiction of the controversy, by con-
ferring jurisdiction over the person in whose possession the property is.
Id. at 430. As in Beeler, the Court in Taubel-Scott was vague as to the source of this
constitutional power, citing cases which had interpreted the scope of the jurisdictional
provisions of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act (without reference to their constitutionality). See
Robertson v. Howard, 229 U.S. 254 (1913); In re Watts & Sachs, 190 U.S. 1, 27 (1903).
Although in National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., Justice Jackson,
in his plurality opinion, described Beeler as a case "raising only questions of Ohio law
concerning the validity under that law of a sheriff's levy and execution[,]" the trustee in
Beeler sought to avoid an execution lien under §§ 60(b), 67(e), or 70(e) of the 1898 Act.
See 337 U.S. 582, 595 (1949). Under the current bankruptcy jurisdictional provisions,
the trustee's avoidance actions in Beeler would either "arise under" successor provisions
of title 11, or "arise in" the title 11 case. Accord Cross, supra note 245, at 1207 (describ-
ing Beeler as involving federal question); but see Thomas Galligan, Jr., Article III and
The "Related To" Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: A Case Study in Protective Jurisdiction, 11 U.
Puget Sound L. Rev. 1, 23-24 (1987) (concluding that, if raised today, facts of Beeler
would involve "related to" jurisdiction). The trustee in Taubel-Scott sought to avoid a
lien under § 67(f) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. That section permitted the avoidance
of certain liens "obtained through legal proceedings against a person who is insolvent, at
any time within four months prior to the filing of a petition in bankruptcy[.]" 1898 Act,
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or similarly broad grants of jurisdiction, although it clearly views the
ch. 541 § 67(f), 30 Stat. 544, 565 (1988). Thus, the avoidance action in Taubel-Scott, if
pursued under the current Bankruptcy Code, also would have either "arisen under" suc-
cessor provisions of title I 1 or "arisen in" the title 11 case. But see Galligan, supra, at 25
n.83 (concluding that Taubel-Scott "would be a 'related to' case in today's vernacular").
273. In dicta, the Supreme Court has indicated on several occasions that a grant of
jurisdiction as broad as the grant of "related to" jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b)
would pass constitutional muster, although it has been unclear on the source of this au-
thority. In Williams v. Austrian, the Court interpreted § 102 of the Bankruptcy Act of
1898, as amended by the Chandler Act of 1938, to render § 23 of the Act inapplicable in
Chapter X reorganization proceedings and, thus, to permit a Chapter X trustee to bring a
plenary suit in a district court, even though the defendants did not consent to the exercise
of jurisdiction and there existed no other basis for federal jurisdiction. See 331 U.S. 642,
657-58 (1947). The trustee's suit in Williams, if brought under the current bankruptcy
jurisdictional provisions, would constitute a "related to" proceeding. See id. at 645 (suit
against past and present officers and directors of debtor-corporation, and other affiliated
person, alleging "a conspiracy to misappropriate corporate assets and asking an account-
ing and other relief"); see also Galligan, supra note 272, at 24. Notwithstanding Justice
Frankfurter's dissent on the issue of statutory interpretation before the Court, 331 U.S. at
662-682, he had "[n]o doubt [that] Congress could authorize such a suit[,]" id. at 664, but
merely cited Schumacher v. Beeler, 293 U.S. 367, 374 (1934), as the source of this author-
ity. See Cross, supra note 245, at 1207 n.72 ("[Williams v.] Austrian therefore adds noth-
ing to the constitutional debate.").
In National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., three Justices of the
Supreme Court, again in dicta, assumed the grant of federal jurisdiction over suits
brought by or against a trustee was constitutional, but on varying grounds. See 337 U.S.
582, 594-99 (1949). Justice Jackson concluded that, although these suits did not "arise
under" federal law, Congress had the power to enact uniform bankruptcy laws in Article
I of the Constitution and, thus, the power to confer jurisdiction over such cases irrespec-
tive of the limitations of Article III. See id. at 594-99; but see Galligan, supra note 272, at
26-27 (criticizing Jackson's analysis as confusing scope of statutory "arising under" with
constitutional "arising under" jurisdiction). Justice Rutledge concluded that the grant fit
within the scope of constitutional "arising under" jurisdiction, although clearly broader
than statutory "arising under" jurisdiction. See Tidewater, 337 U.S. at 611-17. Accord
Galligan, supra note 272, at 26-27. Finally, Justice Frankfurter, in his dissent in Tidewa-
ter, also recognized as constitutional Congress' broad grant of bankruptcy jurisdiction
under the 1898 Act. He supported this conclusion with a melding of the arguments fa-
vored by Justice Jackson and Justice Rutledge. According to Frankfurter:
Congress may deem it desirable that the federal courts be utilized for all the
claims that pertain to the bankrupt estate .... The congeries of controversies
thus brought into being by reason of bankruptcy may be lodged in the federal
courts because they arise under "the Laws of the United States," to wit, laws
concerning the "subject of bankruptcies."
337 U.S. at 652 n.3; see also Galligan, supra note 272, at 27-28 (pointing out inconsisten-
cies in Frankfurter's position regarding bankruptcy jurisdiction, and his basis for dissent
regarding jurisdiction over controversies between citizens of District of Columbia and
citizen of one of the states).
In his dissent in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, Frankfurter elaborated on this
vision of bankruptcy jurisdiction by reference to ancillary and pendent jurisdiction. He
stated that
the bankruptcy decisions may be justified by the scope of the bankruptcy power,
which may be deemed to sweep within its scope interests analytically outside
the "federal question" category, but sufficiently related to the main purpose of
bankruptcy to call for comprehensive treatment. Also, although a particular
suit may be brought by a trustee in a district other than the one in which the
principal proceedings are pending, if all the suits by the trustee, even though in
many federal courts, are regarded as one litigation for the collection and appor-
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grant as constitutional. A number of district and bankruptcy courts
have upheld the constitutionality of § 1334(b)'s grant of federal jurisdic-
tion over proceedings "related to a title 11 case" on the grounds that
"related to" proceedings constitute valid exercises of supplemental juris-
diction. 74 Some bankruptcy courts have alternatively upheld the grant
as authorized by the section in Article III empowering Congress to con-
fer federal jurisdiction over cases or controversies "arising under" federal
law.
275
Commentators have more explicitly debated these sources of jurisdic-
tion, but have not agreed. Thomas Galligan, Jr. contends that "related
to" bankruptcy jurisdiction, "when considered in connection with the
discretionary and mandatory abstention provisions of the 1984 Bank-
ruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act, appears to be a consti-
tutional effort to protect the federal interest in efficient bankruptcy
administration, and at the same time preserve the states' interests in in-
terpreting, applying, and developing state law." '276 He would character-
tionment of the bankrupt's property, a particular suit by the trustee under state
law to recover a specific piece of property might be analogized to the ancillary
or pendent jurisdiction cases in which, in the disposition of a cause of action,
federal courts may pass on state grounds for recovery that are joined to federal
grounds.
353 U.S. 448, 483 (1957) (citations omitted); see also Galligan, supra note 272, at 30;
Cross, supra note 245, at 1208.
By the time the Court was asked to consider the constitutionality of the grant of "re-
lated to" bankruptcy jurisdiction under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, in Northern
Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., Justice Brennan, for the plurality,
assumed without much discussion that "[t]his [related to] claim may be adjudicated in
federal court on the basis of its relationship to the petition for reorganization." See 458
U.S. 50, 72 n.26 (1982) (citing Beeler, Austrian, Tidewater, Lincoln Mills, and Osborn);
see also Galligan, supra note 272, at 30.
274. See, e.g., Sonnyco Coal, Inc. v. Bartley (In re Sonnyco Coal, Inc.), 89 B.R. 658,
665-668 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988) (supporting constitutionality of exercise of "related to"
jurisdiction by non-Article III bankruptcy with reference to doctrines of supplemental
jurisdiction by analogy); In re Tidewater Group, Inc., 63 B.R. 670, 673-74 (Bankr. N.D.
Ga. 1986) (relying on doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction to uphold constitutionality of
grant of "related to" jurisdiction); Ram Construction Co. v. Port Authority, 49 B.R. 363,
366 (W.D. Pa. 1985) (drawing analogy to pendent jurisdiction to uphold constitutionality
of assertion of bankruptcy jurisdiction over state law "related to" proceeding); Eisenberg
v. Resource Dynamics, Inc. (In re Environmental Research & Dev., Inc.), 46 B.R. 774,
778 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (relied on concept of pendent jurisdiction to uphold constitutional-
ity of 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b)); Chemical Bank v. Grisby's World of Carpet, Inc. (In re
WWG Indus., Inc.), 44 B.R. 287, 290 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (concluding that ancillary juris-
diction constituted "the only constitutional basis on which to explain Congress' grant of
subject matter jurisdiction to this Court"); Michelman v. Minor (In re Bible Voice, Inc.),
34 B.R. 733, 736 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (relying on Supreme Court precedent decided under
1898 Act to uphold constitutionality of § 1334(b)).
275. See State Bank v. Chart House, Inc., 46 B.R. 468, 471-72 (Bankr. N.D. I11. 1985);
In re O.P.M. Leasing Servs., Inc., 28 B.R. 740, 748 n.3 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (dictum).
276. Galligan, supra note 272, at 5; see also John T. Cross, Viewing Federal Jurisdiction
Through the Looking Glass of Bankruptcy, 23 Seton Hall L. Rev. 530, 541 & n.46 (1993)
[hereinafter Viewing Federal Jurisdiction](same); Cross, supra note 245, at 1204-29 (con-
tending that "related to" jurisdiction fulfills requirements of Article III, but not because
it constitutes valid grant of "protective jurisdiction").
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ize "related to" jurisdiction as a form of protective jurisdiction. 77
John Cross instead contends that "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction
is best explained as ancillary jurisdiction. He claims that once an ex-
panded definition of ancillary jurisdiction is accepted-one which em-
ploys a logical relationship, rather than a factual nexus, standard for
"relatedness"-jurisdiction over "related to" proceedings is best charac-
terized as a grant of ancillary jurisdiction; the "related to" proceedings
share a logical relationship with the title 11 case and together constitute a
"case" within the meaning of Article III.27 Both Galligan and Cross
reject the characterization of "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction as a
277. Protective jurisdiction has been defined as federal jurisdiction over suits "where
there is no diversity of citizenship and state law governs the decision of the case in that it
not only creates plaintiff's cause of action but also governs any and all defenses that may
be raised." Galligan, supra note 272, at 41 n.151. See Martin H. Redish, Federal Juris-
diction: Tensions in the Allocation of Judicial Power 90-91 (2d ed. 1990) (concluding
that there exist two distinct arguments justifying "protective jurisdiction": (i) Wechsler's
notion that "if Congress could ... pass substantive legislation on a particular matter,
then this 'greater' power logically includes within it the 'lesser' power to provide the
federal courts with jurisdiction over cases in the area;" (ii) Mishkin's contention that
"where there is an articulated and active federal policy regulating a field" there exists the
power to provide jurisdiction protective of it) (citing Henry M. Hart Jr. & Herbert
Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System 744-47 (1953); Paul J. Mishkin,
The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 157, 190-92 (1953);
Herbert Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 Law &
Contemp. Probs. 216, 224-25 (1948)). For additional distinctions among the various pro-
tective jurisdiction theories, see Carole E. Goldberg-Ambrose, The Protective Jurisdiction
of the Federal Courts, 30 UCLA L. Rev. 542 (1983); Cross, supra note 245, at 1210-14;
Galligan, supra note 272, at 43-54; Note, The Theory of Protective Jurisdiction, 57 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 933 (1982). The constitutionality of a grant of protective jurisdiction remains an
open question in light of conflicting Supreme Court dicta. Compare Textile Workers
Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 460 (1957) (Harlan, J. and Burton, J., concurring
in the result) (rejecting view that § 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act, which grants jurisdiction
of suits for violation of labor-management contracts in industries affecting interstate com-
merce, but does not otherwise establish federal law governing such suits, evinced congres-
sional intent to create federal common law of labor-management contracts; concurring in
judgment upholding § 301 on "protective jurisdiction" theory) with id. at 474-75 (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting) (contending that theory of protective jurisdiction "cannot be justi-
fied under any view of the allowable scope to be given to Article III"); see also Verlinden
B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 491 n.17 (1983) ("[W]e need not consider
petitioner's... argument that the Act is constitutional as an aspect of so-called 'protec-
tive jurisdiction.' "); Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 137 (1989) ("We have, in the past,
not found the need to adopt a theory of 'protective jurisdiction' to support Art. III 'aris-
ing under' jurisdiction, and we do not see any need for doing so here because we do not
recognize any federal interests that are not protected by limiting removal to situations in
which a federal defense is alleged.") (citation omitted).
278. See Cross, supra note 245, at 1251 ("Because all the state claims are logically
related to the federal cause of action in bankruptcy, they form part of a single federal
bankruptcy 'case' for purposes of Article III. The doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction ac-
cordingly allows the entire case to be heard in a federal court-a result fully in keeping
with the limits of Article III."); Cross, Viewing Federal Jurisdiction, supra note 276, at
541 n.46 (same); butsee Galligan, supra note 272, at 36-41 (contending that supplemental
jurisdiction fails to justify the constitutional exercise of "related to" jurisdiction, largely
because he would apply a "common nucleus of operative fact" test as controlling the
scope of supplemental jurisdiction).
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type of "arising under" jurisdiction, but their conclusion in this regard
depends upon a narrower reading of Supreme Court precedent than is
proposed below.279
The distinction is relevant to more than academic debate. If "related
to" jurisdiction is a species of "arising under" jurisdiction, then it may
satisfy the Gibbs "substantiality" test because the federal ingredient in
the primary claim (the "related to" proceeding) is sufficiently substantial
to support the supplemental claim. Yet, if "related to" jurisdiction is
best described as either supplemental or protective jurisdiction, then
Gibbs's "substantiality" test may not be satisfied because the federal in-
279. In adopting a theory which justifies "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction as consti-
tutional because it is a variant of ancillary jurisdiction, Cross rejects any argument that
"related to" jurisdiction is constitutional because (i) "[a]ll [c]laims in a [b]ankruptcy
[c]ase [may] '[airise [u]nder' [f]ederal [flaw," (ii) "[b]ankruptcy [may be] a [fQederal [i]n
[r]em [p]roceeding," and (iii) claims in which the trustee in bankruptcy is a party may fit
Article III's "arising under" jurisdiction in that the trustee constitutes a "federal party"
or the trustee's capacity to sue and be sued constitutes an "original federal ingredient."
See Cross, supra note 245, at 1225-33.
As for all claims in a bankruptcy case "arising under" federal law, Cross suggests for
purposes of this argument that "[e]ven though the prebankruptcy debtor-creditor rela-
tionship is established and defined by state law, federal law may supplant this state law
once the debtor seeks bankruptcy relief." Id. at 1225. The federal law Cross has in mind
is the sort of federal common law in which federal courts incorporate state law as federal
law. See id. He rejects this characterization of bankruptcy jurisdiction, however, because
"[t]here is nothing about the fact of bankruptcy that warrants the application of federal
common law." Id. at 1226. Cross concludes that application of federal common law
requires a finding of either constitutional or statutory authorization. See id. at 1226-27.
Constitutional authorization is lacking because much of bankruptcy involves resolution
of purely private disputes rather than disputes in which the "outcome of the dispute may
affect some federal interest." See id. at 1226. Statutory authorization is lacking in both
the plain language of the Bankruptcy Code and its legislative history. See id.
Cross also considers whether "bankruptcy jurisdiction could be sustained as a form of
in rem subject matter jurisdiction, under which a federal court could adjudicate all claims
affecting the debtor's estate simply by taking control of that estate." Id. at 1228-29 (cit-
ing Baggs v. Martin, 179 U.S. 206, 209 (1900), for this proposition). However, he finds in
rem jurisdiction an insufficient basis for characterizing "related to" jurisdiction as consis-
tent with the limits of Article III. See id. at 1229 ("Baggs, however, is too thin a reed to
support the entire system of subject matter jurisdiction in bankruptcy. Baggs was decided
in 1900, and the Court has not seen fit to use its rationale since."). Baggs is a case about
ancillary, not simply in rem, jurisdiction. Not coincidentally ancillary jurisdiction finds
its origins in the notion that a court of equity, having possession of a res, is entitled to
adjudicate all claims "ancillary" to that property. See supra notes 103-09 and accompa-
nying text (discussing origins of doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction).
Finally, Cross contends that neither an "original ingredient" nor "federal party" the-
ory can justify "related to" jurisdiction as constitutional. See Cross, supra note 245, at
1229-33. The notion that bankruptcy jurisdiction may be supported by an "original in-
gredient" theory of the scope of Article III jurisdiction is addressed infra notes 321-34
and accompanying text.
Like Cross, Galligan rejects the "original ingredient" theory as the basis for "related
to" bankruptcy jurisdiction. Galligan, supra note 272, at 32-36; see also infra notes 321-
34 and accompanying text. In addition, Galligan contends that "justifying the federal
court's 'related to' bankruptcy jurisdiction on grounds of pendent or ancillary jurisdiction
strains those concepts as we know them." Galligan, supra note 272, at 5.
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gredient in the primary claim is indirect, and therefore arguably insuffi-
cient to support the supplemental claim.
(a) Bankruptcy Jurisdiction as "'Arising Under" Jurisdiction
Can bankruptcy jurisdiction over "arising in" and "related to" pro-
ceedings be characterized as "arising under" jurisdiction? The answer
depends upon how narrowly or broadly one reads Osborn v. Bank of the
United States,2"' an early Supreme Court decision interpreting the con-
tours of Congress' power under Article III of the Constitution to confer
to federal courts jurisdiction of cases "arising under" federal law.
In Osborn, the Bank of the United States sought an injunction against
enforcement by Ralph Osborn, Auditor of the State of Ohio,"8 ' of an
Ohio statute assessing an annual tax upon the Bank.2"2 The Court ruled,
as a threshold matter,283 on the constitutionality of a federal statute that
gave federal courts jurisdiction over actions by or against the Bank of the
United States, a federally chartered corporation.2"' The Bank of the
United States commenced the action in a federal court pursuant to this
grant of authority.28 5
Referring to the "arising under" jurisdictional provision of Article III,
the Court concluded that the grant of federal jurisdiction in the Bank's
280. 22 U.S. 738 (1824).
281. The injunction was also sought against John L. Harper, J.M. Curry, and S. Sulli-
van. See id at 741-42. According to the Bank, Harper "was employed by Osborn to
collect the tax, and well knew that an injunction had been allowed, proceeded by violence
to the office of the bank, at Chilicothe, and took therefrom S100,000, in specie and bank-
notes, belonging to, or on deposit with" the Bank of the United States. Id. at 741. Curry
was the Treasurer of the State of Ohio at the time Harper seized assets of the Bank of the
United States. See id at 742. Sullivan succeeded Curry as Treasurer. See id.
282. See id. at 739-40. The Ohio statute recited that "the Bank of the United States
pursued its operations contrary to a law of th[is] state." See id at 740.
283. The Supreme Court raised the jurisdictional issue only after the initial oral argu-
ment had occurred, asking the parties to address the jurisdictional issue in a separate
round of briefs. See id at 816.
284. See 22 U.S. at 828. The statute at issue limited this grant of original jurisdiction
to Circuit Courts. In 1911, Congress abolished the Circuit Courts. Judicial Code of
1911, ch. 231, § 289, 36 Stat. 1167, 1167 (1911). That same Act included a savings clause
which conferred upon the district courts any power or duty of the circuit courts not
otherwise expressly transferred within the Judicial Code. See id. at § 291.
285. See id Moreover, in Bank of the United States Y. Deeaux, the Supreme Court
held that a prior federal statute chartering the Bank of the United States did not bestow
federal jurisdiction but merely noted generally the Bank's capacity to sue and be sued.
See 5 Cranch 61, 71, 85-86 (1809). Congressional action followed Dereaux, and the Bank
of the United States was re-chartered. In this second charter, the language authorizing
the Bank to sue and be sued differed from the language in the statute at issue in Deveaux.
In Osborn, the Court considered this second federal charter and concluded that Congress'
intent to confer federal jurisdiction in any suit brought by or against the Bank of the
United States was clearer in the statute at issue in Osborn than in the more general lan-
guage at issue in Deveaux. See Osborn, 22 U.S. at 817-18. For a more recent reconcilia-
tion of Deveaux and Osborn, see American Nat'l Red Cross v. S.G., 112 S. Ct. 2465,
2469-70 (1992).
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charter '86 was constitutional even though "several questions may arise in
[the bank's suit], which depend on the general principles of the law, not
on any act of Congress."2" 7 In often quoted language, Chief Justice Mar-
shall, writing for the Court, rejected the argument that only purely fed-
eral questions are constitutionally within the jurisdiction of federal
courts, because "[tihere is scarcely any case, every part of which depends
on the constitution, laws or treaties of the United States."288 The Court
surmised that such a construction of the Constitution would reduce the
grant of "arising under" jurisdiction in Article III "to almost
nothing."2 9
What is most interesting about Osborn in this context is not its text-
book statement that an actions's combination of federal and state law
issues does not render unconstitutional an assertion of federal question
jurisdiction. What is enlightening about Osborn is the breadth of its lan-
guage in this regard, especially in light of its factual context. The Court
in Osborn considered the circumstances under which an exercise of "aris-
ing under" jurisdiction would be rendered unconstitutional by the pres-
ence of questions depending on general principles of state law.290 It
concluded "that when a question to which the judicial power of the
Union is extended by the constitution, forms an ingredient of the original
cause, it is in the power of congress to give the circuit courts jurisdiction
of that cause, although other questions of fact or of law may be involved
in it."29t
The Court's application of the standard it established in Osborn to the
facts of that case is perhaps most telling of all:
The case of the Bank is, we think, a very strong case of this descrip-
tion. The charter of incorporation not only creates it, but gives it every
faculty which it possesses. The power to acquire rights of any descrip-
tion, to transact business of any description, to make contracts of any
description, to sue on those contracts, is given and measured by its
charter, and that charter is a law of the United States. This being can
acquire no right, make no contract, bring no suit, which is not author-
286. At the time Osborn was decided (in 1824), Congress had not yet enacted a statu-
tory grant of federal question jurisdiction. Congress did not enact a statutory grant of
federal question jurisdiction until 1879. Both Cross and Galligan view the Osborn
Court's discussion of constitutionality of the jurisdiction granted in the charter of the
Bank of the United States as dicta "[b]ecause the claim in Osborn was an Article III
federal question." Cross, supra note 245, at 1231; accord Galligan, supra note 272, at 32.
But their contention that the discussion of the scope of Article III "arising under" juris-
diction in Osborn is dicta is questionable. It depends upon the troubling notion that,
because the constitutional objections raised in Osborn would have constituted a federal
question within the meaning of the statutory grant of federal question jurisdiction enacted
55 years after that case was decided, the Court's Article III "arising under" discussion
was unnecessary to its holding.
287. Osborn, 22 U.S. at 819.
288. Id. at 820.
289. Id.
290. See id. at 821-22.
291. Id. at 823 (emphasis added).
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ized by a law of the United States. It is not only itself the mere crea-
ture of a law, but all its actions and all its rights are dependant on the
same law. Can a being, thus constituted, have a case which does not
arise literally, as well as substantially, under the law?
Take the case of contract, which is put as the strongest against the
Bank. When a Bank sues, the first question which presents itself, and
which lies at the foundation of the cause, is, has this legal entity a right
to sue? Has it a right to come, not into this Court particularly, but
into any Court? This depends on a law of the United State. [sic] The
next question is, has this being a right to make this particular contract?
If this question be decided in the negative, the cause is determined
against the plaintiff; and this question, too, depends entirely on a law
of the United States. These are important questions, and they exist in
every possible case.292
The breadth of the standard in Osborn is evident from its facts, as Osborn
and the other defendants in the action did not question the Bank's power
to act, only the constitutionality of the grant of federal jurisdiction.2 93
The court found the mere possibility of this federal issue sufficient for
jurisdiction, however, for "[w]hether [the federal question of the Bank's
power to act] be, in fact, relied on or not, in the defen[s]e, it is still a part
of the cause, and may be relied on."' 294 Moreover, the true breadth of
292. Id at 823-24.
293. See id at 824-25. The propriety of the injunction at issue involved important
federal questions concerning whether the Bank of the United States was subject to the
taxing power of the State of Ohio and, thus, whether the Ohio statute was constitutional.
See id at 867-68. Nonetheless, because Congress had not enacted a statutory grant of
federal question jurisdiction, the federal issues involving the preemption of the Ohio stat-
ute could not have formed the basis for jurisdiction in the Circuit Court. See id. at 851-
59. Moreover, it is unclear from the litigants' statement of the case whether the question
of the constitutionality of Ohio statute was raised only in reply to the auditor's defense to
the injunction. See Osborn, 22 U.S. at 900 (Johnson, J., dissenting). As Justice Johnson
noted:
It [is] well [known], that it was a case emphatically arising out of an act of the
state of Ohio, operating upon the domicil of the Bank, which, although
purchased in right of an existence metaphysically given it by congress, was ac-
quired and held according to the laws of Ohio, acting upon its own territory.
Id. In statutory federal question cases, the presence of federal questions in a defense is
irrelevant to the satisfaction of the requirements of § 1331. For example, as the Court
stated in Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley
[i]t is not enough that the plaintiff alleges some anticipated defense to his cause
of action and asserts that the defense is invalidated by some provision of the
Constitution of the United States. Although such allegations show that very
likely, in the course of the litigation, a question under the Constitution would
arise, they do not show that the suit, that is, the plaintiffs original cause of
action, arises under the Constitution.
211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908). The "well-pleaded complaint" rule applies only to statutory
"arising under" cases, however. See, e.g., American Nat'l Red Cross v. S.G., 112 S. Ct.
2465, 2473 (1992); Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 494 (1983).
294. Osborn, 22 U.S. at 824. According to the Court,
[t]he right of the plaintiff to sue, cannot depend on the defence which the de-
fendant may choose to set up. His right to sue is anterior to that defence, and
must depend on the state of things when the action is brought. The question
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Osborn is apparent in the subsequent cases brought by or against the
Bank; once resolved by the Supreme Court, similar objections to the
Bank's power to act could not be raised.295 The dissent in Osborn took
issue with the broad constitutional standard set forth by the majority,296
complaining that Article III did not sanction the assertion of jurisdiction
"merely on the ground that a question might possibly be raised in it,
involving the constitution, or constitutionality of a law of the United
States.'297 Nonetheless, Osborn continues to be cited by the Supreme
which the case involves, then, must determine its character, whether those ques-
tions be made in the cause or not.
Id.; see also American Nat'l Red Cross v. S.G., 112 S. Ct. 2465, 2475-76 (1992) (conclud-
ing that constitutionality of grant of jurisdiction over actions involving federally
chartered entities such as the Red Cross was long ago resolved by Osborn and its
progeny).
295. See Bank of the United States v. Planters' Bank, 22 U.S. 904, 904 (1824) (federal
courts have jurisdiction over suit by Bank of United States as endorsee or bearer of prom-
issory note). Further, according to Justice Johnson dissenting in Osborn v. Bank of the
United States
[b]y possibility, a constitutional question may be raised, in any conceivable suit
that may be instituted; but that would be a very insufficient ground for assum-
ing universal jurisdiction; and yet, that a question has been made, as that, for
instance, on the bank charter, and may again be made, seems still worse, as a
ground for extending jurisdiction. For, the folly of raising it again in every suit
instituted by the bank, is too great, to suppose it possible. Yet this supposition,
and this alone, would seem to justify vesting the bank with an unlimited right to
sue in the federal courts. Indeed, I cannot perceive how, with ordinary correct-
ness, a question can be said to be involved in a cause, which only may possibly
be made, but which, in fact, is the very last question that there is any probability
will be made; or rather, how that can any longer be denominated a question,
which has been put out of existence by a solemn decision.
22 U.S. at 886-87 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
296. The dissent intimates that the majority is motivated by political considerations in
reaching its decision. See 22 U.S. at 871-73. Additionally, Henry Shulman and Edward
C. Jaegerman note:
Marshall was apparently anxious to establish the validity of a grant of federal
jurisdiction in any suits by or against the Bank on ordinary commercial transac-
tions. This concern is easily understandable. The Government was interested
as an owner of the Bank and the Bank was performing governmental service.
Moreover, the Bank was the object of great popular hatred and of measures of
reprisal by many state legislatures. It was sadly in need of a federal haven for
its litigation. The doctrinal channel leading to that haven was quite obvious,
once discovered. Whatever the claim it made, a suit by the Bank raised a fed-
eral question.
Henry Shulman & Edward C. Jaegerman, Some Jurisdictional Limitations on Federal
Procedure, 45 Yale L.J. 393, 404-05 (1936) (emphasis in original).
297. 22 U.S. at 874. According to the Dissent:
[w]hy then should [federal courts] be vested with jurisdiction, in a thousand
causes, on a mere possibility of a question arising, which question, at last, does
not occur in one of them? Indeed, I cannot perceive how such a reach of juris-
diction can be asserted, without changing the reading of the constitution on this
subject altogether. The judicial power extends only to "cases arising," that is,
actual, not potential, cases. The framers of the constitution knew better, than
to trust such a quo minus fiction in the hands of any government.
See id. at 886.
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Court as good law.298
Cross reads Osborn broadly enough to support the contention that
§ 1334(a)'s grant of jurisdiction over title 11 cases constitutes a permissi-
ble grant of "arising under" jurisdiction.2 99 Under this construction, the
"title 11 case" is a constitutional "case" within the meaning of Article
III because its commencement is authorized by federal law" c and be-
cause certain federal rights, such as the automatic stay, flow from this
commencement.
301
Applying Osborn, "arising in" proceedings can also be said to fit
within constitutional "arising under" jurisdiction on several grounds.
298. See, e.g., American Nat'l Red Cross v. S.G., 112 S. Ct. 2465, 2476 (1992) (citing
Osborn and referring to it as "long-standing and settled rule, on which Congress has
surely been entitled to rely"); Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480,
492 (1983) (relying on Osborn to uphold jurisdictional grant in Foreign Sovereign Immu-
nities Act).
299. See Cross, supra note 245, at 1242.
300. See 11 U.S.C. § 301.
301. An intuitive difficulty with this construction is that the federal ingredient involved
in the filing of a bankruptcy petition may never be disputed. See Judge Robert E.
DeMascio, et al., National Legal Center for the Public Interest, Fourteen Years or Life:
The Bankruptcy Court Dilemma 1-2 (1983) (Judge DeMascio questions whether bank-
ruptcy courts could be made Article III courts because a bankruptcy case may not be a
"case or controversy" within the meaning of Article III); see also Galligan, supra note
272, at 39 & n.145 ("the bankruptcy proceeding itself is arguably not a case or contro-
versy, and federal courts may only take jurisdiction over cases or controversies"). But
whether a "title 11" case is sufficiently federal to allow the "case" to fulfill constitutional
"arising under" jurisdiction is a question distinct from the justiciability of an undisputed
bankruptcy case.
Most title 11 cases are undisputed. Although 11 U.S.C. § 301 enables an eligible
debtor to fie a bankruptcy petition commencing a "case," this authorization alone cre-
ates no "controversy." See Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Cases, Problems,
and Materials On Bankruptcy 1 (Little, Brown 2d ed. 1990) ("The legal proceeding [in a
bankruptcy case] of the typical individual who asks for a discharge is an uncontested
affair. Frequently, there are no nonexempt assets to turn over to the general creditors.
There is nothing to fight over."). Section 301 provides that the commencement of a vol-
untary bankruptcy case by the filing of a petition "constitutes an order for relief," thus,
the filing of a bankruptcy petition in all instances automatically commences a bankruptcy
case. Objections to the filing must be made in a separate proceeding. For example, a
party in interest could object to a bankruptcy petition on the grounds that the debtor is
ineligible for relief under title 11, but such a proceeding would "arise under" 11 U.S.C.
§ 109, the provision of the Bankruptcy Code governing eligibility requirements. More-
over, the federal rights which flow from the commencement of a title 11 case also may
never be controverted. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 523, 524, 727 (providing that debtor entitled to
discharge under prescribed circumstances, but entitling individual debtor to discharge
unless objection raised by party in interest). Thus, it should not be surprising to note that
there is no case law interpreting the scope of the grant of exclusive federal jurisdiction
over "cases under title 11" found in 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a).
The lack of an actual controversy in any given bankruptcy case should not alone
render unconstitutional the grant of federal jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases, however.
See Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. 568, 577 (1926) (holding that grant of federal juris-
diction over naturalization cases fulfills requirements of Article III of Constitution
although request for naturalization may never be controverted); see also Galligan, supra
note 272, at 39 n.145 ("It is hard to imagine how a naturalization proceeding could be a
case or controversy and a bankruptcy would not.").
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First, by definition, "arising in" proceedings would not exist in the ab-
sence of the federal bankruptcy case. Courts have defined "arising in"
jurisdiction to exist "if it is a proceeding that, by its nature, could arise
only in the context of a bankruptcy case. "302 Consequently, in a broad
sense, "arising in" proceedings can be said to "arise under" the federal
statutes and procedural rules which authorize the filing of a bankruptcy
petition.3 °3 Second, most "arising in" proceedings involve either litiga-
tion on a disputed proof of claim or a claim arising out of the post-peti-
tion administration of the bankruptcy estate. °4 In the first class of cases,
the proceeding can broadly be viewed as "arising under" 11 U.S.C.
§ 501(a), which authorizes the filing of a proof of claim.305 In the second
class of cases, the proceeding can be said to "arise under" 11 U.S.C.
§§ 721 and 1108,306 which authorize the trustee or debtor-in-posses-
sion30 7 to operate the business of the debtor following the filing of a bank-
ruptcy petition, and 28 U.S.C. § 959(a), which provides that trustees and
other enumerated representatives of the bankruptcy estate may be sued
"with respect to any of their acts or transactions in carrying on business
connected with such property [of the estate]. ' 3 a Finally, where the
bankruptcy trustee, debtor-in-possession, or possibly even an official
committee of creditors or equity security holders,30 9 is a party to an
"arising in" proceeding, as often is the case, there also inevitably lurk
302. In re Wood, 825 F.2d 90, 97 (5th Cir. 1987); see also supra notes 75-84 and ac-
companying text (discussing definition of "arising in" bankruptcy jurisdiction).
303. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 301 (permitting "entity that may be a debtor under such
chapter" to commence bankruptcy case under a chapter of title 11 by filing a bankruptcy
petition); Fed. R. Bankr. P., Official Form 1 (form for voluntary petition).
304. See supra notes 75-84 and accompanying text (discussing scope of "arising in"
jurisdiction).
305. See 11 U.S.C. § 501(a) ("A creditor or an indenture trustee may file a proof of
claim. An equity security holder may file a proof of interest."); see also Fed. R. Bankr.
P., Official Form 10 (form for proof of claim).
306. See 11 U.S.C. § 721 ("The court may authorize the trustee to operate the business
of the debtor for a limited period, if such operation is in the best interest of the estate and
consistent with the orderly liquidation of the estate."); § 1108 ("Unless the court, on
request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, orders otherwise, the trustee
may operate the debtor's business.").
307. See 11 U.S.C. § 1107 (authorizing debtor-in-possession to exercise most powers of
trustee in chapter 11 case, including power to operate business).
308. See 28 U.S.C. § 959(a) ("Trustees, receivers or managers of any property, includ-
ing debtors in possession, may be sued, without leave of the court appointing them, with
respect to any of their acts or transactions in carrying on business connected with such
property. Such actions shall be subject to the general equity power of such court so far as
the same may be necessary to the ends of justice, but this shall not deprive a litigant of his
right to trial by jury.").
309. For a definition of an official creditors' or equity security holders' committee, see
11 U.S.C. § 1102. Section 1102 requires the United States Trustee to "appoint a commit-
tee of creditors holding unsecured claims" and permits the U.S. Trustee to appoint "addi-
tional committees of creditors or of equity security holders" as it deems appropriate. See
11 U.S.C. § 1 102(a)(1)-(2). The statute goes on to provide that these committees "shall
ordinarily consist of the persons, willing to serve, that hold the seven largest claims
against the debtor" or equity securities of the debtor, as relevant. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 1102(b)(l)-(2).
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federal-law issues relating to the authority of these actors to sue or be
sued, to enter into contracts, and otherwise to administer the estate. 310
The factual circumstances in Osborn are distinguishable from most
"arising in" proceedings, but none of these factual distinctions seem suffi-
cient to alter the constitutional analysis. First, unlike the federal statute
at issue in Osborn, neither the Bankruptcy Code nor its companion juris-
dictional provisions explicitly enable the trustee and others to sue and be
sued in federal courts.311 Although there is a statute which expressly
provides that a trustee in bankruptcy may "sue and be sued," that statute
does not specifically mention the federal courts and, moreover, expressly
limits this authority to suits relating to post-petition operations.3 12 Still,
§ 1334(b)'s jurisdictional grant is clearly broader than that at issue in
Osborn. Thus, § 1334(b)'s failure to provide explicitly that a trustee and
other representatives of the estate can sue and be sued in federal courts
would not seem to carry constitutional significance.
Second, the suits which could be brought by or against the federally
chartered bank at issue in Osborn necessarily would involve the actions
or inactions of the federally chartered bank. Suits brought by or against
a trustee might involve the actions or inactions of the trustee in his ca-
pacity as representative of the estate. a 3 By contrast, however, suits
might just as easily involve the actions or inactions of the debtor prior to
the filing of the bankruptcy petition and creation of the estate, which the
trustee asserts or raises as a defense in his capacity as representative of
the debtor.314 Thus, "arising in" proceedings involving pre-petition con-
duct are distinct from the conduct at issue in Osborn. Suits involving
post-petition conduct of the estate arguably involve two distinct federal
ingredients, however-the estate's power to enter into the transaction
and its capacity to sue or be sued. Suits involving pre-petition events
involve at least the latter issue of capacity.
Finally, the threshold federal issues referred to in Osborn involved the
power of Congress to charter the Bank under federal law and the scope
of this federal charter. The federal issues in an "arising in" proceeding
will differ depending on the circumstances of the suit. Where the suit
arises out of the post-petition operation of the estate, such as wvith a suit
to enforce a post-petition contract made by the estate, there inevitably
310. See, e.g., American Nat'l Red Cross v. S.G, 112 S. Ct. 2465, 2476 (1992) (constru-
ing charter of American National Red Cross); Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria,
461 U.S. 480 (1983) (construing Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act); Osborn v. Bank of
United States, 22 U.S. 738 (1824) (construing charter of Bank of United States).
311. See American Nat'l Red Cross v. S.G., 112 S. Ct. 2465, 2469-72 (1992) (holding
that a congressional charter's "sue and be sued" provision may be read to confer federal
court jurisdiction if, but only if, it specifically mentions the federal courts).
312. See 28 U.S.C. § 959(a).
313. See id
314. See 11 U.S.C. § 558 (enabling estate to raise any defense "available to the debtor
as against any entity other than the estate, including statutes of limitation, statutes of
frauds, usury, and other personal defenses").
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exist threshold issues relating to the power of Congress to create a bank-
ruptcy estate authorized to carry on the business of the debtor. Where
the "arising in" proceeding involves litigation on a pre-petition claim
against the estate, such as with a claim on a pre-petition contract with
the debtor, the underlying federal issue instead involves the power of
Congress to create a bankruptcy estate against which recovery on pre-
petition claims is limited. In some instances, however, the federal issues
involved in an "arising in" proceeding will involve nothing more than
standing issues-determinations as to whether the trustee is a proper
party to the action. For example, where the trustee is authorized to
bring a suit against the debtor's shareholders seeking recovery on the
theory that the shareholders acted as mere alter egos of the debtor-corpo-
ration, courts have viewed the cause of action as "arising in" the title 11
case, because, but for the filing of the bankruptcy petition and the ap-
pointment of the bankruptcy trustee, the alter ego action would have
been commenced by some party other than the trustee.3 5 The only im-
plicit federal issue in such an action is the standing of the trustee. Be-
cause there is no express provision in the Bankruptcy Code authorizing
the trustee to bring alter ego actions, the trustee's standing to bring the
suit turns on an issue of state law: If, under state law, the debtor-corpo-
ration could have commenced the alter ego action, then, as representative
of the estate, the trustee has the exclusive right to bring such an action on
behalf of the estate; alternatively, if state law defines creditors of the
debtor as the proper parties to commence an alter ego action, then the
trustee may not have standing to bring the action because the trustee is
not empowered to act on behalf of individual creditors.316 An alternative
way to view this issue, however, is that the trustee's ability to bring suit
turns on whether the proceeds of recovery would constitute property of
the debtor's estate, a federal question informed by state law concepts.32 7
Under a broad reading of Osborn, even "related to" proceedings can be
said to "arise under" federal law within the meaning of Article III,
although here the scope of constitutionally permissible grants of "arising
under" jurisdiction would be strained to its limits. Where the "related
to" proceeding is brought by or against the trustee, debtor-in-possession,
or other representative of the estate, there exists an implicit federal issue
315. Compare Koch Refining v. Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc., 831 F.2d 1339,
1344-46 (7th Cir. 1987) (by virtue of appellate procedure followed in case, court pre-
sumed alter ego action to "arise in" title I 1 case), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 906 (1988) with
In re Ozark Restaurant Equip. Co., 816 F.2d 1222, 1226 (8th Cir.) (trustee had no stand-
ing under Bankruptcy Code to bring an alter ego action on behalf of debtor's creditors),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
316. Compare Koch Refining, 831 F.2d at 1344-46 (construing Illinois and Indiana
law) with In re Ozark, 816 F.2d at 1226 n.7 (construing Arkansas law); but see Williams
v. California 1st Bank, 859 F.2d 664, 666 (9th Cir. 1988) (relying solely on Caplin v.
Marine Midland Grace Trust Co., 406 U.S. 416 (1972), court held that trustee is never
entitled to assert general causes of action, such as an alter ego claim; irrelevant that 111
creditors had assigned their rights to trustee).
317. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
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involving the authority of such entity to sue or be sued.3" 8 In addition,
the federal issue underlying every proceeding "related to" a title 11 case
is Congress' power to create the federal remedy of bankruptcy and per-
mit the commencement of a bankruptcy case, for if Congress does not
have this power there can be no title 11 case for the proceeding to af-
fect.3" 9 This is especially true where "related to" jurisdiction is narrowly
defined to include only those proceedings affecting distributions from the
estate or administration of the estate.32 °
The contention that all "arising in" and "related to" proceedings are a
form of constitutional "arising under" jurisdiction is a controversial one.
Galligan and Cross agree that Osborn validates the constitutionality of
"arising in" and "related to" proceedings 2 1 that are brought by or
against a trustee in bankruptcy,322 but contend that Osborn extends no
further.32 3 They describe this argument as the "original ingredient" the-
318. For an example of a "related to" proceeding brought by a debtor-in-possession,
see infra text accompanying notes 550-52 (discussing Marathon-type cause of action).
For an example of a "related to" proceeding involving only non-debtor third parties, see
supra notes 28-37 and accompanying text (stating hypothetical reminiscent of Xonics).
319. Osborn has been very broadly construed by courts and commentators. See Ameri-
can Nat'l Red Cross v. S.G., 112 S. Ct. 2465, 2476 (1992) (upholding grant of federal
jurisdiction in charter of Red Cross as constitutional); Matasar, One Constitutional Case,
supra note 102, at 1445 n.206 (contending that "[a]t the very least, Osborn ... indicate[s]
that Congress ought to have the flexibility to protect an instrumentality of the United
States from potential discrimination at the hands of hostile state judiciaries by providing
for federal jurisdiction in cases involving those instrumentalities .... Moreover, as a
corollary to the principle of protecting federal entities, federal jurisdiction would also
extend to cases involving pure state law issues that have a federal question lurking in the
background.").
320. See supra notes 85-98 and accompanying text (discussing case law interpreting
scope of "related to" jurisdiction).
321. Galligan does not explicitly consider whether Osborn validates the grant of juris-
diction over "arising in" proceedings. See Galligan, supra note 272, at 1 n.2 ("For analy-
sis, this article focuses on a 'related to' case in which the bankruptcy debtor or his estate
is the plaintiff."). Cross seems to cover both "arising in" and "related to" proceedings in
his analysis, although he focuses on "related to" jurisdiction when he criticizes the "origi-
nal ingredient" theory is an insufficient ground for bankruptcy jurisdiction. See Cross,
supra note 245, at 1233 (rejecting various theories, other than ancillary jurisdiction, as
"neither broad nor flexible enough to support the full range of bankruptcy jurisdiction,
especially the district courts' 'related to' jurisdiction over claims that do not involve the
debtor").
322. See Galligan, supra note 272, at 33 ("One could argue that all litigation involving
the trustee could be constitutionally based in federal court because questions concerning
the propriety of the trustee's appointment or his capacity to sue or be sued might arise in
any case."); Cross, supra note 245, at 1230-31 ("The trustee's status as a federal official
arguably brings even state-law claims involving the trustee under Article III federal ques-
tion jurisdiction through the judicially developed 'original ingredient' theory.").
323. See Galligan, supra note 272, at 34 ("However, the original ingredient theory does
not go far enough, because a trustee is not the only 'entity' that might want to sue in
federal court on a 'related to' claim."). Cross agrees that the original ingredient theory is
insufficient to justify the constitutionality of bankruptcy jurisdiction because some "re-
lated to" proceedings exist between third parties. See Cross, supra note 245, at 1232
("These third-party suits accordingly lack even the minimal federal ingredient required to
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ory of constitutional "arising under" jurisdiction, 324 a reference to Jus-
tice Marshall's statement in Osborn that Article III extends to Congress
the power to confer federal jurisdiction whenever "a question to which
the judicial power of the Union ... forms an ingredient of the original
cause." '325 Galligan and Cross reject the notion that proceedings involv-
ing a debtor-in-possession satisfy Osborn because "[i]f all Congress has to
do to grant federal jurisdiction, without providing a rule of decision, is to
'create' a federal juridical entity, then whenever it wanted a federal court
to hear a case Congress could so legislate by engaging in semantics. '326
This narrow reading of Osborn has been refuted by more recent Supreme
Court precedent, however. In American Red Cross v. S. G.,327 the Court
viewed the constitutionality of a federal statute empowering the Red
Cross to "sue or be sued" in federal courts as long resolved,328 citing
Osborn.
Moreover, both Galligan and Cross narrowly read Osborn to uphold a
grant of federal jurisdiction whenever there exists a "federal party" to a
suit, such as a trustee in bankruptcy, 329 although they admit that others
have construed the case more broadly to validate jurisdictional grants in
which a federal question is an "original ingredient" of the case.330 Galli-
gan defines an "original ingredient" for these purposes as "one that the
court must resolve, either implicitly or explicitly, in plaintiff's favor for
plaintiff to win its case."' 331 Thus, an "original ingredient" in every "aris-
ing in" and "related to" proceeding, irrespective of whether a trustee,
debtor-in-possession, or other representative of the estate is a party to the
fit within Article III."). Cross also contends that "there is considerable doubt whether
the theory retains any validity." Id. According to Cross:
Osborn and Planter's Bank were in many ways children of necessity. The Court
faced an important issue-namely, the relationship between the national bank
and the states. In order to deal with this issue expeditiously, the Court had to
find a basis for federal jurisdiction over the actions rather than wait for the
cases to come to it on appeal from a state court. Some have accordingly argued
that the broad language of Osborn was an attempt to deal with a crises and as
such overstated the true reach of Article III federal question jurisdiction.
Id. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court cited Osborn with approval as recently as 1992. See
American Nat'l Red Cross v. S.G., 112 S. Ct. 2465 (1992).
324. See Galligan, supra note 272, at 33; Cross, supra note 245, at 1233.
325. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. 738, 823 (1824).
326. Galligan, supra note 272, at 35; see Cross, supra note 245, at 1230 n.158.
327. 112 S. Ct. 2465 (1992).
328. See id. at 2475-76.
329. Cross distinguishes between an "original ingredient" and a "federal party" theory
of Article III jurisdiction, but then views only the trustee's status as a federal official as
the only relevant "original ingredient." See Cross, supra note 245, at 1231 n.161.
330. See, e.g., Alan D. Hornstein, Federalism, Judicial Power and the 'Arising Under'
Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts: A Hierarchical Analysis, 56 Ind. L.J. 563, 575-90
(1981) (examining the "federal ingredient" test that Chief Justice Marshall used to justify
federal jurisdiction in Osborn); Note, The Theory of Protective Jurisdiction, 57 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 933, 968-74 (1982) (defining Chief Justice Marshall's "original ingredient" analysis
in Osborn as a federal issue comprising a logical component of plaintiff's cause of action,
and discussing the difficulties of using this analysis to invoke federal jurisdiction).
331. Galligan, supra note 272, at 33.
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proceeding, is the power of Congress to authorize the remedy of bank-
ruptcy, including the debtor's eligibility to seek that remedy.
Put so broadly, however, an "original ingredient" theory of Article III
may be difficult to distinguish from the theory of protective jurisdic-
tion.332 But even the narrowest definition of protective jurisdiction re-
quires only that Congress grant federal jurisdiction pursuant to "an
articulated and active federal policy regulating a field." 333 Once it is
shown that the state law claim relates to an articulated and active federal
policy, this definition of protective jurisdiction would permit a federal
court to hear the state law claim standing alone. Bankruptcy jurisdiction
over "arising in" and "related to" proceedings does not work indepen-
dently from the grant of jurisdiction over title 11 cases. "Arising in" and
"related to" proceedings exist only in the context of the title 11 case, and
thus the title 11 case forms an "original ingredient" of any form of bank-
ruptcy relief, including "arising in" and "related to" proceedings occur-
ring in the case.334
(b) Bankruptcy Jurisdiction as Supplemental Jurisdiction
"Related to" proceedings can also be viewed as a form of supplemental
jurisdiction.335 Cross contends that, under the doctrine of ancillary juris-
diction, "related to" jurisdiction involving purely state law claims be-
332. As Matasar notes, at some point a broad reading of Osborn leads to the conclu-
sion that constitutional "arising under" jurisdiction permits Congress to grant to federal
courts protective jurisdiction. See Matasar, One Constitutional Case, supra note 102, at
1445 n.206.
333. See Mishlkin, supra note 277, at 192.
334. Cf. Cross, supra note 245, at 1243-51. According to Cross:
[In bankruptcy cases] the federal remedy is contingent upon resolution of the
related state-law claims. The logical relationship in these cases is the interde-
pendence of the federal and state claims. Because the scope of bankruptcy relief
is intimately tied to the outcome of the state-law claims, it certainly makes sense
to try the state claims along with the federal.
Id. at 1243. Cross further notes that
Federal [bankruptcy] jurisdiction is [thus] limited to those state claims that
must be resolved in order to define the shape of the eventual bankruptcy relief.
Because all the state claims are logically related to the federal cause of action in
bankruptcy, they form part of a single federal bankruptcy "case" for purposes
of Article III.
Id at 1251.
335. Cross seems to view "related to" jurisdiction as consistent with the precepts of
Article III, but only because "[tihe theory of ancillary jurisdiction... provide[s] a means
of sustaining bankruptcy jurisdiction." Cross, supra 245, at 1233. As Cross notes:
[tihe theory of protective jurisdiction, although facially appealing, cannot be
reconciled with Article III. Conversely, although the other theories are consis-
tent with Article III, they are neither broad nor flexible enough to support the
full range of bankruptcy jurisdiction, especially the district courts' "related to"
jurisdiction over claims that do not involve the debtor.
Perhaps my difficulty with this conception of the constitutional sources of bankruptcy
jurisdiction is merely semantic, but I am troubled by the argument that "related to"
jurisdiction, standing alone, is inconsistent with Article III because it does not "arise
under" federal bankruptcy law but that, considered in the context of a bankruptcy case,
1994]
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tween non-diverse parties satisfies Article 111.36 Defining "related to"
jurisdiction as "limited to those state claims that must be resolved in
order to define the shape of the eventual bankruptcy relief," Cross de-
scribes all these "related to" proceedings as "logically related to the fed-
eral cause of action in bankruptcy," thus, forming "part of a single
federal bankruptcy 'case' for purposes of Article III." '
Characterization of § 1334(b)'s grant of jurisdiction over "related to"
proceedings as a form of supplemental jurisdiction is also supported by
the statute's plain language, especially when that language is taken in its
historical context . 3 8 The phrase "related to" consistently indicates a
"related to" jurisdiction fits within the limitations of Article III because it can be de-
scribed as a form of ancillary jurisdiction.
First, "related to" jurisdiction never stands alone and always only exists in the context
of a bankruptcy case. Cf. id. at 1243 (describing "scope of bankruptcy relief [as] inti-
mately tied to the outcome of the state-law claims" that presumably constitute "arising
in" and "related to" proceedings within the bankruptcy case). Viewed from this perspec-
tive, "related to" proceedings "arise under" federal bankruptcy law precisely because
they are so "logically related" to the case. See supra notes 318-34 and accompanying text
(describing "related to" jurisdiction as "arising under" jurisdiction).
Second, the doctrine of supplemental jurisdictional exists because Congress has never
utilized the full extent of power granted to it in Article III. See infra notes 378-85 and
accompanying text (describing supplemental jurisdiction as closing the gap between the
constitutional grant and the statutory exercise of federal court jurisdiction). Supplemen-
tal jurisdiction, thus, exists within, rather that expands upon, the limits of Article III
jurisdiction. See infra note 386 and accompanying text (arguing that there is but one
"case or controversy" within the meaning of Article III); but see Texas Employers Ins.
Ass'n v. Felt, 150 F.2d 227, 234 & n.26 (5th Cir. 1945) (suggesting that Congress can give
federal courts jurisdiction beyond scope of Article III when "a necessary incident to an
effectual exercise of jurisdiction over the enumerated cases and controversies"). Cross's
argument seems to make inferences to the contrary.
336. See Cross, supra note 245, at 1251.
337. Id.
338. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 337 (1979) ("As is true in every case
involving the construction of a statute, our starting point must be the language employed
by Congress.").
Distinct from "related to" jurisdiction, jurisdiction over "arising under" proceedings
resembles a grant of federal question jurisdiction. Section 1334(b)'s phrase proceedings
"arising under title 11" closely resembles the general grant of federal question jurisdiction
in 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) ("The district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States.") (emphasis added). More specific grants of federal question
jurisdiction are found in other federal statutes. See 28 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1988) ("arising
under any Act of Congress regulating commerce or protecting trade and commerce
against restraints and monopolies") (emphasis added); 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1988) ("aris-
ing under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, copyrights
and trade-marks") (emphasis added); 28 U.S.C. § 1339 (1988) ("arising under any Act of
Congress relating to the postal service") (emphasis added); 28 U.S.C. § 1340 (1988)
("arising under any Act of Congress providing for internal revenue, or revenue from
imports or tonnage") (emphasis added).
Section 1334(b) also grants original jurisdiction over civil proceedings "arising in ...
cases under title 11." 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). The phrase "arising
in" does not appear in any other grant of federal jurisdiction. Courts have defined "aris-
ing in" proceedings as those civil proceedings which arise under non-bankruptcy law but
which occur only in the context of a bankruptcy case. A review of case law indicates that
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grant of supplemental jurisdiction in other federal statutes. In 28 U.S.C.
§ 1338(b), district courts are empowered to hear "any civil action assert-
ing a claim of unfair competition when joined with a substantial and re-
lated claim under the copyright, patent, plant variety protection or trade-
mark laws."' 339 Courts have described § 1338(b)'s grant ofjurisdiction as
"supplemental" to the patent, copyright and trademark federal question
jurisdiction granted in § 1338(a).3" Similarly, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a),
which expressly grants supplemental jurisdiction to the district courts,
defines that jurisdiction as extending to all claims "so related to claims in
the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the
same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitu-
tion."' I Thus, reading the statutory grants of federal jurisdiction in pari
materia,342 the grant of jurisidiction over proceedings "related to" a title
11 case constitutes a grant of supplemental jurisdiction.
Moreover, courts historically have recognized exercises of supplemen-
tal bankruptcy jurisdiction. Congress can be assumed to have been
aware of this practice and to have intended to codify it, 3 when, in 1978,
and again in 1984, it enacted a bankruptcy jurisdictional provision con-
ferring on district courts jurisdiction over civil proceedings "arising
under title 11, or arising in or related to cases under title 1." '
In this instance, legislative history345 does not specifically refer to deci-
sions under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 in which ancillary346 and pen-
"arising in" proceedings nearly always involve suits brought by or against the estate or a
representative of the estate, and as such resemble the grants of federal jurisdiction over
civil actions involving the United States as a plaintiff or defendant. See, eg., 28 U.S.C.
§ 1345 (1988) (United States as plaintiff); § 1346 (United States as defendant); § 1347
(partition action where United States is joint tenant); § 1348 (banking association as
party); § 1349 (corporation organized under federal law as party). Alternatively, "arising
in" proceedings can be said to be supplemental to the title 11 case in that, by definition,
they arise only as a result of the title 11 case.
339. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) (1988) (emphasis added).
340. See, e.g., Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 555 (1988) (referring to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1338(b) having been "accomplished by wording that could not be mistaken").
341. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (Supp. IV 1992) (emphasis added).
342. See, e-g., Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773, 780 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(" 'identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same
meaning' ") (quoting Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 484 (1990)); see also, eg., United
States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 1011, 1015 (1992) ("[A] statute must, if possible,
be construed in such fashion that every word has some operative effect.").
343. Generally, the Supreme Court has applied case law decided under prior bank-
ruptcy acts when interpreting the Bankruptcy Code unless, by explicit language in either
the statute or legislative history, Congress articulated an intent to alter the longstanding
practice. See, eg., Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773, 778 (1992); Kelly v. Robinson, 479
U.S. 36, 46-47 (1986); Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't. of Envtl. Protection,
474 U.S. 494, 501 (1986).
344. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b) (repealed).
345. See H.R. Rep. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. at 47 (1977) ("The jurisdictional grants
to the court of bankruptcy by the Acts of 1841 and 1867 were almost as extensive [as that
in H.R. 8200], and the Supreme Court gave the provisions of those Acts a generous
construction and approval of their constitutionality.").
346. Section 2a(20) of the 1898 Act explicitly granted to district courts "ancillary juris-
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diction over persons or property within [the] respective territorial limits [of a district
court sitting in bankruptcy] in aid of a receiver or trustee appointed in any bankruptcy
proceedings pending in any other [district court]." This provision was added to the 1898
Act in 1910, Amendment of June 25, 1910, ch. 412, 36 Stat. 838, 839; see Lazarus,
Michel & Lazarus v. Prentice, 234 U.S. 263, 267 (1914) (interpreting 1910 amendment to
§ 2a(20) of the 1898 Act), to codify the result reached in Babbitt v. Dutcher, 216 U.S. 102
(1910) (concluding that where original court of bankruptcy is entitled to act summarily,
another court of bankruptcy, sitting in another district, can also act in aid of court of
original jurisdiction). Accord Elkus v. Madson Steele Co. (In re Madson Steele Co.), 216
U.S. 115 (1910) (same); In re Benedict, 140 F. 55 (E.D. Wis. 1905) (same); In re Peiser,
115 F. 199 (E.D. Pa. 1902) (same). In Babbitt v. Dutcher, the Court reviewed case law
decided under the 1841 and 1867 Acts, such as Lathrop v. Drake, 91 U.S. 516 (1875),
which had authorized a district court, other than that in which the bankruptcy petition
had been filed, to issue injunctions and maintain suits in aid of the district court in which
the petition had been filed. See Babbitt, 216 U.S. at 106-11 (1910). The Court concluded
that the jurisdictional provisions of the 1898 Act did not alter this long-standing rule.
See id. at 111-14. Babbitt thus rejected those decisions which had reached a contrary
result under the 1898 Act, such as In re Von Hartz, 142 F. 726 (2d Cir. 1905); In re
Williams, 123 F. 321 (W.D. Tenn. 1903); In re Williams, 120 F. 38 (E.D. Ark. 1903).
Section 2a(20)'s grant of ancillary jurisdiction was a limited one, however, and did not
extend beyond "preserving such property and, where necessary, conducting the business
of the bankrupt, and reducing the property to money, paying therefrom such liens as the
court shall find valid and the expenses of ancillary administration, and transmitting the
property or its proceeds to the court of primary jurisdiction." This limitation probably
referred to the principle established in Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. 450 (1860), that ancil-
lary jurisdiction exists to permit a court of equity to resolve claims against property in its
possession. After enactment of § 2a(20), courts similarly interpreted the scope of ancil-
lary jurisdiction. See supra notes 103-09 and accompanying text (discussing development
of ancillary jurisdiction). Courts, thus, narrowly construed § 2a(20)'s statutory grant of
ancillary jurisdiction. See, e.g., Lazarus, Michel & Lazarus v. Prentice, 234 U.S. 263, 269
(1914) (noting that because seizure of property of debtor by ancillary receiver appointed
pursuant to 1898 Act § 2a(20) is a summary proceeding, intervenor's claim for attorney's
fees, which is a plenary action, must be brought in the district court in which bankruptcy
petition was filed); Butler v. Ellis (In re Waldeck-Deal Dredging Co.), 45 F.2d 951, 952-
53, 956 (4th Cir. 1930) (district court exercising ancillary jurisdiction entitled to resolve
validity of liens asserted against property in its custody and order sale in satisfaction of
valid liens; ancillary court erred in permitting sale of property without compliance with
provisions relating to notice and allowances); Fidelity Trust Co. v. Gaskell, 195 F. 865,
868-69 (8th Cir. 1912) (district court exercising ancillary jurisdiction under 1898 Act
§ 2a(20) obligated to determine validity of adverse claims asserted against property in
custody of ancillary receiver, and depending upon result of that determination to send
property to court of primary jurisdiction or apply proceeds in satisfaction of adverse
claims); In re Rodgers & Garrett Timber Co., 22 F.2d 571, 574 (D. Md. 1927) (district
court exercising ancillary jurisdiction entitled to resolve priority and lien claims asserted
against property in its custody; distinguishes Lazarus, Michel & Lazarus v. Prentice, 234
U.S. 263 (1914), as precluding ancillary court from resolving claim against such property
where claims arose after not before filing of bankruptcy petition); In re Meyer & Judd, I
F.2d 513, 526 (W.D. Tenn. 1924) (district court exercising ancillary jurisdiction under
§ 2a(20) has jurisdiction to determine whether property seized by ancillary receiver is
property of debtor); In re Einstein, 245 F. 189, 191 (N.D.N.Y. 1917) (district court exer-
cising ancillary jurisdiction under § 2a(20) has jurisdiction to determine whether fund
collected by ancillary receiver belongs to debtor or to adverse claimant, and to determine
validity of liens asserted against such fund); In re Lipman, 201 F. 169, 172-73 (D.N.J.
1912) (where ancillary receiver obtained possession of goods alleged to have been fraudu-
lently transferred by the debtor, district court exercising ancillary jurisdiction under
§ 2a(20) acquired jurisdiction to determine rights of debtor's transferee and grant com-
plete relief relating to such property); In re Sutter Bros., 131 F. 654, 654 (S.D.N.Y. 1904)
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dent 347 bankruptcy jurisdiction were exercised, but does, in general,
indicate Congress' intent to replicate and possibly exceed the grants of
jurisdiction under the Bankruptcy Acts of 1841348 and 1867,11 and spe-
cifically cites Lathrop v. Drake,350 a case validating an exercise of ancil-
(district court exercising ancillary jurisdiction under § 2a(20) entitled to grant creditor's
application for examination of witnesses). Courts also narrowly construed assertions of
ancillary jurisdiction outside the scope of § 2a(20). See, e.g., In re Converse-Hough &
Co., 27 F.2d 368, 370 (W.D.N.Y. 1928) (ancillary bankruptcy jurisdiction did not exist
after confirmation of composition because confirmation divests court of possession of
property of estate). Where the court no longer had possession of the property, ancillary
jurisdiction was said not to exist.
347. Before the Supreme Court's expansion of the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction in
Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933), and United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715
(1966), courts had uniformly declined to find pendent jurisdiction over state law claims
joined with federal claims in a plenary bankruptcy action commenced by a trustee. See
State Trust & Say. Bank v. Dunn, 278 U.S. 582 (1929) (per curium) (reversing assertion
of federal pendent-claim jurisdiction over state law claims asserted in plenary avoidance
action); Lowenstein v. Reikes, 60 F.2d 933 (2d Cir. 1932), cert denied, 287 U.S. 669
(1933) (pendent jurisdiction denied, in part, due to insufficient relationship between
claims); Kaigler v. Gibson, 264 F. 240, 241 (N.D. Ga. 1920) (same). As the Court ex-
panded the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction in the context of general civil litigation with
its decisions in Hum and Gibbs, however, courts divided on whether pendent bankruptcy
jurisdiction was authorized under the 1898 Act.
In Bartle v. Markson, the Second Circuit held that the district court was empowered to
assert pendent jurisdiction over state law claims joined by a trustee in bankruptcy with
claims under § 70e of the 1898 Act. See 357 F.2d 517, 522-23 (2d Cir. 1966) (Friendly,
J.). Because § 70e of the 1898 Act permitted a trustee to avoid transactions that would
have been avoidable by actual unsecured creditors of the bankrupt under state law, the
trustee's § 70e claims in Bartle actually derived from state law; federal bankruptcy juris-
diction existed as to the trustee's § 70e claim although the defendants had not consented
to jurisdiction because § 23 explicitly excepts from the general rule that defendants must
consent to federal bankruptcy jurisdiction actions brought under, among other things,
§ 70e. See id at 522-23. Although decided in 1966, Bartle pre-dates Gibbs by several
months and thus relied on Hum. Nonetheless, the court found that the state law claims
were but "the second act" to the § 70e claims. Id. at 523. Relying on Bartle, the Sixth
Circuit, in Melamed v. Lake County Nat'l Bank, 727 F.2d 1399 (6th Cir. 1984), similarly
affirmed the district court's assertion of pendent jurisdiction over the trustee's claim that
the defendant had tortiously interfered with the debtor's business because it arose out of
the same nucleus of facts as the trustee's fraudulent transfer action. See id. at 1403.
Because it was decided in 1984, Melamed looked to Gibbs for the governing standard.
See id It also applied Zahn and Aldinger, but predated Finley. See id.
The court in Melamed distinguished an earlier district court decision, Creel v. Lawler,
462 F. Supp. 118, 122-23 (N.D. Tex. 1978), in which pendent jurisdiction was declined.
See Melamed, 727 F.2d at 1403. In Creel, the court declined to exercise pendent jurisdic-
tion over the trustee's alter ego action, although it admittedly arose out of a common
nucleus of facts with the trustee's preference and fraudulent transfer suit, because it
thought the state claims predominated over the federal ones and, thus, were likely to
confuse the jury. See Creel, 462 F. Supp. at 122. In dicta, the court cast doubt upon the
power of a district court to assert jurisdiction pendent to plenary actions brought pursu-
ant to § 23 of the 1898 Act. See id. at 120. It noted that § 23's grant of federal bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction was narrowly crafted by Congress, and that the doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction, vastly expanded by courts since enactment of this section, could eviscerate
these limitations. See id at 121-22.
348. See infra note 499 (discussing jurisdictional provisions of 1841 Act in detail).
349. See infra note 500 (discussing jurisdictional provisions of 1867 Act in detail).
350. 91 U.S. 516 (1875).
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lary jurisdiction under the 1867 Bankruptcy Act.351 Congress can be
presumed to have been familiar with courts' reliance on the doctrines of
ancillary and pendent jurisdiction in the bankruptcy context, at least
under the 1867 Bankruptcy Act.35 2
Thus, there may be more to the "substantiality" test than courts or
commentators have previously concluded. The "substantiality" test may
indeed impose a test of constitutional significance only apparent when
applied to an exercise of supplemental bankruptcy jurisdiction, rather
than an exercise of jurisdiction supplemental to federal question or diver-
sity jurisdiction. It may require that the federal ingredient in the primary
claim be "substantial." And where the primary claim is an "arising in"
or a "related to" proceeding this requirement may not be satisfied, de-
pending upon the constitutional sources of this jurisdiction. If it is a
form of "arising under" jurisdiction, its federal ingredient may be viewed
as sufficiently "substantial" to serve as the basis of an exercise of supple-
mental jurisdiction. If it is a form of supplemental jurisdiction, however,
the "substantiality" requirement may not be met.
(ii) Relatedness
Gibbs also provides that an exercise of pendent jurisdiction is constitu-
tionally authorized when "the relationship between [a claim arising
under the Laws of the United States] and the state claim permits the
conclusion that the entire action before the court comprises but one con-
stitutional 'case.' "'I As applied to an assertion of supplemental bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction, this language does not clearly describe the focus of
this "relatedness" test. To what must the supplemental claim relate? Is
it sufficient that the supplemental claim shares a logical or factual rela-
tionship with the primary claim, if the primary claim derives from state
law?
Some commentators restate the Gibbs "relatedness" test slightly differ-
351. In Lathrop, relying on the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction, the Supreme Court
held that an assignee in bankruptcy was entitled to bring a suit in a federal circuit court
for the recovery of assets in a district other than that in which the bankruptcy petition
had been filed although the citizenship of the parties was not diverse. See id. at 517-18.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on a combination of statutory construction
and policy arguments. See id. at 518 ("Proceedings ancillary to and in aid of the proceed-
ings in bankruptcy may be necessary in other districts where the principal court cannot
exercise jurisdiction; and it may be necessary for the assignee to institute suits in other
districts for the recovery of assets of the bankrupt .... The State courts may undoubt-
edly be resorted to in cases of ordinary suits for the possession of property or the collec-
tion of debts; and it is not to be presumed that embarrassments would be encountered in
those courts in the way of a prompt and fair administration of justice. But a uniform
system of bankruptcy, national in its character, ought to be capable of execution in the
national tribunals, without dependence upon those of the States in which it is possible
that embarrassments might arise.").
352. See infra notes 496-503 and accompanying text (discussing reference in legislative
history to Lathrop v. Drake).
353. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
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ently.35 4 They contend that the dictates of Article III are satisfied only if
the constitutional "category" or "case" tests are satisfied with respect to
both the primary and supplemental claims.355
According to this analysis, an assertion of jurisdiction over a primary
claim complies with the constitutional "category" test if it falls within
one of the nine categories of "cases or controversies" enumerated in Arti-
cle III, Section 2.356 For example, in Gibbs, the primary claim involved a
federal question "arising under" the National Labor Relations Act.
Thus, because Article III, Section 2, includes among its categories
"Cases... arising under.., the Laws of the United States," the assertion
of primary jurisdiction in Gibbs satisfies the constitutional "category"
test.
357
By definition, therefore, an assertion of supplemental jurisdiction,
standing alone, cannot comply with the constitutional "category" test.35 8
For example, in Gibbs, the state law pendent-claim at issue did not fit
within the categories listed in Article III because it neither arose under
federal law nor involved litigants of diverse citizenship. Instead, under
this analysis, an assertion of supplemental jurisdiction is constitutional if
it satisfies the constitutional "case" test 359 -that is, if the supplemental
claim is so related to the primary claim as to form a single "case or con-
troversy." And in Gibbs, the Court found the constitutional "case" test
satisfied only where the primary claim and the supplemental claim arose
out of a common nucleus of fact. 360
This two-part test for the constitutionality of an assertion of supple-
mental jurisdiction sharpens the focus of the "relatedness" test as applied
to the bankruptcy context, but, depending upon the breadth of the con-
stitutional "category" test, may lead to the conclusion that the Constitu-
tion can support assertions of supplemental bankruptcy jurisdiction only
where the primary claim "arises under" title 11.
Under a narrow application of the constitutional "category" test,
354. See, eg. McLaughlin, supra note 102, at 890-93.
355. See id. at 892.
356. See supra note 1 (quoting U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1).
357. Because the constitutional "category" test focuses on the primary claim, it resem-
bles the first prong of Gibbs-the "substantiality" test. For a discussion of the Gibbs
"substantiality" test, see supra notes 267-79 and accompanying text.
358. McLaughlin notes that it is irrelevant under § 1367 that a supplemental claim
satisfies constitutional "category" test. The example he provides is of a counterclaim
between two diverse citizens (which satisfies constitutional "category" test) but for less
than $50,000 (thus failing statutory requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1332). Unless the pri-
mary claim and counterclaim "derive from a common nucleus of operative fact," the
assertion of supplemental jurisdiction is not supported by 28 U.S.C. § 1367. See Mc-
Laughlin, supra note 102, at 904-07.
359. See McLaughlin, supra note 102, at 892.
360. Because the constitutional "case" test focuses on the supplemental claim, and
especially the relationship between the primary and supplemental claims, it resembles the
second prong of the Gibbs test-the "common nucleus of operative fact" test. For a
discussion of the "common nucleus of operative fact" test, see supra notes 116-18, 246-62
and accompanying text.
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"arising under" bankruptcy proceedings clearly comply with this re-
quirement. Proceedings that "arise under" title 11 satisfy the constitu-
tional "category" test because they are "arising under.., the Laws of the
United States,, 3 61 one of the categories listed in Article III. Thus, an
assertion of jurisdiction supplemental to an "arising under" proceeding
would satisfy this two-step analysis if the supplemental claim is suffi-
ciently related3 62 to the "arising under" proceeding to satisfy the consti-
tutional "case" test.
Whether proceedings that "arise in" or "relate to" a title 11 case sat-
isfy the constitutional "category" test is much more complicated, how-
ever. Article 111363 does not expressly enumerate these sorts of cases or
controversies within its list of categories.3" Supreme Court precedent is
unclear as to the constitutional sources of this jurisdiction. 65 Courts and
commentators agree that an assertion of jurisdiction over proceedings
that "arise in" or "relate to" a title 11 case is constitutional, but disagree
as to whether this is because these proceedings independently fulfill the
constitutional "category" test ("arising under" jurisdiction) or because
they fulfill the constitutional "case" test (supplemental jurisdiction).3 66
But if jurisdiction over "arising in" and "related to" proceedings is
constitutional only under the constitutional "case" test, then an assertion
of jurisdiction over a claim supplemental to such a proceeding is consti-
tutionally suspect. Under this construction, neither the primary nor the
supplemental claim satisfies the constitutional "category" test, for the
federal element-the title 11 case-is not once, but twice, removed from
the supplemental claim: the supplemental claim is so related to the "aris-
ing in" or "related to" proceeding as to form a single "case or contro-
versy" with that proceeding, and the "arising in" or "related to"
proceeding is so related to the title 11 case as to form a single "case or
controversy" with the title 11 case. This separation between satisfaction
of the constitutional "category" and "case" test may be too great. Thus,
the requirements of Article III of the Constitution may not be satisfied
361. U.S. Const. art. I1, § 2.
362. For a discussion of just how related the primary claim must be to the supplemen-
tal claim to satisfy the constitutional "case," see supra notes 246-62 and accompanying
text.
363. The Bankruptcy Clause of the United States Constitution, Article I, Section 8,
Clause 4, like the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution, Article I, Section
8, Clause 3, constitutes merely an authorization for Congress to pass "Laws of the United
States" on the subject of bankruptcy or commerce, but not a constitutional grant of
power to Congress to confer federal jurisdiction. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3-4.
364. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (nine categories enumerated). Assertions of
"related to" jurisdiction clearly satisfy the constitutional "category" test if between
"[c)itizens of different States," or if it "arose under" some federal law other than the
Bankruptcy Code. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
365. See supra notes 272-73 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court
precedent).
366. See supra notes 267-352 and accompanying text (contending that "related to"
jurisdiction can be characterized either as "arising under" jurisdiction or supplemental
jurisdiction).
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where the assertion of supplemental jurisdiction involves a proceeding
which is related to a proceeding "arising in" or "related to" a title 11
case.
It is far from clear, however, that the "category" of "Cases arising
under... the Laws of the United States" set forth in Article III, Section
2, should be construed so narrowly 67 As discussed above, Osborn may
be read to characterize all of § 1334(b)'s jurisdictional grants as within
the grant of authority in Article III, Section 2, to vest district courts with
original jurisdiction over cases that "arise under" federal law. 6 s Once
Osborn facilitates a broad construction of the constitutional "category"
test, one could argue that § 1367(a)'s grant of jurisdiction supplemental
even to "related to" proceedings satisfies the constitutional "case" test so
long as the supplemental claim is sufficiently "related to" the primary
claim.
If the statutory grants of "arising in" and "related to" jurisdiction are
viewed as satisfying the constitutional "category" test because Osborn
permits so broad an interpretation of constitutional "arising under" juris-
diction, the analysis returns to the scope of the constitutional "case" test.
Osborn says nothing about the constitutionality of a grant of jurisdiction
that is supplemental to a federal question because, although it defines the
limits of constitutional "arising under" jurisdiction, it assumes the exist-
ence of a constitutional "case." '3 69 And the only precedent purporting to
define the limits of the constitutional "case" in this context is Gibbs.
In the abstract, the argument that Gibbs's constitutional "case" test is
satisfied whenever the primary claim is logically or factually related to
367. Because the Supreme Court has long recognized that constitutional federal ques-
tion jurisdiction, see Franchise Tax Bd v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S.
1, 8-9 n.8 (1983) (constitutional federal question jurisdiction under Article III "has long
been recognized... [as] broader than federal-question jurisdiction under [28 U.S.C.]
§ 1331"), and constitutional diversity jurisdiction, see State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. x.
Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967) (although Article III requires only minimal diver-
sity, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 requires complete diversity of citizenship), exceeds that granted by
statute, the Court's jurisdictional decisions are often limited to a discussion of the statute
at issue. If the Court does explicitly discuss the scope of Article III, its discussion is all
too often dicta. More frequently, however, the Court's jurisdictional decisions have been
unclear as to whether they turn on an analysis of the statute or the Constitution.
368. See supra notes 280-334 and accompanying text. Under this interpretation,
§ 1334's grant of jurisdiction would be viewed as broader than § 133 I's grant of jurisdic-
tion, but both statutes would be viewed as a specie of "arising under" jurisdiction. At
least two commentators have rejected a characterization of "related to" jurisdiction as a
specie of constitutional "arising under" jurisdiction. See Cross, supra note 245, at 1251
("[Flederal bankruptcy jurisdiction does not fit readily within any of the Article III cate-
gories .... This does not mean that federal bankruptcy jurisdiction is invalid. Under the
doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction, bankruptcy jurisdiction clearly falls within Article
III."); Galligan, supra note 272, at 5 (agreeing that "related to" jurisdiction does not
satisfy "arising under" jurisdiction, but concluding that it is a constitutional grant of
protective jurisdiction).
369. See 22 U.S. 738, 819 ("The suit of The Bank of the United States . Osborn and
others, is a case, and the question is, whether it arises under a law of the United States?")
(emphasis in original).
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the supplemental claim is an appealingly simple one. The contention be-
comes more suspect when related to facts, however. Recall the hypothet-
ical involving an assertion of jurisdiction supplemental to a "related to"
proceeding-the malpractice action supplemental to the priority dispute
between two secured creditors of the debtor.370 In this scenario, a broad
reading of Osborn permits the conclusion that the constitutional "cate-
gory" test is satisfied because the secured creditors' priority dispute (a
"related to" proceeding based solely on questions of state law) "aris[es]
under . . . the Laws of the United States" within the meaning of the
Constitution.37  Application of Gibbs permits the conclusion that the
constitutional "case" test is satisfied because the priority dispute and the
malpractice action enjoy a "common nucleus of operative fact. 3 72
But step back and consider that this analysis has led us to conclude
that the title 11 case, the proceeding "related to" the title 11 case, and
the claim related to the "related to" proceeding are one constitutional
"case." 373 No court 37 4 and no commentator 375 has expressly advocated
so broad a definition of a constitutional "case. 3 76
370. See supra notes 28-37 and accompanying text (setting forth hypothetical "related
to" proceeding and supplemental claim).
371. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
372. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
373. Quite clearly, all three cannot enjoy a "common nucleus of operative fact."
Although Gibbs applied a narrower standard of relatedness-"common nucleus of opera-
tive fact"-commentators have argued that the broader "logical relationship" test may be
all that the constitution requires. See supra notes 246-62 and accompanying text. If the
requirements of Article III are fulfilled only when the constitutional case shares a "com-
mon nucleus of operative fact," however, then "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction can-
not be characterized as a form of supplemental jurisdiction and assertions of jurisdiction
over claims related to a "related to" proceeding are clearly unconstitutional. Cf. Galli-
gan, supra note 272, at 37; Cross, supra note 245, at 1235-37.
374. Of course, this is the implication of all those cases that exercise jurisdiction sup-
plemental to a "related to" proceeding without discussion. See supra part II.A.
375. Galligan questions whether the title 11 case and all proceedings "arising under"
title 11, and "arising in" or "related to" the title 11 case, constitute a single constitutional
"case," thus, rejecting the analogy of bankruptcy jurisdiction to supplemental jurisdic-
tion. See Galligan, supra note 272, at 36-41. Although Cross argues that a title 11 case
and all proceedings "related to" the title 11 case constitute a single constitutional "case,"
he would not agree that the constitutional "case" also includes all supplemental claims
related to the "related to" proceedings. See Cross, supra note 245, at 1233-50,
376. Matasar contends that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure define the limits of a
constitutional "case" in the context of an assertion of jurisdiction supplemental to a non-
bankruptcy federal claim. See Matasar, One Constitutional Case, supra note 102, at 1477-
90. His argument boils down to the notion that a constitutional case is the largest poten-
tial litigation unit, which historically varies depending upon the breadth of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. His contention is controversial among commentators analyz-
ing the scope of supplemental jurisdiction in ordinary civil litigation, see McLaughlin,
supra note 102, at 912-13 n.358 (criticizing Matasar's proposal), but appealing in that
context from historical and practical perspectives. Outside the bankruptcy context,
"case," even a constitutional "case," is defined in the practical context of a "transaction
or occurrence." Matasar, Jurisdiction Primer, supra note 102, at 155-56 ("Since Gibbs,
the trend in pendent cases has been toward a transactional test similar to that in ancillary
jurisdiction."). Nonetheless, Matasar's proposition that a constitutional "case" be de-
fined by federal procedural rules falls apart when considered in the context of bank-
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This reconciliation of Gibbs and Osborn is troubling in its acceptance
of an indirect relationship between the supplemental claim and the fed-
eral ingredient as constitutionally sufficient. Once it is agreed that this
relationship can be satisfied even indirectly, there is little to limit the
standard. Under this broad a construction of Article III, what constitu-
tional principle would preclude the assertion of jurisdiction supplemental
to the supplemental claim related to the "related to" proceeding? Under
this analysis, so long as a claim can trace a chain of logical relationships
to the commencement of a title 11 case, no matter how long the chain
and how attenuated the relationship between the ultimately supplemental
claim and the federal ingredient, the entire chain of claims would consti-
tute a "single case or controversy under Article III of the United States
Constitution" and, thus, the exercise of jurisdiction over this chain of
claims would be viewed as constitutionally permissible.3"
A constitutional analysis which rejects exercises of jurisdiction that are
supplemental to "related to" bankruptcy proceedings is also supported
by the realization that supplemental jurisdiction exists as a result of the
distinctions between statutory and constitutional jurisdiction.7 8 Supple-
mental jurisdiction exists to resolve the tension between constitutional
authority for, and congressional grants of, federal jurisdiction. The
Supreme Court has historically found that Congress has not conferred by
statute the full extent of federal jurisdiction authorized by Article III of
the Constitution.379 For example, the Court has defined constitutional
ruptcy. A bankruptcy case does not exist to resolve a single "transaction or occurrence"
between parties; instead it exists to resolve the debtor's estate.
While most of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are adopted wholesale by the Fed-
eral Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001-7071, this broad cooption of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is limited to "adversary proceedings." See supra
note 3 (defining "adversary proceedings). A more limited reference of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure applies to "contested matters." See supra note 3 (defining "contested
matters"). Moreover, nothing in the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure make the
Rules of Civil Procedure generally applicable in a "title 11 case," and indeed many of the
procedural rules applicable generally to the administration of a "title 11 case" bear no
resemblance to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, eg., Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2004.
In the context of bankruptcy appeals, moreover, the relevant "litigation unit" is substan-
tially smaller than either the adversary proceeding or contested matter. See 6 Norton
Bankruptcy Law and Practice § 148.28 at 148-100 (2d ed. 1993) ("[S]plits among the
circuits [relating to the definition of a 'final order' of a bankruptcy court that is appeala-
ble, first to a district court, bankruptcy appellate panel and then, to a court of appeals]
can be explained by courts' readiness to measure finality against smaller and smaller 'ju-
dicial units.' ").
377. Cf. John Guare, Six Degrees of Separation 81 (Random House 1990) ("I read
somewhere that everybody on this planet is separated by only six other people. Six de-
grees of separation. Between us and everybody else on this planet.").
378. See Matasar, Jurisdiction Primer, supra note 102, at 106-18 (arguing that limited
federal jurisdiction justifies exercise of supplemental jurisdiction).
379. See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 429-30 (1944) (holding that since
Article III authorizes Congress to create or not to create lower federal courts, it also
entitles Congress to restrict jurisdiction of lower federal courts); Lockerty v. Phillips, 319
U.S. 182, 187-88 (1943) (same); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. 453, 461, 8 How. 441, 448 (1850)
(same); see also, eg., Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 513 (1869) (upholding
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"arising under" jurisdiction much more broadly than its statutory coun-
terpart.38° Once this schism exists, however, as a practical matter, it may
be impossible for a federal court to resolve questions involving only an
interpretation of federal law. 38 ' Thus, as early as 1824, the Supreme
Court has held that the presence of issues of state law do not prevent a
federal court from exercising a statutory grant of jurisdiction,382 conclud-
ing that to hold otherwise would "reduce[ ] to almost nothing"3"3 the
authority to confer federal jurisdiction over "cases... arising under...
the Laws of the United States, ' 38 4 for "[t]here is scarcely any case, every
part of which depends on the constitution, laws or treaties of the United
States." '385 If Congress were to enact a statute conferring original federal
jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by Article III-to the full extent
permitted by Osborn-then there would be no need for supplemental ju-
risdiction. Supplemental jurisdiction exists only because Congress has
not granted original federal jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by
Article III.
Courts appear tempted to conclude that for every statutory grant of
non-supplemental jurisdiction, § 1367 provides an additional grant of
supplemental jurisdiction. But this conclusion views Article III as an
ever-expanding reservoir of jurisdiction, with supplemental jurisdiction
congressional regulation of appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court); see generally, e.g.,
Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An
Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1362 (1953) (discussing congressional control of
federal jurisdiction); Lawrence Gene Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term-Foreword:
Constitutional Limitation on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Fed-
eral Courts, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 17 (1981) (same); Wright, supra note 266, § 3561 (same).
380. Compare Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. 738, 823 (1824) (construing
scope of constitutional "arising under" jurisdiction, Chief Justice Marshall upheld consti-
tutionality of grant of federal jurisdiction of suits by and against federally chartered bank
irrespective of source of law, or subject matter, of suit) with, e.g., American Well Works
Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916) (holding that § 1331 did not confer
jurisdiction over suit for damages to business for defendant's statements that plaintiff was
infringing defendant's patents; Justice Holmes stated that, for purposes of this statute,
"[a] suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action"); see generally Wright,
supra note 266, § 3562 (discussing efforts by courts and commentators to explicate dis-
tinction between constitutional "arising under" jurisdiction and its statutory counterpart
in 28 U.S.C. § 1331); see also supra notes 280-334 and accompanying text (discussing
breadth of holding in Osborn as to scope of constitutional "arising under" jurisdiction).
381. Moreover, this practical problem may exist even though the statutory grant of
federal jurisdiction is not 28 U.S.C. § 1331. In Osborn v. Bank of United States, the
Supreme Court reached similar conclusions although it reconciled constitutional "arising
under" jurisdiction with a statutory grant which pre-dated and far exceeded the scope of
statutory "arising under" jurisdiction. See 22 U.S. at 823-28 (interpreting federal charter
granting Bank of United States power to sue and be sued in federal courts as a grant of
federal jurisdiction, and concluding that this statutory grant of jurisdiction fits within
scope of constitutional "arising under" jurisdiction); see also supra notes 280-334 and
accompanying text (discussing Osborn).
382. See Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. 738 (1824).
383. Id. at 820.
384. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
385. 22 U.S. at 820.
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expanding at the same rate as statutory grants of original jurisdiction.3" 6
This limitless vision of Article III is surely flawed. Gibbs tells us that
supplemental jurisdiction may not exceed the notion of a constitutional
"case." Surely, the Constitution refers to but one constitutional "case,"
not to two distinct definitions of "case" depending upon whether the ref-
erence is to original or supplemental jurisdiction.
2. Constitutional Questions Surrounding the Exercise of
Supplemental Bankruptcy Jurisdiction by Non-Article III
Bankruptcy Courts
Except during the four-year period between enactment of the 1978
bankruptcy jurisdictional provisions and the ruling of the Supreme Court
that this broad delegation of the "'essential attributes' of the judicial
power of the United States" exceeded the limits of Article III,"" the
exercise of bankruptcy jurisdiction has been divided between district
courts and bankruptcy courts. Under Article III of the Constitution,
only a life-tenured judge may exercise the "'essential attributes' of judi-
cial power," except as to controversies falling within three narrow histor-
ical exceptions.1 8  The exercise of supplemental jurisdiction may be
among these " 'essential attributes' of judicial power."3 9 For this rea-
son, any exercise of supplemental bankruptcy jurisdiction by non-Article
III bankruptcy courts may be unconstitutional."'
a. Non-Article III Bankruptcy Courts
(i) Bankruptcy Act of 1898
Under the former Bankruptcy Act of 1898, bankruptcy judges (who
prior to 1972 were called "referees") were entitled to exercise only lim-
386. This view of the relationship between Article III of the Constitution and the stat-
utory grants of federal jurisdiction could be illustrated as that of concentric balloons: one
balloon (statutory grants of primary and supplemental jurisdiction) inside of another
(constitutional authorization for grants of federaljurisdiction). An alternative view that I
find more compelling, would analogize this relationship to a cup and its filling. Under
this view, the reservoir of federal jurisdiction would be illustrated as a balloon (statutory
grants of primary and supplemental jurisdiction) inside of a rigid sphere (constitutional
authorization for such grants in Article III).
387. See Northern Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87
(1982).
388. See infra notes 398-415 and accompanying text (discussing these narrow
exceptions).
389. Marathon, 458 U.S. at 84-85.
390. Cross raises a distinct constitutional issue related to bankruptcy courts' non-Arti-
cle III status. He notes that "[t]he Supreme Court has held on a number of occasions
that two of Article III's other restrictions-the judicial power and case or controversy
requirements-do not apply to certain non-Article III courts. These cases suggest that
Congress similarly should not be bound by the other main restriction of Article IIl-the
nine categories-when assigning cases to the non-Article III courts." Cross, supra note
245, at 1202. He ultimately rejects this argument, "although appealing," as " not persua-
sive." Id.
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ited bankruptcy jurisdiction.39 Under the 1898 Act, they had only sum-
mary jurisdiction over (i) matters involving the administration of the
bankruptcy case, (ii) disputes involving property in the actual or con-
structive possession of the bankruptcy court, (iii) proceedings in which
the parties had consented to bankruptcy court jurisdiction (expressly, im-
pliedly by failing to object in time, or impliedly by filing a proof of claim
or otherwise participating in the bankruptcy case), and (iv) a few limited
matters over which the statute expressly granted jurisdiction to bank-
ruptcy courts.3 9 2 In all other instances, only a state court or federal dis-
trict court was said to have plenary jurisdiction over the dispute.393
The division of summary and plenary jurisdiction over bankruptcy
matters was severely criticized because, in some cases, litigants were able
to dispute the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction for years before any court
ever reached the merits of the suit.3 94 This undesirable jurisdictional liti-
gation and the attendant cost and delay caused Congress in 1978 to in-
crease substantially the grant of bankruptcy jurisdiction which
bankruptcy courts were entitled to exercise. 395
(ii) Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
The 1978 bankruptcy jurisdictional provision did not directly confer
its pervasive jurisdiction on bankruptcy courts, but instead vested federal
district courts with broad-ranging jurisdiction and at the same time au-
thorized bankruptcy courts to exercise nearly all of that jurisdiction. 396
Legislative history confirmed Congress' intent to confer broad jurisdic-
tional authority to the bankruptcy courts.39 7
391. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, § 2a(20) in App. 1 Collier on
Bankruptcy 1 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1993), repealed by Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. and
scattered provisions of 28 U.S.C.); 1 Collier on Bankruptcy 3.01[l][b][iv] (Lawrence P.
King ed., 15th ed. 1993).
392. See 1 Collier on Bankruptcy T 1.02-1.03[2] (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed.
1993).
393. See 1 Collier on Bankruptcy 3.01[l][b][iv] (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed.
1993).
394. See, generally, 1 Collier on Bankruptcy § 3.01, (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed.
1993) ("'Summary' versus 'plenary' actions, resulted in the primary battleground be-
tween trustees and defendants often being one of jurisdiction rather than the merits.").
395. For a discussion of this legislative history, see infra notes 496-503 and accompa-
nying text.
396. See 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (a), (b) and (c) (repealed). For a complete quotation of§ 1471, see supra note 100 and accompanying text; see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 1480, 1481 (re-
pealed) (reserving in district court power to enjoin another court, sanction certain crimi-
nal contempts and render appeals from bankruptcy court decisions).
397. See S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 153 (1978) ("This broad grant of juris-
diction will enable the bankruptcy courts, which are created as adjuncts of the district
court for the purpose of exercising the jurisdiction, to dispose of controversies that arise
in bankruptcy cases or under the bankruptcy code. Actions that formerly had to be tried
in the State court or in the Federal district court, at great cost and delay to the estate,
may now be tried in the bankruptcy court."); 124 Cong. Rec. 32,410 (1978) (statement of
Rep. Edwards) (referring to bankruptcy jurisdiction as "pervasive jurisdiction over all
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In Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,"
the Supreme Court held that "the broad grant of jurisdiction to the bank-
ruptcy courts contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1471 [violates Article III of the
Constitution]." '399 It held constitutionally invalid Congress' 1978 grant
of power which gave bankruptcy courts jurisdiction to make final deter-
minations in matters involving purely private state law disputes-that is,
matters merely "related to" the bankruptcy case.
Under the jurisdictional provisions enacted in 1978, Congress had
"vest[ed] all 'essential attributes' of the judicial power of the United
States in the... bankruptcy court."'  The Court held that such judicial
power could not constitutionally be exercised by a court whose judges
lacked the attributes of life tenure and salary protection set forth in Arti-
cle III. The plurality" concluded that the bankruptcy jurisdictional
provision at issue violated Article III because it did not fit within any of
the three exceptions previously crafted by the Court to the general rule
that federal judicial power is to be exercised only by Article III judges.'
The plurality described the two most relevant exceptions as those involv-
ing the adjudication of "public rights" and those in which the non-Arti-
cle III decision-maker acted as an "adjunct" to an Article III court. °3
The public rights doctrine finds its origin in a group of cases in which
proceedings arising in or relating to bankruptcy cases"); 124 Cong. Rec. 34,010 (1978)
(statement cf Sen. DeConcini) (same).
398. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
399. 458 U.S. at 87. Article III of the Constitution provides that judges of courts
vested with 'Judicial power of the United States" shall hold their offices "during good
behavior and shall, at stated times, receive for their services a compensation, which shall
not be diminished during their continuance in office." Article III, § 1.
400. 458 U.S. at 84-85.
401. Marathon involved no single opinion of the Court. The plurality opinion was
endorsed by four Justices; then Associate Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor concurred
only in the judgment, but provided only a terse paragraph to explain their distinct posi-
tion; Chief Justice Burger and Justice White each filed their own dissenting opinions. See
Marathon, 45 U.S. 50 (1982).
402. Despite the broad language of the plurality decision in Marathon, the Court sub-
sequently limited the Marathon holding:
The Court's holding in [Marathon] establishes only that Congress may not vest
in a non-Article III court the power to adjudicate, render final judgment, and
issue binding orders in a traditional contract action arising under state law,
without consent of the litigants, and subject only to ordinary appellate review.
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 584 (1985); see also Commod-
ity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986); but see Granfinanciera, S.A.
v. Nordberg (In re Chase & Sanborn Corp.), 492 U.S. 33, 53 (1989) (holding that
trustee's avoidance action against entity that had not filed proof of claim against chapter
11 estate did not involve "public rights" and, thus, defendant in such action was not
precluded by that doctrine from asserting right to trial by jury before non-Article III
bankruptcy court; Court stated that question "requires the same answer as the question
whether Article III allows Congress to assign adjudication of that cause of action to a
non-Article III tribunal").
403. See Marathon, 458 U.S. at 63-87. The concurring opinion did not fully join in the
plurality's adjunct court and public rights analysis. A majority of the justices could only
agree that the particular claim before it could not be adjudicated by the bankruptcy court
as then constituted. See id at 88.
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the Supreme Court had upheld the constitutionality of legislative and
administrative courts. The plurality in Marathon described the public
rights doctrine as limited to matters arising "between the Government
and persons subject to its authority in connection with the performance
of the constitutional functions of the executive or legislative depart-
ments" and which "historically could have been determined exclusively
by those departments."'  The Marathon plurality declined to uphold
the jurisdictional statute at issue under the public rights doctrine because
the suit there involved two private parties litigating liability under state
law.4 5 However, the plurality noted that some bankruptcy proceedings
might fall within the public rights exception:
[T]he restructuring of debtor-creditor relations, which is at the core of
the federal bankruptcy power, must be distinguished from the adjudi-
cation of state-created private rights, such as the right to recover con-
tract damages that is at issue in this case. The former may well be a
"public right," but the latter obviously is not.40 6
The Marathon plurality derived the adjunct court exception to Article
III from two cases, Crowell v. Benson" 7 and United States v. Raddatz.408
Crowell validated the statutory grant of authority to a federal administra-
tive agency to make initial factual determinations pursuant to a federal
statute requiring employers to compensate their employees for work-re-
lated injuries occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States40 9
In Raddatz the Supreme Court upheld the practice, authorized by the
1978 Federal Magistrates Act, of referring certain pre-trial motions in
criminal cases to a magistrate for initial determination. 4 0 From these
cases, the plurality derived two principles relevant in determining the
extent to which Congress constitutionally may vest judicial power in ad-
juncts to Article III courts. First, it suggested that Congress, when it
creates a substantive federal right, possesses substantial discretion to pre-
scribe the manner in which that right may be adjudicated-including the
right to delegate judicial functions to the non-Article III adjunct. The
second principle that the plurality inferred from these cases is that the
adjunct must be limited in such a way that the "essential attributes" of
judicial power are retained in the Article III court.
In applying this analysis, the Marathon plurality found that the first
principle-Congress' discretion to prescribe the manner in which feder-
ally created rights are adjudicated-was of no assistance to the plaintiff,
because its suit was predicated on state, not federal, law.4 '
404. 458 U.S. at 67-68.
405. See id. at 71-72.
406. 458 U.S. at 71.
407. 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
408. 447 U.S. 667 (1980).
409. See Crowell, 285 U.S. at 47-48.
410. See Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 683-84.
411. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 83-84
(1982).
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The Marathon plurality also determined that the delegation ofjurisdic-
tion to bankruptcy judges under the 1978 legislation was far greater than
that approved of in either Crowell or Raddat. 41 2 In reaching this con-
clusion, the plurality noted that under the 1978 jurisdictional provision,
bankruptcy courts exercised all ordinary powers of federal district
courts, including the powers to preside over jury trials, issue declaratory
judgments, issue writs of habeas corpus, and issue any other order neces-
sary or appropriate to enforce the provisions of the Code.4 ' Addition-
ally, bankruptcy courts exercised the power to make conclusive findings
of fact and conclusions of law, subject to review by Article III courts
only under ordinary appellate review, which upholds findings of fact
made by bankruptcy courts unless clearly erroneous.4" 4
The Supreme Court declined in its decision in Marathon to rework the
jurisdictional provisions of the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act so as to
separate the functions that constitutionally could be allocated to the
bankruptcy court from those that could only be exercised by Article III
district courts.415 It left that task for Congress. In July 1984, Congress
enacted the current bankruptcy jurisdictional provisions.
(iii) 1984 Amendments
In the current bankruptcy jurisdictional provisions, Congress has di-
vided bankruptcy jurisdiction between that which can be "heard and de-
termined" by non-Article III bankruptcy courts, and that which can only
be "heard" by bankruptcy courts but must be finally determined by dis-
trict courts. Under 28 U.S.C. § 157(a), district courts "may provide that
any or all cases ... and... proceedings... shall be referred to the
bankruptcy judges." '416 Once a proceeding is referred, the power of the
bankruptcy judge will depend upon whether the proceeding "arises
under" title 11 or "arises in" a title 11 case-that is, whether it is a
"core" proceeding or whether the proceeding is merely related to the title
11 case. Although the language of § 157(a) merely authorizes this refer-
ence, district courts uniformly have adopted local rules referring jurisdic-
tion to bankruptcy courts.
"Core" proceedings are defined in 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) to include the
following types of proceedings: administrative; claim allowances; coun-
terclaims by the estate against claimants; financing orders; turnovers;
preference; stays; fraudulent transfers; discharge and dischargeability;
412. See id. at 86.
413. See id. at 84-86.
414. See id. at 85.
415. Both the plurality and concurrence agreed that, because the grant of jurisdiction
to bankruptcy courts over matters related to bankruptcy cases was made in the same
statutory provision as the remaining grant of jurisdiction to bankruptcy courts, the Court
could not simply remove jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court over state common law
actions. See 458 U.S. at 71. Thus, the Supreme Court invalidated the jurisdiction
granted to non-Article III bankruptcy courts in its entirety.
416. 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) (1988).
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lien priority and validity; confirmation of plans; leases and property sales;
and "other proceedings affecting ... the adjustment of the debtor-credi-
tor or the equity security holder relationship, except personal injury tort
or wrongful death claims." '417 That a claim involves state law is not de-
terminative of whether a proceeding is "core" or not.4 8 And it is the
bankruptcy court, not the district court, which initially determines
whether a proceeding is "core" or not.419
A bankruptcy judge may, subject to ordinary appellate review, hear,
determine, and enter judgment in all proceedings "arising under" title 11
or "arising in" a title 11 case.420 Bankruptcy courts are not authorized to
determine proceedings that are merely "related to" a title 11 case, how-
ever.421 Moreover, personal injury and wrongful death tort claims are
not triable in the bankruptcy courts. 4 2 2
"Non-core" proceedings include proceedings against persons who
have not filed claims against the estate. As to these "non-core" proceed-
ings, a bankruptcy court may hear, but may not enter a final order, with-
out the parties' consent.423 And, upon timely and specific objection, the
district judge is required to review de novo proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law made by the bankruptcy judge in these "related to"
proceedings.424
417. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2) (1988).
418. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(3) (1988).
419. See id.
420. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) (1988).
421. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1) (1988).
422. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) (1988).
423. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(l)-(2) (1988). With the parties' consent, however, the
bankruptcy court is entitled to hear and determine even matters only "related to" the
bankruptcy case, subject only to ordinary appellate review. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2)
(1988). See, e.g., Mann v. Alexander Dawson, Inc. (In re Mann), 907 F.2d 923, 926 (9th
Cir. 1990). Courts are divided as to whether consent to the bankruptcy court's exercise
of "related to" jurisdiction may be implied. Compare Canal Corp. v. Finnman (In re
Johnson), 960 F.2d 397, 400 (4th Cir. 1992) (implied consent sufficient to bind parties)
and Cain Partnership, Ltd. v. Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. (In re Pioneer Investment Services
Co.), 946 F.2d 445, 450 (6th Cir. 1991) (same) and In re G.S.F. Corp., 938 F.2d 1467,
1477 (1st Cir. 1991) (same) and In re Mann, 907 F.2d 923, 926 (9th Cir. 1990) (same)
and In re Rath Packing Co., 75 B.R. 137, 138 (N.D. Iowa 1987), affd sub nom. Rath
Packing Co. v. United Food, 860 F.2d 1086 (8th Cir. 1988) (same) and Men's Sports-
wear, Inc. v. Sasson Jeans, Inc. (In re Men's Sportswear, Inc.), 834 F.2d 1134 (2d Cir.
1987) (same) and In re Daniels-Head & Assoc., 819 F.2d 914, 919 (9th Cir. 1987) (same)
and In re Southern Ind. Banking Corp., 809 F.2d 329, 331 (6th Cir. 1987) (same) with In
re Marill Alarm Sys. Inc., 81 B.R. 119, 122 (S.D. Fla. 1987), affd sub nom. Marill Alarm
Sys., Inc. v. Equity Funding, 861 F.2d 725 (11th Cir. 1988) (bankruptcy court's entry of
order invalidated by failure to make core/non-core determination under § 157(b)(3); par-
ties' failure to raise issue does not constitute waiver).
424. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1) (1988). Despite § 157(a)'s authorization of a general
reference of proceedings and cases to bankruptcy courts, § 157 also authorizes district
courts to withdraw the reference of case or proceeding on its own motion or on timely
motion by party, "for cause shown." 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) (1988). See Parklane Hosiery
Co., Inc. v. Parklane/Atlanta Venture (In re Parklane/Atlanta Joint Venture), 927 F.2d
532, 536 (1 lth Cir. 1991) ("Even though Congress provided no statutory definition of the
word 'cause,' the courts have made it plain that this is not an empty requirement."); Oaks
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b. Supplemental Jurisdiction as an Essential Attribute of
Judicial Authority
Many courts have construed the judicial power of non-Article III
bankruptcy courts narrowly in order to avoid the conclusion that the
power delegated to them involves the "essential attributes of judicial au-
thority" and exceeds the limits of Article III of the Constitution. 4" For
example, courts of appeals, although divided, generally have concluded
that non-Article III bankruptcy courts are not authorized by statute to
conduct jury trials in core proceedings; in reaching this conclusion, these
courts were influenced by concerns that any statute that conferred such
power on bankruptcy courts would be unconstitutional.4" 6 In analogous
cases courts of appeal are divided on whether the Bankruptcy Code vests
bankruptcy courts with contempt power and, if so, whether the exercise
of such power by these non-Article III courts would be unconstitu-
tional.427 Similarly, courts of appeal have held that non-Article III bank-
of Woodlake Phase III, Ltd. v. Hall Bayoutree Assocs., Ltd. (In re Hall Bayoutree As-
socs., Ltd.), 939 F.2d 802, 805 (9th Cir. 1991) ("It is clear that, under § 157(d), a district
court may withdraw reference at any time, for cause shown .... "); Appeal of Landmark
Say. Ass'n (In re Priutt), 910 F.2d 1160 (3d Cir. 1990) ("Although '[n]othing in the
legislation or otherwise indicates what may constitute cause,'. . . one court of appeals has
listed the following considerations: [']The district court should consider the goals of pro-
moting uniformity in bankruptcy administration, reducing forum shopping and confu-
sion, fostering the economical use of the debtors' and creditor's resources, and expediting
the bankruptcy process.[']") (citations omitted). Moreover, a district court must with-
draw reference of proceeding, on timely motion of party in interest, if resolution of pro-
ceeding requires consideration of "both" bankruptcy and other federal law "affecting
interstate commerce." See 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) (1988). Compare In re White Motor
Corp., 42 B.R. 693, 703-04 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (withdrawal required only when bank-
ruptcy court litigation "cannot be resolved without substantial and material considera-
tion" of non-bankruptcy federal law affecting interstate commerce) with City of New
York v. Exxon Corp., 932 F.2d 1020, 1026 (2d Cir. 1991) (withdrawal required "of cases
or issues that would otherwise require a bankruptcy court judge to engage in significant
interpretation, as opposed to simple application, of federal laws apart from the bank-
ruptcy statutes") and Shugrue v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. (In re Ionosphere Clubs,
Inc.), 142 B.R. 645, 647 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (same).
425. See infra notes 426-33 and accompanying text.
426. See, eg., In re Stansbury Poplar Place, Inc., 62 U.S.L.W. 2449 (4th Cir. 1993)
(bankruptcy court not authorized to conduct jury trials); In re Grabill, Corp., 967 F.2d
1152, 1158, reh'g denied, 976 F.2d 1126 (7th Cir. 1992) (same); Rafoth v. National Union
Fire Ins. Co. (In re Baker & Getty Fin. Servs., Inc.), 954 F.2d 1169, 1172-74 (6th Cir.
1992) (explicitly avoiding constitutional issue); In re United Missouri Bank, N.A., 901
F.2d 1449, 1450 (8th Cir. 1990) (same); Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Frates (In re Kaiser Steel
Corp.), 911 F.2d 380, 389-92 (10th Cir. 1990) (same). The Second Circuit and a number
of district courts have held that bankruptcy courts can conduct jury trials in core pro-
ceedings, however. See, eg., Ben Cooper, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania (In re
Ben Cooper, Inc.), 896 F.2d 1394, 1404 (2d Cir.) cert granted, 110 S. Ct. 3269, vacated
and remanded, 111 S. Ct. 425 (1990), reinstated, 924 F.2d 36, 38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 2041 (1991) (bankruptcy court has statutory and constitutional power to con-
duct jury trials); Walsh v. California Commerce Bank (In re Interbank Mortgage Corp.),
128 B.R. 269 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (same); Leonard v. Wessel (In re Jackson), 118 B.R. 243,
251 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (same).
427. Compare Mountain Am. Credit Union v. Skinner (ln re Skinner), 917 F.2d 444,
447-50 (10th Cir. 1990) (bankruptcy courts vested with civil contempt power and exercise
1994]
798 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62
ruptcy courts are not empowered to enter an unreviewable order under
11 U.S.C. § 305 to dismiss or abstain from jurisdiction over an entire
bankruptcy case.42s
Related to the question of whether bankruptcy courts enjoy broad ju-
dicial power, courts of appeal are also divided on whether bankruptcy
courts are entitled to sanction the government pursuant to certain non-
bankruptcy provisions although they are not Article III "courts of the
United States."429 In addition, courts have construed statutes referring
to a power of the "district courts" as exclusive of the power of non-Arti-
cle III bankruptcy courts.430
is constitutional) and Burd v. Walters (In re Walters), 868 F.2d 665, 669-70 (4th Cir.
1989) (same) with Griffith v. Oles (In re Hipp, Inc.), 895 F.2d 1503, 1511 (5th Cir. 1990)
(bankruptcy courts do not have criminal contempt power) and Plastiras v. Idell (In re
Sequoia Auto Brokers, Ltd.), 827 F.2d 1281, 1284 (9th Cir. 1987) (bankruptcy courts not
vested with inherent civil contempt power by Constitution; must be explicitly authorized
by statute); cf. Budget Serv. Co. v. Better Homes, Inc., 804 F.2d 289, 291 (4th Cir. 1986)
(avoiding entirely issue of contempt powers of bankruptcy courts in case involving bank-
ruptcy court power under § 362(h)).
428. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Parklane/Atlanta Venture (In re Parklane/Atlanta
Joint Venture), 927 F.2d 532, 538 (1 lth Cir. 1991); Goerg v. Parungao (In re Goerg), 930
F.2d 1563 (1 1th Cir. 1991). Section 305 has since been amended to provide that an order
under that "section ... is not reviewable by appeal or otherwise by the court of appeals
under section 158(d), 1291, or 1292 or this title or by the Supreme Court of the United
States under section 1254 of this title." Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-650, title III, § 309(a), 104 Stat. 5113 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 305(c)
(Supp. IV 1992)) ("JIA"). And courts have interpreted this amendment to render a
bankruptcy court's decision under this section reviewable by a district court, but the
district court's review of the bankruptcy court decision not appealable to a court of ap-
peals or the Supreme Court. See Chemical Bank v. Togut (In re Axona Int'l Credit &
Commerce Ltd.), 924 F.2d 31, 34-35 (2d Cir. 1991) (appeal from § 305 abstention order
dismissed; 1990 amendment to this provision pursuant to JIA discussed).
429. Compare IRS v. Brickell Inv. Corp. (In re Brickell Inv. Corp.), 922 F.2d 696, 701
(11th Cir. 1991) (bankruptcy court not "court of United States" entitled to rule on
debtor's motion to assess costs and attorney's fees against IRS pursuant to 26 U.S.C.
§ 7430) and Gower v. Farmers Home Admin. (In re Davis), 899 F.2d 1136, 1138-39
(1 1th Cir. 1990) (bankruptcy court not court of United States entitled to rule on trustee's
request for attorney's fees under EAJA) with O'Connor v. United States Dep't of Energy,
942 F.2d 771, 774 (10th Cir. 1991) (bankruptcy court empowered to award attorneys'
fees pursuant to EAJA because plain language of that statute does not limit that provi-
sion to adjudication by "courts of the United States").
430. For example, courts are divided as to whether bankruptcy courts can entertain a
motion to change venue although the express language of 28 U.S.C. § 1412 refers to "a
district court." Compare Hunt v. Bankers Trust Co., 799 F.2d 1060, 1070 (5th Cir. 1986)
(determination whether to transfer venue of case "to be decided, at least in first instance,
by the bankruptcy court") and Wells Fargo Credit Corp. v. Owens (In re Owens), 96
B.R. 215, 218 n.3 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988) (motion to transfer venue case is core pro-
ceeding over which bankruptcy courts have jurisdiction) and Mann v. Michael Indus.,
Inc. (In re Island Shoe Mfg. Co.), 90 B.R. 981, 933 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1988) (same) and
In re Texaco Inc., 89 B.R. 382, 387 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988) (same) and NBA Int'l Bank-
ing Corp. v. Kersting (In re Kersting), 85 B.R. 61, 63 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988) (same)
and In re Toxic Control Technologies, Inc., 84 B.R. 140, 142-43 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1988)
(same) and In re Waits, 70 B.R. 591, 594 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987) (same) and F/S
Airlease II, Inc. v. Aerothrust Corp. (In re F/S Airlease II, Inc.), 67 B.R. 428, 431-32
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1986) (same) and Burlingame v. Whilden (In re Whilden), 67 B.R. 40,
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Like the power to conduct a jury trial, exercise contempt power, and
render decisions subject only to ordinary appellate review or, in limited
instances set forth by statute, subject to no review, the power to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction clearly should be counted among the "'essen-
tial attributes' of judicial authority." '' Although the Supreme Court
has cautioned that the scope of Article III involves practical considera-
tions and a complex balancing of competing interests,432 it seems clear
that the grant of supplemental jurisdiction to non-Article III bankruptcy
courts creates questions of constitutional dimension.433
B. Did Congress Expressly Intend To Confer Supplemental
Bankruptcy Jurisdiction?
Finley requires Congress to authorize expressly the exercise of pen-
dent-party jurisdiction.434 Some courts interpreted Finley to require
Congress to authorize expressly other types of supplemental jurisdiction
as well.435 In 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), Congress explicitly and broadly
41-42 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1986) (same) and McLemore v. Thomasson (In re Thomasson),
60 B.R. 629, 630-32 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1986) (same) and In re Oceanquest Feeder
Serv., Inc. 56 B.R. 715, 718-19 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1986) (same) and In re Leonard, 55
B.R. 106, 109 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1985) (same) with In re HME Records, Inc., 62 B.R. 611,
612 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1986) (original motion to transfer venue denied for lack of juris-
diction; second motion made in district court which referred back to bankruptcy court)
and Moody v. Empire Life Ins. Co. (In re Moody), 46 B.R. 231, 234, (M.D.N.C. 1985)
(in dicta, court assumed only district court empowered to rule on motion to transfer
venue) and Armstrong v. Ranier Fin. Serv., Inc. (In re Greinier), 45 B.R. 715, 716
(Bankr. D.N.D. 1985); see also Williams v. Shaw (In re Roberts), 91 B.R. 71, 72 n.2
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988) (court stated that motion to transfer venue of proceeding is itself
a core proceeding only if proceeding sought to be transferred also is core); In re Retire-
ment Inn at Forest Lane, Ltd., 83 B.R. 796, 796-800 (D. Utah 1988) (en banc) (adopting
a middle-ground procedure for resolving venue transfer motions whereby motion treated
as non-core proceeding as to which bankruptcy court makes recommendations of fact
and law, subject to de novo review by district court); see also, generally, R_ Lieb & J.
Lewittes, Correspondence: Some Thoughts on Jurisdiction and Venue, Norton Bankr. L.
Adv., Nov. 1985, at 7-11 (arguing for and against exercise of power by bankruptcy court
to transfer venue).
431. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 84-85
(1982); Aemi v. Columbus Fed. Savs. (In re Aemi), 86 B.R. 203, 207 (Bankr. D. Neb.
1988) ("The absence of ancillary jurisdiction would make it virtually impossible for bank-
ruptcy courts to implement a modem system of procedural rules.").
432. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 853 (1986).
433. See Southtrust Bank v. Alpha Steel Co. (In re Alpha Steel Co.), 142 B.R. 465, 471
(M.D. Ala. 1992) ("[The recent Congressional amendments codifying and merging the
doctrines of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction expressly apply only to district courts.").
434. See Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 553 (1989).
435. See, e.g., Community Coffee Co. v. M/S Kriti Amethyst, 715 F. Supp. 772, 773
(E.D. La. 1989) (holding that Finley undercuts viability of assertion of ancillary jurisdic-
tion); accord Wright, supra note 266, § 1436, at 276 (same); but see, eg., Associated Dry
Goods Corp. v. Towers Fin. Corp., 920 F.2d 1121, 1125-26 (2d Cir. 1990) (concluding
that Finley did not undercut power of district court to exercise ancillary jurisdiction over
compulsory counterclaim against third party); see generally Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.
v. Spartan Mechanical Corp., 738 F.Supp. 664, 673-77 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (reviewing con-
flicting district court decisions); see also H.R. 734, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1990).
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grants supplemental jurisdiction to district courts exercising original ju-
risdiction in a civil action.43 6 "Except ... as expressly provided other-
wise by Federal statute,"4"' § 1367(a)'s grant of supplemental
jurisdiction extends to "claims that are so related to claims in the action
within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or
controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution."43
Thus, § 1367 confers supplemental bankruptcy jurisdiction (i) unless
"expressly provided otherwise by Federal statute," (ii) unless the grant of
original jurisdiction to the district court does not involve a "civil action,"
or (iii) unless the assertion of supplemental jurisdiction exceeds the limi-
tations of Article III of the United States Constitution.439 Moreover,
§ 1367's grant of supplemental jurisdiction is limited to "the district
courts."
1. "Except... as Expressly Provided Otherwise by Federal Statute"
One commentator opines that the "[e]xcept ... as expressly provided
otherwise" language was intended to mark "the statute's departure from
the former Aldinger test of 'expressed or implied negation.' "440 Under
this commentator's analysis, a statute must expressly, rather than merely
impliedly, "provide otherwise" in order for it to preclude a district court
from exercising supplemental jurisdiction.
Section 1367(a)'s language, however, fails to identify the quality of the
express statement which will suffice to negate supplemental jurisdiction.
One interpretation is to conclude that, by a federal statute other than
§ 1367, Congress must expressly provide that the supplemental jurisdic-
tion granted by § 1367(a) may not be exercised. For example, if a federal
statute contained language similar to the express prohibition in
§ 1367(b)-which provides that, where jurisdiction over the original
claim is based on the diversity of the litigants' citizenship, district courts
436. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (Supp. IV 1992). For a complete quotation of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367, see supra note 39.
437. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (Supp. IV 1992) ("Except as provided in subsections (b) and
(c) or as expressly provided otherwise by Federal statute . . . ."). Section 1367(b) is
irrelevant to an assertion of supplemental bankruptcy jurisdiction. See supra note 39
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b)). Section 1367(c) authorizes a district court to decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction under limited circumstances. See supra note 39 (quot-
ing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)). The circumstances under which a court, applying this subsec-
tion (c), would decline to exercise supplemental bankruptcy jurisdiction are discussed
infra in the text accompanying notes 568-78.
438. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (Supp. IV 1992).
439. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (Supp. IV 1992).
440. McLaughlin, supra note 102, at 934; see also supra notes 123-29 and accompany-
ing text (discussing Aldinger). In Aldinger, the Supreme Court had held that supplemen-
tal jurisdiction could not be exercised if the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction was
"expressly or by implication negated" by the jurisdictional statute. See Aldinger v. How-
ard, 427 U.S. 1, 18 (1976) (emphasis added) (concluding that "a fair reading of the lan-
guage in [28 U.S.C.] § 1343, together with the scope of [42 U.S.C.] § 1983" impliedly
precludes assertion of pendent-party jurisdiction).
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shall not have pendent-party supplemental jurisdiction" '-such a provi-
sion would clearly satisfy the language of § 1367(a). Further, a federal
statute limiting supplemental jurisdiction in a manner similar to§ 1367(c)-which permits district courts to decline to exercise supple-
mental jurisdiction after considering statutorily specified factors-would
constitute an express statement that limits, rather than prohibits, the ex-
ercise of supplemental jurisdiction and would also seem to satisfy the
proviso found in § 1367(a)." 2
Another interpretation of the language of § 1367(a) is that the other
federal statute need not expressly prohibit or limit supplemental jurisdic-
tion, but merely "provide otherwise" than § 1367(a) for an exercise of
supplemental jurisdiction. There are two federal statutes-28 U.S.C.
§§ 1338(b) and 1334(b)-which arguably fall into this category.
First, 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) grants to district courts original jurisdiction
over civil actions "arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents,
plant variety protection, copyrights and trade-marks."" 3 Subsection (b)
of § 1338 also grants to district courts original jurisdiction over "any
civil action asserting a claim of unfair competition when joined with a
substantial and related claim under the copyright, patent, plant variety
protection or trade-mark laws." 4 " The § 1338(b) express grant of sup-
plemental jurisdiction only extends to claims of unfair competition, and
thus can be viewed as "providing otherwise" than § 1367 by conferring a
narrower grant of supplemental jurisdiction than the much broader grant
in § 1367.445
441. See supra note 39 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b)).
442. See supra note 39 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)).
443. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1988). Section 1338(a) provides in its entirety:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising
under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, copy-
rights and trade-marks. Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of the
states in patent, plant variety protection and copyright cases.
28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1988).
444. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) (1988) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
any civil action asserting a claim of unfair competition when joined with a substantial and
related claim under the copyright, patent, plant variety protection or trade-mark laws.");
see also 28 U.S.C. § 1338(c) ("Subsections (a) and (b) apply to exclusive rights in mask
works under chapter 9 of title 17 to the same extent as such subsections apply to
copyrights.").
445. Legislative history is ambiguous as to congressional intent in this regard. In testi-
mony during hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee on S. 2648, the bill which
ultimately was enacted as the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650,
104 Stat. 5089, it was suggested that 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) be repealed in the context of
enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1367. See Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act
and Civil Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 5381 and 3898 Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciary
House of Representatives, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 720 (1990) (letter dated Aug. 31, 1990
from Arthur D. Wolf, Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law).
Congress did not follow this advice and has not repealed § 1338(b), but its inaction does
not provide an unequivocal indication of its intention. On one hand, Congress' failure to
repeal § 1338(b) may be viewed as an indication of its understanding that it "provides
otherwise" than the more generalized grant of supplemental jurisdiction found in
1994]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62
A similar argument can be constructed with respect to 28 U.S.C.§ 1334(b). Section 1334(b) grants to district courts original jurisdiction
over "civil proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or related to
cases under title 11."446 The grant of jurisdiction over civil proceedings
"related to" a title 11 case has been described as a grant of supplemental
jurisdiction." 7 If that characterization is accurate, then § 1334(b)-like
§ 1338(b)-contains an express grant of supplemental jurisdiction which
is narrower than that in § 1367. Thus, § 1334(b) also can be viewed as a
federal statute which "provides otherwise" than, and thus overrides, the
broad general grant found in § 1367.
The limited case law that exists on the issue does not support this al-
ternative interpretation, however. As noted above, courts have nearly
uniformly concluded that § 1367 authorizes the exercise of supplemental
bankruptcy jurisdiction."' In addition, courts also have viewed
§§ 1338(b) and 1367(a) as separate, rather than mutually exclusive,
grants of supplemental jurisdiction.449 Courts have not, however, explic-
itly considered the "expressly provided otherwise" language in § 1367(a).
The statutory argument against an exercise of jurisdiction supplemen-
tal to a proceeding "related to" a title 11 case is even stronger than that
against the exercise of supplemental patent, copyright, and trademark
§ 1367(a). On the other hand, Congress' silence on the interrelationship between these
two statutes might just as easily be construed as an indication of its intent that they act as
alternative, rather than mutually exclusive, grants of supplemental jurisdiction.
446. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). For a complete quotation of
§ 1334(b), see supra note 61.
447. See Cross, supra note 245, at 1233-50; supra notes 335-52 and accompanying text.
448. See supra part II.
449. See Gemco Ware Inc. v. E. Mishan & Sons, Inc., No. Civ. 5885, 1992 WL 281389
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (district court reserved decision on whether to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction, under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), over claim for tortious interference with business
relations that was related to patent infringement action because interference action might
not share common nucleus of fact with patent action; requirements of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1338(b) clearly not fulfilled); Relational Design & Technology, Inc. v. Data Team
Corp., 1992 Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) 26,932 (D. Kan. 1992) (denying motion to dis-
miss various state law claims for misappropriation of trade secret, fraud and breach of
contract, court exercised supplemental jurisdiction over these claims under § 1367(a)
rather than § 1338(b)); Friedman v. Stacey Data Processing Services Inc., 22 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1528 at n.2 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (denying motion to dismiss unfair competition coun-
terclaim, district court found supplemental jurisdiction under § 1338(b) and declined to
reach "theoretical thicket" involving interplay of Finley, § 1367(a), and pendent-party
jurisdiction); see also, e.g., Lone Ranger Television, Inc. v. Program Radio Corp., 740
F.2d 718, 724 (9th Cir. 1984) (decided before enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1367) (holding
that district court entitled to exercise pendent jurisdiction over state law conversion claim
related to copyright infringement action, although § 1338(b) mentions only claims of un-
fair competition joined with "substantial and related claim under the copyright" laws;
"[w]e do not read [§ 1338(b)] to limit pendent jurisdiction in appropriate cases over other
types of claims."); Schulman v. Huck Finn, Inc., 472 F.2d 864, 866 (8th Cir. 1973) (de-
cided before enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1367) ("[E]ven if plaintiff's second cause of action
against the two moving defendants does not state a claim of 'unfair competition' and thus
does not fall within § 1338(b), the Court nevertheless has the power to exercise jurisdic-
tion over these State law claims by virtue of the more general doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction.").
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jurisdiction. In decisions that seek to reconcile §§ 1338(b) and 1367(a), a
claim arising under a patent, copyright, or trademark statute had been
joined with a claim arising under state law but not involving a claim of
unfair competition; in these decisions, the courts viewed §§ 1338(b) and
1367(a) as distinct and alternative grants of supplemental jurisdiction.
Decisions reconciling §§ 1334(b) and 1367(a) are very different, however,
involving a much more expansive assertion of supplemental jurisdic-
tion.450 In many of these decisions the complaint had joined a civil pro-
ceeding "related to" a title 11 case with one related to the "related to"
civil proceeding. Thus, in upholding these assertions of supplemental
bankruptcy jurisdiction, the courts viewed §§ 1334 and 1367 as cumula-
tive grants of jurisdiction; they viewed § 1334(b)'s grant of original juris-
diction as primary and § 1367(a)'s grant of jurisdiction as supplemental
to it.45 1 If supplemental trademark jurisdiction were construed as
broadly as supplemental bankruptcy jurisdiction has been, courts would
have sanctioned an exercise of jurisdiction over jurisdictionally insuffi-
cient state law claims factually related to a state law unfair competition
claim that is, in turn, related to the federal trademark claim.452 Court
have not construed § 1338(b) this broadly. Nor should they.
Additional evidence can be found elsewhere in § 1367(a) that Congress
understood § 1334(b)'s grant of bankruptcy jurisdiction to "expressly
provid[e] otherwise" than the supplemental jurisdiction provision. Thus,
§ 1367(a) is inapplicable to bankruptcy jurisdiction.
450. See supra part II.A (discussing, in detail, cases exercising supplemental bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction).
451. See Publicker Indus., Inc. v. United States (In re Cuyahoga Equip. Corp.), 980
F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1992) (although the court of appeals referred to primary claims as
"related to" proceedings, they probably constituted "arising under" or "arising in" pro-
ceedings); Petrolia Corp. v. Elam (In re Petrolia Corp.), 79 B.R. 686 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
1987) (bankruptcy court found supplemental jurisdiction over claims of debtor's principal
and corporation with which debtor was to have merged since they arose out of "common
nucleus of operative fact" with debtor's identical "related to" proceeding); Total Petro-
leum, Inc. v. Coral Petroleum, Inc. (In re Coral Petroleum, Inc.), 62 B.R. 699 (Bankr.
S.D. Tex. 1986) (bankruptcy court exercised supplemental jurisdiction over claims
against non-debtor-codefendant, despite settlement of "related to" proceeding against
debtor-codefendant).
452. Pictorially, supplemental bankruptcy jurisdiction over claims related to a "related
to" proceeding can be drawn as follows:
TITLE "RELATED SUPPLE-
11 TO" MENTAL
CASE PROCEEDING CLAIM
Thus, if courts were to construe supplemental trademark jurisdiction equally as broad, it
would exercise jurisdiction over claims related to unfair competition claims related to a
trademark action. This broad exercise could be drawn as follows:
1994]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62
2. "In Any Civil Action of Which the District Courts Have Original
Jurisdiction, the District Courts Shall Have Supplemental Jurisdiction"
Bankruptcy litigation does not involve the commencement of "civil ac-
tions," unlike litigation commenced in the non-bankruptcy context.
Rule 2 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-which provides that
"[t]here shall be one form of action to be known as 'civil action' "-is
inapplicable in bankruptcy.45 3 Instead, the units of litigation that occur
in the context of a bankruptcy "case"4 4 are defined either as an "adver-
sary proceeding ' 455 or a "contested matter." '456 And while an adversary
proceeding is commenced by the filing of a complaint,45 7 a contested
matter is not. Contested matters are instead commenced by the filing of
a motion.458 Thus, the premise of § 1367(a)-original jurisdiction over a
"civil action"-is unfulfilled in the bankruptcy context.
3. "Related to Claims in the Action Within Such
Original Jurisdiction"
Section 1367(a) appears to divide the universe of permissible assertions
of jurisdiction between claims within the "original jurisdiction" of the
district court and claims within its "supplemental jurisdiction" 45g-re-
quiring that the supplemental claim be sufficiently related to "claims in
the action within such original jurisdiction."" ° Three definitions of the
phrase "original jurisdiction" in § 1367(a) are plausible: (i) a claim may
ARISING
UNDER UNFAIR SUPPLE-
TRADEMARK COMPETITION MENTAL
LAWS CLAIM CLAIM
453. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7002 (failing to incorporate Fed. R. Civ. P. 2 to bankruptcy
procedure); see also supra note 3 (discussing irrelevance of term "civil action" to bank-
ruptcy procedure).
454. For a definition of "title 11 case," see supra note 1.
455. For a definition of "adversary proceeding," see supra note 3.
456. For a definition of "contested matter," see supra note 3.
457. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7003 (incorporating Fed. R. Civ. P. to adversary proceed-
ings; Rule 3 provides that "[a] civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the
court").
458. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9014 ("In a contested matter in a case under the Code not
otherwise governed by these rules, relief shall be requested by motion .... ").
459. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (Supp. IV 1992) ("Except as provided in subsections (b)
and (c) or as expressly provided otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which
the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental
jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such
original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III
of the United States Constitution.") (emphasis added).
460. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (Supp. IV 1992).
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be within the "original jurisdiction" of the district courts for this purpose
if there exists a statutory grant of federal jurisdiction explicitly referred
to as "original;" (ii) a claim may be within the "original jurisdiction" of
the district courts for purposes of § 1367(a) if it is among the enumerated
categories of cases and controversies found in Article III of the Constitu-
tion; or (iii) a claim may fulfill this requirement of § 1367(a) if it consti-
tutes a permissible exercise of "non-supplemental jurisdiction."
Surprisingly, the first construction permits the broadest interpretation of
the scope of supplemental bankruptcy jurisdiction permitted by
§ 1367(a).
In virtually all of the other provisions of title 28 that use the term
"original jurisdiction," it is used to distinguish original jurisdiction from
appellate jurisdiction." 1 An interpretation of § 1367(a) that defines the
phrase "original jurisdiction" as used in that provision to refer to the
"non-supplemental jurisdiction" of the district courts would thus be
anomalous. Moreover, the dichotomy between "original" or "non-appel-
late" jurisdiction on one hand and "appellate" jurisdiction on the other
finds support not only in the statutory grants of jurisdiction found in title
28, but also in Article III of the Constitution." 2
a. Section 1367(a)'s Use of the Phrase "Original Jurisdiction" May
Refer to Statutory Grants of "Original Jurisdiction"
Numerous provisions of title 28 grant federal jurisdiction to district
courts.463 Many of these provisions are phrased in terms of grants of
461. Compare, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) ("mThe district courts
shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title
11, or arising in or related to cases under title I 1.") (emphasis added) with, e.g., 28 U.S.C.
§ 158(a) (1988) ("The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to hear
appeals from final judgments, orders, and decrees, and, with leave of the court, from
interlocutory orders and decrees, of bankruptcy judges ... under section 157 of this
title.") (emphasis added).
462. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 ("In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be a Party, the supreme
Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the
supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such
Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.") (emphasis added).
463. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330-1340, 1343-1358, 1361-1365 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); but
see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1342, 1359 (1988) (limiting the exercise of federal jurisdiction
rather than granting it). Section 1349 appears merely to limit federal jurisdiction, but by
implication may be viewed as a grant of jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1349 (1988) (pro-
viding that district courts do not have jurisdiction of civil actions by or against federally
chartered corporations unless United States is owner of more than one-half of stock);
Charles A. Wright, Handbook on the Law of Federal Courts § 17, at 65 & n.13 (3d ed.
1976) (explaining that Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1349 in response to the Pacific Rail-
road Removal Cases, 115 U.S. 1, 11 (1885), which had held that there existed statutory
"arising under" jurisdiction over state law tort actions against federally chartered rail-
road companies, and that this statutory grant of federal jurisdiction complied with the
requirements of Article III of the Constitution); see also American Nat'l Red Cross v.
S.G., 112 S. Ct. 2465, 2476 (1992) (relying on Pacific Railroad Removal Cases and others,
to conclude that "Article III's 'arising under' jurisdiction is broad enough to authorize
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"original jurisdiction" to the district courts.4" In the limited instances
in which a provision of title 28 grants "appellate jurisdiction" to the dis-
trict courts, the phrase "original jurisdiction" is absent. 465  Section
Congress to confer federal court jurisdiction over actions involving federally chartered
corporations" like the Red Cross). By contrast, 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (1988) grants juris-
diction but not to the district courts, instead enumerating which States have jurisdiction
over certain "civil causes of action between Indians or to which Indians are parties."
464. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (granting to district courts "original jurisdiction" of
"any nonjury civil action against a foreign state... as to any claim for relief in personam
with respect to which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity"); § 1331 (granting to
district courts "original jurisdiction" of "all civil actions arising under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States"); § 1332(a) (granting to district courts "original
jurisdiction" of "all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or
value of $50,000... and is between-(1) citizens of different States; (2) citizens of a State
and citizens or subjects of a foreign state; (3) citizens of different States and in which
citizens or subjects of a foreign state are additional parties; and (4) a foreign state ... as
plaintiff and citizens of a State or of different States"); § 1333 (granting to district courts
"original jurisdiction" of "[a]ny civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction");
§ 1335(a) (granting to district courts "original jurisdiction" of "any civil action of inter-
pleader or in the nature of interpleader" relating to "money or property of the value of
$500 or more" if "[t]wo or more adverse claimants, of diverse citizenship.., are claim-
ing or may claim to be entitled to such money or property" and if "the plaintiff has
deposited such money or property.., into the registry of the court"); § 1337(a) (granting
to district courts "original jurisdiction" of "any civil action or proceeding arising under
any Act of Congress regulating commerce or protecting trade and commerce against re-
straints and monopolies"); § 1338(a) (granting to district courts "original jurisdiction" of
"any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety
protection, copyrights and trade-marks"); § 1339 (granting to district courts "original
jurisdiction" of "any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to the postal
service"); § 1340 (granting to district courts "original jurisdiction" of "any civil action
arising under any Act of Congress providing for internal revenue"); § 1343(a) (granting
to district courts "original jurisdiction" of "any civil action authorized by law to be com-
menced by any person" to recover damages or redress deprivation of various civil rights
specified in federal statutes and the United States Constitution); § 1344 (granting to dis-
trict courts "original jurisdiction" of "any civil action to recover possession of any office,
... [with specified exceptions], authorized by law to be commenced, where in it appears
that the sole question touching the title to office arises out of denial of the right to vote, to
any citizen offering to vote, on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude");
§ 1345 (granting to district court "original jurisdiction" of "all civil actions, suits or pro-
ceedings commenced by the United States"); § 1346(a) (granting to district courts "origi-
nal jurisdiction" of specified civil actions against the United States); § 1347 (granting to
district courts "original jurisdiction" of "any civil action commenced by any tenant in
common or joint tenant for the partition of lands where the United States is one of the
tenants in common or joint tenants"); § 1348 (granting to district courts "original juris-
diction" of "any civil action commenced by the United States ... against any national
banking association"); § 1349 (denying district courts jurisdiction of "any civil action by
or against any corporation" simply because it was "incorporated by or under an Act of
Congress, unless the United States is the owner" of greater than half of the capital stock);
§ 1351 (granting "original jurisdiction" to district courts in "all civil actions" against
"consuls or vice consuls of foreign states," or members of a diplomatic "mission or mem-
bers of their families"); § 1352 (granting original jurisdiction to the district courts, "con-
current with State courts, of any action on a bond executed under any law of the United
States," excepting those matter which fall to the Court of International Trade).
465. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1988) (granting to district courts "jurisdiction to hear
appeals from final judgments, orders, and decrees" of bankruptcy courts); § 636(c)(4)
(1988) (granting to district courts appellate jurisdiction over judgment of magistrate
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1367(a)'s requirement that supplemental claims be sufficiently related to
"claims in the action within such original jurisdiction of the district
courts" may, thus, require that the jurisdiction of the primary claim de-
rive from some statutory grant of "non-appellate jurisdiction" other than
§ 1367. Under this construction of § 1367(a), assertions of supplemental
bankruptcy jurisdiction are statutorily authorized without regard to
whether the primary claim "arises under" title 11, or "arises in" or "re-
lates to" a title 11 case, because 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) grants district courts
"original but not exclusive jurisdiction" of all three types of
proceedings.4 6
6
b. Section 1367(a)'s Use of the Phrase "Original Jurisdiction" May
Refer to the Categories of Cases and Controversies
Enumerated in Article III of the United States
Constitution
Section 1367(a)'s use of the phrase "original jurisdiction" may refer to
the nine categories of cases and controversies enumerated in Article III,
Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution.467 Courts have interpreted these
categories of cases and controversies as referring to the "original jurisdic-
tion"-that is, the "non-appellate jurisdiction"-of the "inferior" federal
courts.
468
Under this construction, § 1367 clearly would authorize an assertion
of supplemental jurisdiction where bankruptcy jurisdiction under
§ 1334(b) exists over the primary claim because it involves a proceeding
"arising under" title 11. Article III, Section 2 enumerates "Cases...
arising under... the Laws of the United States" as within the original
jurisdiction of the district courts." 9 Whether, under this construction,
courts under limited specified circumstances); § 1336(a) (1988) (granting to district
courts "jurisdiction of any civil action to enforce, in whole or in part, any order of the
Interstate Commerce Commission, and to enjoin or suspend, in whole or in part, any
order of the Interstate Commerce Commission for the payment of money or the collec-
tion of fines, penalties, and forfeitures").
466. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); but see 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a)
(conferring "original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under title Ii") (emphasis
added).
467. See supra note 1 (quoting Article III, § 2, cl. 1). Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 of
the Constitution does not itself refer to the nine categories as grants of "original jurisdic-
tion," but Clause 2 of this section of the Constitution does refer to some of these catego-
ries as within the "original jurisdiction" of the Supreme Court and to others as within the
Supreme Court's "appellate jurisdiction." See U.S. Coast. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
468. See U.S. Const. art. III, § I ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time
to time ordain and establish."); see also, e.g., Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S.
738, 820-21 (1824) (concluding that Article III's authorization to grant "appellate juris-
diction" and "original jurisdiction" to Supreme Court of the United States is co-extensive
with authorization to grant "original jurisdiction" to inferior federal courts, and defining
"original jurisdiction" as "non-appellate jurisdiction" in this context).
469. See supra notes 361-62 and accompanying text (discussing application of constitu-
tional "category" test to "arising under" proceedings).
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§ 1367 also would sanction an assertion of supplemental jurisdiction
when the primary claim is subject to § 1334(b) bankruptcy jurisdiction as
a proceeding "arising in" or "related to" a title 11 case depends on the
breadth of Article III, Section 2.470
c. Section 1367(a)'s Use of the Phrase "Original Jurisdiction" May
Refer to "Non-Supplemental Jurisdiction" of District Courts
Alternatively, § 1367(a)'s use of the phrase "original jurisdiction" may
be sui generis. This language may indicate Congress' intent to describe a
dichotomy different from the "appellate/non-appellate" distinction
found in the Constitution and in statutory grants of federal jurisdiction
other than that in § 1367(a).471 It may indicate an intent to describe a
dichotomy between supplemental and "non-supplemental" jurisdiction.
A definition of the term "original jurisdiction" as "non-supplemental ju-
risdiction" works backward from a definition of "supplemental
jurisdiction. 4 72
Under this construction of § 1367(a), it is unclear whether Congress
intended to confer supplemental bankruptcy jurisdiction to the extent
courts have exercised this jurisdiction.473 One could argue that the "non-
supplemental" jurisdiction granted in a bankruptcy context is limited to
that of "cases under title 111' 47' and "proceedings arising under title
11."471 It may also be possible to view "arising in" jurisdiction as "non-
supplemental jurisdiction. 4 76 Characterization of "related to" jurisdic-
tion as "non-supplemental jurisdiction" in this sense may be much more
difficult, however.4
77
One difficulty with this construction is that it may permit too broad a
reading of § 1367(a). For example, if § 1367(a) defines "original jurisdic-
tion" to mean "non-supplemental jurisdiction" then it may codify the
judicially created doctrine of pendent appellate jurisdiction,478 although
there is no indication in legislative history that Congress intended to cast
470. For a discussion of the constitutionality of such an assertion of supplemental ju-
risdiction, see supra part III.A.
471. See supra notes 463-70 and accompanying text (discussing definition of "original
jurisdiction" with reference to statutory and constitutional sources).
472. Supplemental jurisdiction can only be defined in the context of an assessment of
its purposes. For a fuller discussion of the purposes of supplemental jurisdiction, see
supra notes 378-85, infra notes 553-56 and accompanying text (discussing inapplicability
of policies generally supporting exercise of supplemental jurisdiction when applied to
bankruptcy context).
473. See supra part II (discussing this case law in detail).
474. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
475. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
476. See supra notes 302-17, 338 and accompanying text (discussing whether "arising
in" jurisdiction constitutes grant of supplemental or non-supplemental jurisdiction).
477. See supra notes 318-34 and accompanying text (arguing that "related to" jurisdic-
tion may constitute grant of "arising under" jurisdiction and noting difficulties with this
contention).
478. See, e.g., Akers v. Caperton, 998 F.2d 220 (4th Cir. 1993) (exercising pendent
appellate jurisdiction).
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so broad a net.47 9 Another difficulty is that it requires the awkward con-
clusion that Congress meant "non-appellate jurisdiction" when it refers
to the "original jurisdiction" of district courts in most of title 28, but
meant "non-supplemental jurisdiction" when it refers to the "original ju-
risdiction" of district courts in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).480 This construction
is most awkward as applied to 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b), which grants supple-
mental jurisdiction over "a claim of unfair competition when joined with
a substantial and related claim under the copyright, patent, plant variety
protection or trade-mark laws" but which refers to this grant as "original
jurisdiction."4 '
4. "The District Courts Shall Have Supplemental Jurisdiction"
The plain language of § 1367(a) refers only to the authority of the dis-
trict courts to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.482 It does not expressly
grant this power to the bankruptcy courts.48 3
The plain language of 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) also supports a construction
which disallows bankruptcy courts from exercising supplemental juris-
diction.4 4 That section permits district courts to "provide that any or all
cases under title 11 and any or all proceedings arising under title 11 or
arising in or related to a case under title 11 shall be referred to the bank-
ruptcy judges for the district."'48 Although extremely broad, this refer-
ence of jurisdiction to bankruptcy courts does not expressly include
jurisdiction supplemental to proceedings "arising under" title 11, or
"arising in" or "related to" a title 11 case. Thus, read together with 28
U.S.C. § 157(a), the reference to "the district courts" in § 1367(a) should
be viewed as intentionally exclusive of the bankruptcy courts.48 6
In addition, 28 U.S.C. § 157(c) supports this conclusion. Section
157(c)(1) permits a bankruptcy judge to "hear a proceeding that is not a
479. See generally H.R. Rep. No. 734, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
480. This is not to say that the Supreme Court has not construed the plain language of
a statute to mean one thing in one provision and the very same plain language to mean
something quite different in another related provision. See, eg., Dewsnup v. Timm, 112
S. Ct. 773, 778-79 (1992) (term "allowed secured claim" defined to mean different things
in 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and (d)).
481. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) (1988).
482. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (Supp. IV 1992) ("in any civil action of which the district
courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction
[as provided therein]") (emphasis added).
483. See supra part III.A.2 (discussing constitutional issues by exercise of supplemen-
tal jurisdiction by non-Article III bankruptcy courts).
484. But see Cook v. United States (In re Earl Roggenbuck Farms, Inc.), 51 B.R. 913,
925 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985) (explaining that § 157(a) supports finding that non-Article
III bankruptcy courts empowered to exercise supplemental bankruptcy jurisdiction be-
cause nothing in that statute excludes reference of such jurisdiction).
485. 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) (1988).
486. Moreover, nothing in the legislative history of the Judicial Improvements Act of
1990 indicates an intent to empower bankruptcy courts to exercise the supplemental ju-
risdiction granted in § 1367(a).
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core proceeding but that is otherwise related to a case under title 11 "4"
Absent the consent of the parties, the bankruptcy judge's power in "re-
lated to" proceedings is severely limited.48 Legislative history and case
law both indicate that constitutional concerns explain the limited power
of a bankruptcy court to "hear" a "related to" proceeding but not enter
the final order in the proceeding.4 89 Given that there exist similar consti-
tutional issues relating to the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction by a
non-Article III bankruptcy court, 4 9 0 it seems likely that Congress would
have similarly limited the power of bankruptcy courts to "hear" and not
"determine" supplemental claims, and yet § 157(c)(1) speaks only of "a
proceeding that is not a core proceeding but that is otherwise related to a
case under title 11.,,491 It is silent with regard to the power of a bank-
ruptcy court to "hear" or "determine" a supplemental claim-a proceed-
ing that is neither core nor related to the title 11 case. A proceeding
requiring supplemental jurisdiction for the court to have the power to act
would not be "related to" the title 11 case; if it were, resort to supple-
mental jurisdiction would not be necessary. Since § 157(c) grants to
bankruptcy courts the more limited power to "hear" proceedings "re-
lated to" a title 11 case, without mention of their power to act in in-
stances where this relationship is absent, it should not be expanded to
include the power to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.
Did Congress intend, in § 1367, to grant to district courts jurisdiction
supplemental to the bankruptcy jurisdiction conferred by § 1334(b)? Did
it intend to grant supplemental jurisdiction to bankruptcy courts? Sec-
tion 1367 is ambiguous. If Congress did intend to confer supplemental
bankruptcy jurisdiction on these courts, it may have exceeded the limita-
tions which Article III of the Constitution places upon Congress' power
to bestow jurisdiction upon federal courts. Given the substantial consti-
487. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1) (1988).
488. See id. (providing that the bankruptcy court may "hear" such matters, but that
the district court shall enter any final orders or judgments and conduct a de novo review
of any findings of fact or law to which any party has specifically objected).
489. See 130 Cong. Rec. 58891 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (remarks of Sen. Hatch),
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 590, 591 (voicing concern that bankruptcy jurisdictional
provisions may exceed limitations of Article III of the Constitution in permitting "purely
State law claims which do not arise under the Bankruptcy Code... to be tried in [federal]
courts."). Because of these and other constitutional concerns, courts have often said that
they "should avoid characterizing a proceeding as 'core' if to do so would raise constitu-
tional problems." In re Castlerock Properties, 781 F.2d 159, 162 (9th Cir. 1986); see also
Pettibone Corp. v. Easley, 935 F.2d 120, 123 (7th Cir. 1991) (precluding bankruptcy
court judges from resolving state law tort claims based on § 157); IRS v. Bricknell Inv.
Corp. (In re Bricknell Inv. Corp.), 922 F.2d 696, 701 (11th Cir. 1991) (application for
attorney's fees under 26 U.S.C. § 7430 is a "non-core" proceeding); Taxel v. Electronic
Sports Research (In re Cinematronics, Inc.), 916 F.2d 1444, 1449-50 (9th Cir. 1990) (sup-
porting limited power of bankruptcy court to hear "core" claims where constitutional
problems would result); Gower v. Farmers Home Admin. (In re Davis), 899 F.2d 1136,
1140-42 (11th Cir.) (application for attorney's fees under 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) is
not a "core" proceeding), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 510 (1990).
490. See supra part III.A.2 (discussing these constitutional issues).
491. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1) (1988).
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tutional questions surrounding such an exercise of jurisdiction, these am-
biguities should be resolved to avoid a finding of unconstitutionality.
Section 1367 should be construed to preclude the exercise of jurisdiction
supplemental to "arising in" and "related to" proceedings by a district
court. It also should be construed as inapplicable to bankruptcy courts,
conferring no supplemental jurisdiction on these non-Article III courts.
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FAVORING A LIMITATION OF
SUPPLEMENTAL BANKRUPTCY JURISDICTION
This part argues that, even if authorized by the Constitution and by
statute, supplemental bankruptcy jurisdiction should be limited by Con-
gress to include only supplemental claims related to an "arising under"
or "arising in" proceeding, and possibly to include supplemental claims
related to a "related to" proceeding that involves property of the estate.
It concludes that the policies and purposes of supplemental jurisdiction
are best reconciled with the purposes of the bankruptcy jurisdictional
provision when district courts are precluded from exercising supplemen-
tal bankruptcy jurisdiction over claims related to "related to" proceed-
ings, and statutorily permitted to decline other assertions of
supplemental bankruptcy jurisdiction when the exercise would contra-
vene important bankruptcy policies.
Bankruptcy jurisdiction exists to facilitate the efficient resolution of a
debtor's estate, including litigation that "affects the amount of property
available for distribution or the allocation of property among credi-
tors,"492 but does not exist to facilitate the resolution of litigation unre-
lated to the estate.493 An assertion of jurisdiction supplemental to a
"related to" proceeding may be consistent with the efficient resolution of
complex litigation, a single claim of which "might have a conceivable
effect" on the estate, and yet actually hinder resolution of the bankruptcy
case.494 Moreover, the policies generally favoring an exercise of supple-
mental jurisdiction in ordinary civil litigation are not wholly applicable
in the context of bankruptcy.49
A. A Principal Purpose of Bankruptcy Jurisdiction Is to Facilitate the
Resolution of an Estate
Congress should prohibit the exercise of supplemental bankruptcy ju-
risdiction when the exercise would be inconsistent with the fundamental
purpose of a broad grant of bankruptcy jurisdiction: the efficient resolu-
tion of claims against and distributions from a bankruptcy estate. The
492. Elscint, Inc. v. First Wis. Fin. Corp. (In re Xonics, Inc.), 813 F.2d 127, 131 (7th
Cir. 1987) (defining scope of "related to" jurisdiction).
493. See infra part IV.A.
494. See id.
495. See infra part IV.B.
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exercise of supplemental bankruptcy jurisdiction could hinder closure of
a given bankruptcy case depending upon the factual circumstances.
When Congress determined to expand bankruptcy jurisdiction with
the enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, it indicated that it
was motivated by a desire to facilitate the resolution of an estate:
A comprehensive grant of jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts over
all controversies arising out of any bankruptcy or rehabilitation case
would greatly diminish the basis for litigation of jurisdictional issues
which consumes so much time, money, and energy of the bankruptcy
system and of those involved in the administration of debtors'
affairs.496
It understood that its broad grant of jurisdiction was not without limits,
in that questions regarding the scope of any statutory grant of federal
jurisdiction are inescapable.497 When discussing the parameters of those
limitations, Congress repeatedly referred to them as relating to the reso-
lution of a bankruptcy case. 4 9 8
Congress justified this expansive grant of jurisdiction by reference to
the jurisdictional provisions of the Bankruptcy Acts of 1841499 and
496. H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1977); see also id. at 48-49 ("H.R.
8200 grants the bankruptcy courts broad and complete jurisdiction over all matters and
proceedings that arise in connection with bankruptcy cases .... The forum shopping and
jurisdictional litigation that have plagued the bankruptcy system, the unfairness to de-
fendants from 'jurisdiction by ambush,' and the dissipation of assets and the expense
associated with bifurcated jurisdiction will be eliminated by the jurisdiction proposed by
this bill.").
497. See id. at 46 n.29 ("Litigation of jurisdictional issues would not be eliminated
since the existence of jurisdiction is always questionable in a federal tribunal. As part of
the federal government the bankruptcy courts would be courts of limited jurisdiction, and
it would always be open to a party haled into such a court to object that there was not
sufficient connection between the litigation and any legitimate federal concern to warrant
the assumption of jurisdiction.").
498. See id. at 46 ("A comprehensive grant of jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts
over all controversies arising out of any bankruptcy or rehabilitation case would greatly
diminish the basis for litigation of jurisdictional issues which consumes so much time,
money, and energy of the bankruptcy system and of those involved in the administration
of debtors' affairs. It would foster the development of a more uniform, cohesive body of
substantive and procedural law which would be applicable to the administration of estates
under the Bankruptcy Act."); at 47-48 ("There appears to be no reason why congress
cannot in the exercise of its power under the Bankruptcy Clause of the Constitution
confer jurisdiction over all litigation having a significant connection with bankruptcy."); at
48 ("Congress may be said to have given comprehensive jurisdiction to the bankruptcy
courts under the Act with respect to all litigation arising from the administration of the
estate of any eligible or amenable debtor.... ."); at 48 ("H.R. 8200 grants the bankruptcy
courts broad and complete jurisdiction over all matters and proceedings that arise in
connection with bankruptcy cases.") (emphasis added).
499. The 1841 Act broadly conferred upon district courts "jurisdiction in all matters
and proceedings in bankruptcy arising under this act.., the said jurisdiction to be exer-
cised summarily, in the nature of summary proceedings in equity." Bankruptcy Act of
1841, ch. 9, sec. 6., 5 Stat. 440, 445 (repealed). It further provided that this jurisdiction
extended "to all cases and controversies in bankruptcy" involving the estate. Id. Section
6 of the 1841 Act provided that
the jurisdiction hereby conferred on the district court shall extend to all cases
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1867 ,"c° which were "almost as extensive" '° and upheld by the Supreme
and controversies in bankruptcy arising between the bankrupt and any creditor
or creditors who shall claim any debt or demand under the bankruptcy; to all
cases and controversies between such creditor or creditors and the assignee of
the estate, whether in office or removed; to all cases and controversies between
such assignee and the bankrupt, and to all acts, matters, and things to be done
under and in virtue of the bankruptcy, until the final distribution and settlement
of the estate of the bankrupt, and the close of the proceedings in bankruptcy.
kd; see also Exparte Christy, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 292, 311-12 (1845) (Story, J.) (construing
jurisdictional provisions of 1841 Bankruptcy Act to hold that federal district court, when
sitting in bankruptcy, had jurisdiction to determine validity and extent of liens and mort-
gages against debtor's property, whether or not lienor or mortgagee had filed proof of
claim against estate).
500. The jurisdictional provisions of the 1867 Act closely resembled those in the 1841
Act. It provided that the district courts are "courts of bankruptcy, and they shall have
original jurisdiction in their respective districts in all matters and proceedings in bank-
ruptcy," and that this grant extended to enumerated "cases and controversies" involving
the bankruptcy estate. Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, sec. 1, 14 Stat. 517, 517 (re-
pealed). The 1867 Act specifically provided:
the jurisdiction hereby conferred shall extend to all cases and controversies aris-
ing between the bankrupt and any creditor or creditors who shall claim any
debt or demand under the bankruptcy; to the collection of all the assets of the
bankrupt; to the ascertainment and liquidation of the liens and other specific
claims thereon; to the adjustment of the various priorities and conflicting inter-
ests of all parties; and to the marshalling and disposition of the different funds
and assets, so as to secure the rights of all parties and due distribution of the
assets among all the creditors; and to all acts, matters, and things to be done
under and in virtue of the bankruptcy, until the final distribution and settlement
of the estate of the bankrupt, and the close of the proceedings in bankruptcy.
Id; see also Phelps v. Sellick, 19 F. Cas. 463, 464 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1873) (No. 11,079)
(court had little difficulty in concluding "[t]hat all the creditors of the bankrupt, secured
as well as unsecured, become and are at once, by virtue of the bankruptcy, parties to the
proceedings, and they and their debts are thereby brought under and subject to the sole
and exclusive jurisdiction and control of the bankruptcy court; and that such jurisdiction
and control exist and may be enforced as well before as after proof of debt").
501. H.R. Rep. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1977). According to House Reports:
The constitutionality of a grant of a jurisdiction in such comprehensive terms
should not be subject to any serious doubt. The jurisdictional grants to the
court of bankruptcy by the Acts of 1841 and 1867 were almost as extensive, and
the Supreme Court gave the provisions of those Acts a generous construction
and approval of their constitutionality. There appears to be no reason why
Congress cannot in the exercise of its power under the Bankruptcy Clause of the
Constitution confer jurisdiction over all litigation having a significant connection
with bankruptcy. Indeed, it could not be contended otherwise without challeng-
ing the jurisdictional provisions of the present Bankruptcy Act [of 1898]. Sec-
tion 2a(7) of the [1898] Act confers jurisdiction on the courts of bankruptcy
over the determination of controversies "in relation to" the estates of bankrupts
"except as herein otherwise provided." By clear implication § 23b [of the 1898
Act] recognizes that courts of bankruptcy have jurisdiction of any action
brought there by a receiver or trustee "by consent of the defendant." Since
consent of the parties cannot create jurisdiction of the subject matter in a court
which has not been vested with it by a valid legislative act, Congress may be
said to have given comprehensive jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts under
the Act with respect to all litigation arising from the administration of the es-
tate of any eligible or amenable debtor, while in certain situations limiting the
exercise of this jurisdiction to accommodate the convenience of adversaries of a
receiver or trustee.
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Court as constitutional. 50 2 Further, in upholding the broad grants of ju-
risdiction under the Bankruptcy Acts of 1841 and 1867, the Supreme
Court noted that the "manifest object" of these jurisdictional provisions
was to provide speedy proceedings, and the ascertainment and adjust-
ment of all claims and rights in favor of or against the bankrupt's es-
tate, in the most expeditious manner.503
Nonetheless, policy arguments favoring an expansive grant of bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction apply only to those proceedings "arising under title
11, or arising in or related to cases under title 11 ."' The exercise ofjurisdiction over these proceedings facilitates the goal of expeditious ad-
ministration of bankruptcy cases. 50 5 Yet, these strong policy arguments
may not be present for an assertion of jurisdiction over a supplemental
claim which relates only to the "arising under," ''arising in" or "related
to" proceeding, and not to the title 11 case itself. An assertion of such
supplemental bankruptcy jurisdiction may hinder rather than facilitate
resolution of the title 11 case because, by definition, the supplemental
proceeding has no conceivable effect on distributions from the estate or
the administration of the estate.50 6 Resolution of the supplemental claim
may delay closure of the case50 7 if it distracts the court, trustee, debtor-
Id. at 47-48 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
502. See Exparte Christy, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 292, 311-12 (1845) (1841 Act); Lathrop v.
Drake, 91 U.S. 516, 518 (1875) (1867 Act); see also supra notes 272-73 (discussing cases
in which the Supreme Court, in dicta, opined that broad grants of bankruptcy jurisdiction
under 1898 Bankruptcy Act and 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act were constitutional).
503. Ex parte Christy, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 292, 314-15 (1845). In reaching this conclu-
sion the Court noted that a broad grant of federal jurisdiction was "indispensable" to the
realization of this goal. See id. at 311-12 ("For this purpose it was indispensable that an
entire system adequate to that end should be provided by Congress, capable of being
worked out through the instrumentality of its own courts, independently of all aid and
assistance from any other tribunals over which it could exercise no effectual control .....
[I]t is manifest that the purposes so essential to the just operation of the bankrupt system,
could scarcely be accomplished except by clothing the courts of the United States sitting
in bankruptcy with the most ample powers and jurisdiction to accomplish them; and it
would be a matter of extreme surprise if, when Congress had thus required the end, they
should at the same time have withheld the means by which alone it could be successfully
reached."); see also Lathrop, 91 U.S. at 518 ("But a uniform system of bankruptcy, na-
tional in its character, ought to be capable of execution in the national tribunals, without
dependence upon those of the States in which it is possible that embarrassments might
arise."); Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342, 346 (1874) ("It is obviously one of the
purposes of the Bankrupt law [of 1867], that there should be a speedy disposition of the
bankrupt's assets.").
504. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
505. See supra notes 496-503 and accompanying text (discussing policy of bankruptcy
jurisdiction).
506. See supra notes 85-98 and accompanying text (discussing various definitions of
"related to" jurisdiction).
507. Resolution of a supplemental claim, standing alone, is not likely to delay distribu-
tions to creditors, for if it were to have this effect it would constitute a "related to"
proceeding. See supra notes 85-98 and accompanying text (defining "related to" jurisdic-
tion). Nonetheless, the supplemental claim would be joined to an "arising under," "aris-
ing in" or "related to" proceeding which, by definition, will need to be resolved before
distributions to creditors can be completed. Moreover, even though distributions to cred-
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in-possession, creditors' committee or other interested parties from com-
pleting necessary tasks in a timely fashion.
This is not to say that judicial economies never flow from an exercise
of supplemental bankruptcy jurisdiction. They do. Because the supple-
mental proceeding involves a common factual nexus with the primary
proceeding, litigation in a single forum would be more efficient than re-
quiring the parties to litigate the primary claim in federal court and the
supplemental claim in state court. The efficiencies, however, relate to the
resolution of the proceedings between the litigants rather than to the res-
olution of the bankruptcy case as a whole. The economies to the litigants
may be offset by diseconomies to the bankruptcy case as a whole.
Whether an exercise of supplemental bankruptcy jurisdiction presents an
impediment to the completion of a bankruptcy case differs depending
upon the factual circumstances.
This argument against exercise of supplemental bankruptcy jurisdic-
tion, which follows from the purposes of bankruptcy jurisdiction, is
strongest as applied to an assertion of jurisdiction of a claim supplemen-
tal to a "related to" proceeding between non-debtor third parties. Recall
the hypothetical involving the priority dispute between secured creditors
of the debtor and the related third-party malpractice action brought by
one of the lenders against its attorneys.508 Because the priority dispute
might conceivably affect distributions to creditors from the estate, it is
sufficiently "related to" the title 11 case to justify an assertion of bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction, even though the property in dispute is no longer
property of the estate. Thus, an exercise of jurisdiction over the priority
dispute is consistent with the bankruptcy policy favoring an expeditious
resolution of the debtor's bankruptcy case.5°" In contrast, an exercise of
supplemental bankruptcy jurisdiction over the malpractice action sharing
a "common nucleus of operative fact" with the "related to" proceeding is
inconsistent with this bankruptcy policy because it can only slow down
resolution of the debtor's estate.
By contrast, when an assertion of jurisdiction supplemental to an
"arising under" or "arising in" proceeding is considered in light of the
bankruptcy policy favoring speedy resolution of the case, the result dif-
itors are not directly held up pending resolution of the supplemental claim, they may be
held up indirectly. The time which district and bankruptcy judges have is limited, and
time spent resolving a supplemental claim likely means that some other proceeding will
be delayed.
508. See supra notes 28-37 and accompanying text (detailing this hypothetical).
509. Because of the expansive definition of "related to" jurisdiction, the bankruptcy
policies are, in some proceedings, only weakly furthered by the assertion of jurisdiction.
See Elscint, Inc. v. First Wis. Fin. Corp. (In re Xonics, Inc.), 813 F.2d 127, 131 (7th Cir.
1987) ("There is jurisdiction under § 157(c)(1) only when the dispute is 'related to' the
bankruptcy-meaning that it affects the amount of property available for distribution or
the allocation of property among creditors .... The bankruptcy jurisdiction is designed
to provide a single forum for dealing with all claims to the bankrupt's assets. It extends
no farther than its purpose.").
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fers depending on the circumstances. For example, courts ° otherwise
uncertain as to the propriety of an exercise of supplemental bankruptcy
jurisdiction have indicated in dicta that they would exercise jurisdiction
over a request for a declaratory judgment establishing the validity and
amount of a debt which is supplemental to an objection to the debtor's
discharge 1 or the dischargeability of the debt at issue. 12
A proceeding objecting to discharge or the dischargeability of an obli-
gation clearly "arises under" title 11, as the bases for these claims51 3 de-
rive from 11 U.S.C. §§ 727 or 523. A claim seeking a declaration as to
the validity and amount of the debt at issue in this "arising under" pro-
ceeding will undoubtedly involve "a common nucleus of operative fact"
between the supplemental and primary claims. Moreover, resolution of
this sort of supplemental claim may be viewed as consistent with expedi-
tious resolution of the bankruptcy case, even though arguably outside the
scope of "related to" jurisdiction. In a case in which there will be distri-
butions to creditors,51 4 the declaratory action can be viewed as assisting
in the resolution of the case because the Bankruptcy Code generally has
not been interpreted to prevent non-dischargeable claims from receiving
distributions from the estate. 51 5 Thus, the declaratory action can be
510. See Official Creditors' Comm. of Prods. Liab. & Personal Injury Claimants v.
International Ins. Co. (In re Pettibone Corp.), 135 B.R. 847, 852 (Bankr. N.D. I11. 1992)
(stating in dicta that "except to enter a dollar judgment in actions to bar dis-
chargeability," it doubted it had general ancillary jurisdiction); see also Aerni v. Colum-
bus Fed. Sav. (In re Aerni), 86 B.R. 203, 206 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1988) (exercising
supplemental jurisdiction over claim "related to" objection to debtor's discharge).
511. See I 1 U.S.C. § 727 (1988) (describing grounds on which chapter 7 debtor may be
denied bankruptcy discharge).
512. See 11 U.S.C. § 523 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (describing specific debts from which
individual debtor may not receive bankruptcy discharge).
513. The term "claim" is used here in the procedural sense to refer to a unit of litiga-
tion within an adversary proceeding. See supra note 3 (discussion definition of "claim" in
greater detail).
514. In cases in which there is unencumbered, nonexempt property of the estate, there
will be property available for distributions to creditors. See I 1 U.S.C. §§ 725, 726 (1988)
(establishing priority of distributions to creditors in chapter 7 liquidation).
515. In the chapter 13 context, courts are divided on whether non-dischargeable claims
are entitled to distributions pursuant to the repayment plan. Some courts have held that
chapter 13 plans proposing to pay non-dischargeable child support payments on a de-
ferred basis are not proposed in good faith as required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) (1988).
See e.g., Pacana v. Pacana (In re Pacuna), 125 B.R. 19, 25 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1991) (absent
written consent of recipient, bad faith to propose chapter 13 plan proposing deferred
payment of back child support payments); In re Harris, 132 B.R. 166, 170 (Bankr. S.D.
Iowa 1989) (same); In re Santa Maria, 128 B.R. 32, 37 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1991) (same).
In a distinct line of cases, other courts have not only permitted the holders of non-dis-
chargeable claims to receive distributions pursuant to a chapter 13 plan, but have permit-
ted the debtor to separately classify non-dischargeable claims from his or her other
claims, notwithstanding the direction in 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(1) (1988) that a chapter 13
plan "may not discriminate unfairly against any class" of unsecured claims. See, e.g.,
Mickelson v. Leser (In re Leser), 939 F.2d 669, 672 (8th Cir. 1991) (separate classification
and disparate treatment justified because child support claims non-dischargeable in chap-
ter 13 anyway); In re Saulter, 133 B.R. 148, 150 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1991) (separate classi-
fication justified because, after 1990 amendment to Code, student loan liability will
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viewed as tantamount to a proof of claim. 16
Even in a "no-asset" case5 17 the declaratory action might be viewed as
consistent with efficient resolution of the case, because the Code provides
for the possibility that the trustee discovers assets after the case is
closed." 8 In this event, the debtor's bankruptcy case would be re-
opened519 and creditors notified of the need to file proofs of claim against
the estate. 20 Even the creditor whose claim was held to be non-dis-
chargeable would be entitled to file a proof of claim and receive distribu-
tions from the reopened estate. Judgment on the declaratory action
could be viewed as streamlining this process, although only
marginally. 521
typically survive discharge). Yet other decisions have held that the separate classification
of non-dischargeable claims, other than non-dischargeable child support claims, is unau-
thorized by the Code. See, eg., In re Schieber, 129 B.R. 604, 607 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1991)
(separate classification of student loans not justified, notwithstanding 1990 amendment
rendering most student loans non-dischargeable; court distinguished case in same district
permitting separate classification of child support payments since basis for separate classi-
fication in that case was policy importance of ensuring support of children not non-dis-
chargeability of support payments); In re Lawson, 93 B.R. 979, 982 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1988) (same, critical of four-factor test).
516. Litigation surrounding a proof of claim "arises in" a title 11 case for purposes of
§ 1334(b). See supra notes 75-84 and accompanying text (discussing "arising in" jurisdic-
tion in greater detail). With this characterization, jurisdiction over the declaratory action
may not be merely supplemental jurisdiction.
517. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2002(e) (defining a "no-asset" case as a "chapter 7 liquida-
tion case [in which].. . it appears from the schedules that there are no assets from which
a dividend can be paid"). In "no-asset" cases, Rule 2002(e) permits the trustee to notify
creditors of this fact and that it is unnecessary to file claims until further notice. See Fed.
R. Bankr. P. 2002(e). As a result, the relationship between the creditors' declaratory
action and resolution of the bankruptcy estate is much more attenuated.
518. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(d)(2), (e) (1988) (permitting trustee to request revocation of
discharge, within later of close of case or one year after discharge, if "debtor acquired
property that is property of the estate, or became entitled to acquire property that would
be property of the estate, and knowingly and fraudulently failed to report the acquisition
of or entitlement to such property, or to deliver or surrender such property to the
trustee").
519. See 11 U.S.C. § 350(b) (1988) ("A case may be reopened in the court in which
such case was closed to administer assets, to accord relief to the debtor, or for other
cause."); see also Fed. R. Bankr. P. 5010 (setting forth procedure for reopening case).
520. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2002(e) ("In a chapter 7 liquidation case, if it appears from
the schedules that there are no assets from which a dividend can be paid, the notice of the
meeting of creditors may include a statement to that effect; that is unnecessary to file
claims; and that if sufficient assets become available for the payment of a dividend, fur-
ther notice will be given for the filing of claims."); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3002 (c)(5) (ex-
tending time for filing proofs of claim against chapter 7 estate "[i]f notice of insufficient
assets to pay a dividend was given to creditors pursuant to Rule 2002(e), and subse-
quently the trustee notifies the court that payment of a dividend appears possible").
521. To some extent, characterization of the declaratory action as a proof of claim
contingent upon a later reopening of the debtor's bankruptcy case may support the con-
clusion that jurisdiction over the declaratory action is "related to," not supplemental,jurisdiction in that the claim could have a "conceivable effect" on administration of the
estate. See supra notes 85-98 and accompanying text (discussing "related to" jurisdiction
in greater detail). Courts, however, have not uniformly defined "related to" jurisdiction
this broadly.
1994]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62
Nothing, however, requires a creditor holding a non-dischargeable
claim to file a proof of claim against the estate and seek distributions
from the estate.522 Indeed, tactical considerations may lead the creditor
to waive this right. 523 Under these circumstances, the exercise of supple-
mental bankruptcy jurisdiction over the declaratory action may hinder
rather than assist the resolution of the bankruptcy case.524 The only
economy that judgment in the declaratory action would provide is to the
creditor collecting on the obligation in a non-bankruptcy context.
If the trustee, debtor-in-possession, or other representative of the estate
is a party to the action, the exercise of supplemental bankruptcy jurisdic-
tion might be justified as fostering an efficient resolution of the adminis-
tration of the bankruptcy estate. Consider a series of hypotheticals.
First, imagine that in response to an action brought by the trustee to
avoid a transaction as preferential or fraudulent the defendant raises
counterclaims alleging breach of contract. These counterclaims are
likely to be viewed as "related to" the title 11 case, even if, for tactical
reasons, 52 5 the defendant has not filed a proof of claim against the
522. See 11 U.S.C. § 501 (1988) (providing that creditors "may" file proof of claim).
523. The filing of a proof of claim may be viewed as consent to the exercise of jurisdic-
tion by a non-Article III bankruptcy judge for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2) (1988)
(permitting bankruptcy judge to "hear and determine" even "related to" proceedings if
litigants consent to such exercise). Although courts disagree as to whether this consent
can be implied, see supra note 423, it is clear that the filing of a proof of claim constitutes
consent to the exercise of bankruptcy court jurisdiction over related counterclaims. See
28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C) (1988) (defining "core proceedings" as including "counter-
claims by the estate against persons filing claims against the estate"); but see Piombo
Corp. v. Castlerock Properties (In re Castlerock Properties), 781 F.2d 159, 162-63 (9th
Cir. 1986) (court of appeals declined to find that creditor consented to exercise of bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction over counterclaims asserted by debtor to creditor's request for relief
from automatic stay, notwithstanding creditor's subsequent filing of proof of claim);
Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Axton (In re Axton), 641 F.2d 1262, 1268 (9th Cir.
1981) (decided under Bankruptcy Act of 1898) (court of appeals declined to find that
lessor had consented to exercise of bankruptcy court jurisdiction although lessor had
asserted entitlement to administrative expense for debtor's use and occupancy of prem-
ises). Determination by the bankruptcy court of a proof of claim filed against the estate
may preclude subsequent claims under the doctrine of res judicata. See Bank of Lafayette
v. Baudoin (In re Baudoin), 981 F.2d 736, 737 (5th Cir. 1993) (court of appeals dismissed
lender liability action as barred by doctrine of res judicata; bankruptcy court previously
had allowed proof of claim filed by defendant). Moreover, the filing of a proof of claim
forecloses the exercise of important procedural rights by the claimant. See Langenkamp
v. Culp, 498 U.S. 42, 44-45 (1990) (per curiam) (filing of proof of claim against estate
precludes exercise of right to trial by jury by such claimant).
524. The debtor, rather than the bankruptcy trustee, is the proper defendant to both
the objection to discharge and the related declaratory action. Therefore, one cannot ar-
gue that supplemental jurisdiction over the declaratory action assists in resolution of the
bankruptcy case because it frees the trustee from the responsibility to litigate the declara-
tory action in a nonbankruptcy forum.
525. See supra note 524 (discussing these tactical considerations); see also 11 U.S.C.
§ 502(d) (1988) (disallowing claim of transferee in avoidable transfer unless transferee has
disgorged benefit received from such transfer). Because in this hypothetical the defend-
ant has not filed a proof of claim, it is not entitled to receive a dividend from the estate.
See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3002(a) (1988) (generally requiring holder of claim to file proof of
claim to receive dividend in bankruptcy case) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3003(c)(2) (requiring
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estate.
52 6
If, on the other hand, the state law counterclaims are raised in an
avoidance action brought by the debtor, rather than the trustee,527 they
may not be viewed as "related to" the title 11 case.528 The case for exer-
cise of supplemental bankruptcy jurisdiction is concomitantly weak. The
debtor's estate can be administered without resolution of the supplemen-
tal counterclaim, thus, it seems likely that an exercise of supplemental
jurisdiction over the counterclaim will stall that resolution.529
holder of disputed claim to file proof of claim to receive dividend from chapter I I estate).
The counterclaim could affect the administration of the debtor's estate in another way; if
the counterclaim is successful but the defense against the debtor's primary action is not,
the defendant's liability to the estate will be reduced by the recovery in the counterclaim.
In addition, failure to file a proof of claim will preclude the defendant from recovering
any amount from the estate, even if recovery on the counterclaim exceeds recovery on the
debtor's action.
526. See supra notes 85-98 (discussing "related to" jurisdiction); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 157(b)(2)(C) (1988) (defining "core proceedings" to include "counterclaims by the es-
tate against persons filing claims against the estate"). Courts differ as to the breadth of
this provision. Some hold that a counterclaim based on a state law cause of action is not
"core," even though a proof of claim was filed by the party against whom the claim was
asserted, unless the state law claim itself constitutionally can be heard by the bankruptcy
court. See, eg., Nanodata Computer Corp. v. Kollmorgen Corp. (In re Nanodata Com-
puter Corp.), 52 B.R. 334, 338-43 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding that state law issues
are not "core" matters, and merit only "related to" jurisdiction as governed by § 157(c));
see also Piombo Corp. v. Castlerock Properties (In re Castlerock Properties), 781 F.2d
159, 162-63 (9th Cir. 1986) (debtor fied state law counterclaims to motion for relief from
automatic stay to continue pending state court action; after bankruptcy court denied mo-
tion to dismiss counterclaims, state court plaintiff filed proof of claim; court of appeals
held that bankruptcy court did not have jurisdiction over counterclaim when proof of
claim was filed after court had asserted jurisdiction over counterclaims). Other courts
read subsection (C) literally to find "core" status for counterclaims based on state law
whenever the counterclaims are against a party who filed a proof of claim. Some, how-
ever, would limit this definition to counterclaims arising out of the same transaction as
that which gave rise to the proof of claim. See, eg., Macon Prestressed Concrete Co. v.
Duke, 46 B.R. 727, 731 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1985) (finding jurisdiction for debtor's coun-
terclaim because it was "intimately connected" with debtor's petition for reorganization).
527. See II U.S.C. § 522(0 (1988) (permitting debtor to avoid certain judicial liens, or
non-possessory, non-purchase-money security interests, which impair an exemption to
which debtor otherwise would have been entitled); § 522(h) (permitting debtor to bring
avoidance actions if property to be recovered in such action otherwise could have been
claimed as exempt by debtor under 11 U.S.C. § 522(g)(1) and trustee does not attempt to
avoid such transfer).
528. Cf. Turner v. Ermiger (In re Turner), 724 F.2d 338, 341 (2d Cir. 1983) (cause of
action, which was allocated to debtor as exempt property, was not "related to" bank-
ruptcy case because suit was no longer property of estate, proceeds from recovery on suit
would not enhance estate, and there was no other significant connection to bankruptcy
case).
529. One might argue that the exercise of supplemental bankruptcy jurisdiction would
assist the trustee in a speedy resolution of the estate because it provides the debtor the
convenience of a single forum for resolution of both the avoidance action and the coun-
terclaims. But this argument seems unconvincing because, if supplemental bankruptcy
jurisdiction were not exercised, the defendant would be forced to choose between filing a
proof of claim on grounds of breach of contract, requesting relief from the automatic stay
in order to pursue the breach of contract action (to judgment) in a nonbankruptcy forum,
or abandoning the claim. Only if there were a substantial likelihood that the defendant's
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The notion that an exercise of supplemental bankruptcy jurisdiction
may assist in, rather than hamper, the administration of an estate, how-
ever, is heightened when the counterclaims occur in an action involving
the bankruptcy trustee. Assume in this instance that a suit is brought
against the trustee, alleging that the trustee should be held personally
liable for some malfeasance which occurred during her representation of
the estate.530 For example, the plaintiffs, attorneys to the trustee during
the pendency of the bankruptcy case, may allege that the trustee should
be held personally liable for their attorneys' fees, which previously were
disallowed by the bankruptcy court on the grounds that the plaintiffs
were not "disinterested, 5 31 because the trustee fraudulently misrepre-
sented to them the factual circumstances leading to their conclusion that
they were sufficiently "disinterested." In response, the trustee defends
against the attorneys' claim, arguing that even if she had misrepresented
the facts to the attorneys, she should not be held liable because the plain-
tiffs had themselves committed malpractice. Here, the plaintiffs' suit
against the trustee should be viewed as "arising in" the title 11 case since,
but for the bankruptcy filing, the trustee would not have been appointed,
the plaintiffs would not have been employed by the trustee and the entire
situation would not have occurred. The trustee's counterclaim to the
"arising in" proceeding may not "relate to" the title 11 case in that reso-
lution of the counterclaim will have no conceivable effect on distributions
to creditors or the administration of the estate. 532 The only effect of suc-
cess in her counterclaim would be to reduce the trustee's personal liabil-
ity to the plaintiffs. Still, an exercise of supplemental bankruptcy
jurisdiction might assist the trustee in a speedy resolution of the estate
because it may provide her the convenience of a single forum for resolu-
tion of both the personal liability action and the counterclaim. If supple-
request for relief from the automatic stay would be granted would this judicial economy
argument hold any water, however, and courts are most reluctant, absent special comity
concerns not likely to exist in a garden-variety contract action, to grant such a request
and permit the litigation of unsecured claims in a nonbankruptcy forum. There would
seem to be no judicial economy if the debtor's objections to the contract action are liti-
gated in the context of the avoidance suit rather than as an objection to a proof of claim.
530. See, e.g., Lopez-Stubbe v. Rodriguez-Estrada (In re San Juan Hotel Corp.), 847
F.2d 931, 937 (1st Cir. 1988) (upholding assessment of personal liability against former
trustee of chapter 7 estate).
531. See 11 U.S.C. § 327(a) (1988) (permitting trustee, with court's approval, to em-
ploy attorneys "that do not hold or represent an interest adverse to the estate, and that
are disinterested persons"); § 328(a) (permitting trustee to employ professional persons
"on any reasonable terms and conditions of employment"); § 328(c) (permitting court to
deny allowance of compensation for services rendered by such professional persons if
"such professional person is not a disinterested person, or represents or holds an interest
adverse to the interest of the estate with respect to the matter on which such professional
person is employed"); see also 11 U.S.C. § 101(13) (defining "disinterested person").
532. One could argue that the trustee's counterclaims "arise in" the title 11 case if the
alleged malpractice occurred post-petition because, but for the commencement of the
bankruptcy case, the post-petition malpractice may not have occurred. See supra notes
75-84 (discussing scope of "arising in" jurisdiction as inclusive of most claims arising out
of post-petition transactions).
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mental bankruptcy jurisdiction were not exercised, the trustee would face
the choice of abandoning her claim or bringing it against the debtor's
former attorneys in a nonbankruptcy forum. Forcing the trustee to sue
the attorneys outside the bankruptcy court would distract her from ad-
ministering the estate and possibly delay its resolution. Moreover, the
court may decline to close the bankruptcy case until the supplemental
claim is resolved because cessation of the case may alter the capacity of
the trustee to assert the counterclaim.533
Finally, an assertion of supplemental jurisdiction against non-parties is
difficult, but not impossible, to reconcile with the bankruptcy policy
favoring expeditious resolution of an estate.5 34 Recall the hypothetical
involving the preference and fraudulent transfer actions brought by the
trustee against various defendants, but in this instance, assume that the
defendants also bring a third-party complaint against their attorneys and
accountants for malpractice.5 35 Because the trustee is not a party to the
third-party action, it is more difficult to justify the exercise of supplemen-
tal jurisdiction out of a concern for the convenience to the trustee, be-
cause it does not seem as though it would be inconvenient for the trustee
if the avoidance action (to which the trustee is a party) were resolved in a
bankruptcy forum and the malpractice action (to which the trustee is not
533. See 11 U.S.C. § 558 (1988) (permitting "estate" to raise defenses available to
debtor as against any entity other than the estate).
534. Assertions of supplemental jurisdiction "involv[ing] the joinder or intervention of
additional parties," 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (Supp. IV 1992), were, prior to enactment of the
supplemental jurisdictional provision, referred to as exercises of ancillary jurisdiction
when the supplemental claim against a third party was brought by the defendant, see
supra notes 103-09 and accompanying text (discussing ancillary jurisdiction), or as exer-
cises of pendent-party jurisdiction when the supplemental claim against a third party was
brought by the plaintiff, see supra notes 119-36 and accompanying text (discussing pen-
dent-party jurisdiction). The distinction between supplemental jurisdiction "involv[ing]
the joinder or intervention of additional parties" generally, and supplemental jurisdiction
"involv[ing] the joinder or intervention of additional parties" which is asserted by plain-
tiffs, continues under the supplemental jurisdiction provision. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b)
(Supp. IV 1992) (prohibiting the latter where "original jurisdiction founded solely on
section 1332 of [title 28]").
535. See supra notes 12-18 and accompanying text (setting forth hypothetical in de-
tail). Because the third-party action is brought by the defendants, it would be viewed as
an assertion of ancillary jurisdiction, see supra notes 103-09 and accompanying text,
rather than an assertion of pendent-party jurisdiction, see supra notes 119-36 and accom-
panying text. The distinction may have been rendered irrelevant by 28 U.S.C. § 1367
(Supp. IV 1992). That statute generally permits an exercise of supplemental jurisdiction
even as to "claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties." See 28
U.S.C. § 1367(a) (Supp. IV 1992). The only exception that § 1367 provides to an asser-
tion of pendent-party jurisdiction is where the sole basis for jurisdiction over the primary
claim is 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (diversity and alienage jurisdiction). See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b)
(Supp. IV 1992). Where jurisdiction of the primary claim is instead founded on 28
U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), the bankruptcy jurisdictional provision, an
exercise of pendent-party jurisdiction would seem to be authorized. But see infra note
570 (arguing, on policy grounds, that Congress should reconsider grant of supplemental
bankruptcy jurisdiction involving joinder or intervention of additional parties by
plaintiffs).
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a party) were resolved in a nonbankruptcy forum.5 36 Where there is a
536. There undoubtedly exists substantial overlap between proceedings "related to"
the title 11 case, and supplemental claims sufficiently related to an "arising under" or
"arising in" proceeding. For example, reconsider the hypothetical involving the avoid-
ance action and third-party malpractice suit. See supra notes 12-18 and accompanying
text (setting forth this hypothetical). One could argue that the third-party action is a
proceeding "related to" the title 11 case-one which might conceivably affect distribu-
tions from the estate or administration of the estate-in that the third-party plaintiff's
success in this suit renders the trustee's action against him more collectable. Courts are
divided as to whether such an extensive interpretation of the grant of "related to" juris-
diction is supportable, however. Compare Hawkins v. Eads (In re Eads), 135 BR. 387,
393 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1991) (concluding that it had "related to" jurisdiction over third-
party claims because "possibility of recovery on the third-party complaint enhances the
collectability of any judgment against the [non-debtor] defendants") with Scott v. Equita-
ble Fed. Savs. & Loan Ass'n (In re German), 97 B.R. 373, 375 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989)
(concluding that "related to" jurisdiction did not extend to third-party claims). In part
this disagreement may be explained by the more general disagreement as to whether any
"conceivable" relationship between the proceeding and the estate satisfies the standard of
"related to" jurisdiction, or whether a direct, legal relationship is required. See supra
notes 85-98 and accompanying text (discussing disagreement about standard of "related
to" jurisdiction).
Courts generally have held that suits between third party non-debtors do not involve
"related to" jurisdiction unless resolution of the action would (1) result in automatic
liability against the debtor; (2) bar the debtor from relitigating any issue determined by
the suit under principles of res judicata or collateral estoppel; or (3) otherwise affect the
debtor's rights, liabilities, options or freedom of action in any way that impacts upon the
handling and administration of the bankruptcy estate. Compare Quattrone Accountants,
Inc. v. IRS, 895 F.2d 921, 926-27 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding bankruptcy court has no "re-
lated to" jurisdiction over suit to determine non-debtor's liability as "responsible person"
for failure to pay trust fund taxes) and Home Ins. Co. v. Cooper & Cooper, Ltd., 889
F.2d 746, 749-51 (7th Cir. 1989) (court of appeals remanded for determination as to
whether action brought by debtor/law firm's insurer seeking declaration that "claims
made" malpractice policy was invalid because of misrepresentations on application form,
both as to misrepresenting sole shareholder of debtor and innocent associates of firm, was
"related to" debtor's bankruptcy case) and Fietz v. Great Western Savings (In re Fietz),
852 F.2d 455, 458 (9th Cir. 1988) (cross-claim by debtor's former wife against mortgagee
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; "related to" jurisdiction did not exist
over cross-claim because, even if cross-claim was community property and thus property
of debtor's estate, resolution of cross-claim would have no conceivable effect on estate
when debtor's plan had been confirmed and could not be modified by creditors, absent
proof of fraud) and National City Bank v. Coopers & Lybrand, 802 F.2d 990, 993-94 (8th
Cir. 1986) (holding no bankruptcy jurisdiction over post-confirmation suit by class of
note holders who had received less than full payment under debtors' reorganization plan
against debtors' pre-petition accountants asserting that negligence, breach of contract and
fraud by accountants caused devaluation of their claims and reduced dividends under
plan) and Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 995 (3d Cir. 1984) (finding no bankruptcy
jurisdiction over personal injury tort claim brought by Higgins (consumer), against
Pacor, Inc. (supplier), although Pacor had filed third-party complaint against Manville
(manufacturer), and third-party claim was stayed by Manville's chapter 11 filing; Hig-
gins' claim was described as "a mere precursor to the potential third party claim for
indemnification" by Pacor against Manville because Manville would not be barred by res
judicata or collateral estoppel from relitigating any issue decided in suit between Higgins
and Pacor, nor did Higgins' action create automatic liability against Manville) with Mich-
igan Employment Sec. Comm'n v. Wolverine Radio Co. (In re Wolverine Radio Co.),
930 F.2d 1132, 1143 (6th Cir. 1991) (distinguishing Pacor as involving merely common-
law rather than contractual claim for indemnification, the court of appeals found "related
to" jurisdiction over determination of tax liability of debtor's assignee because contrac-
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substantial overlap between the factual basis for the avoidance action and
that of the third-party malpractice action,537 however, the resolution of
both the primary and supplemental claims in the same bankruptcy forum
may make discovery and other procedural developments in the related
cases easier for the trustee.5 a8 In addition, the exercise of supplemental
bankruptcy jurisdiction over the malpractice action may work to the ad-
vantage of the trustee in negotiating a settlement of the avoidance action.
These judicial economies may outweigh any possible delay in administra-
tion of the estate.
Where the trustee or other representative of the estate is a third-party
defendant, these convenience arguments are substantially weakened.
Consider, in this instance, a suit brought by an individual against a drug
manufacturer. 539 The plaintiff alleges that the defendant is liable to her
under state tort law. Federal jurisdiction is based on the diversity of
tual indemnification provision might render debtor liable to assignee in event assignee
held liable to debtor's former employees) and Robinson v. Michigan Consolidated Gas
Co., 918 F.2d 579, 584 (6th Cir. 1990) (finding "related to" jurisdiction existed over
tenants' suit against utility and bankruptcy trustee for wrongful termination of service
since tenants sued trustee in his official capacity and thus sought recovery from debtor's
estate) and Dogpatch Properties, Inc. v. Dogpatch U.S.A., Inc. (In re Dogpatch U.S.A.,
Inc.), 810 F.2d 782, 786 (8th Cir. 1987) (finding "related to" jurisdiction over counter-
claim and third party claim in action brought by purchaser of property against debtor,
mortgagee and Arkansas Real Estate Commission, because outcome of counterclaim
brought by mortgagee against purchaser to foreclose and third party claim brought by
mortgagee against alleged guarantors to collect on guarantee would affect estate in that
purchaser's inability to pay mortgages would render debtor responsible to repay mort-
gaged amount) and DuVoisin v. Foster (In re Southern Indus. Banking Corp.), 809 F.2d
329, 331 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding action between assignee of note given to debtor and
maker of note was "related to" debtor's bankruptcy case because suit arose as result of
debtor's bankruptcy, single substantive claim concerning maker's setoff rights against as-
signee was based on bankruptcy law, and debt to be set off was debt owed to maker, not
by assignee, but debtor) and Su-Ra Enterprises, Inc. v. Barnett Bank, N.A., 142 B.R. 502,
505 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (finding "related to" jurisdiction to exist over equitable action under
Florida law brought by non-debtorAessee against purchaser of leasehold from estate be-
cause defendant raised Bankruptcy Code as affirmative defense and both plaintiff and
defendant had claimed that they would bring action against estate if unsuccessful in this
suit).
537. The extent to which the primary and supplemental claims are related will affect
whether the exercise of jurisdiction over the supplemental claim is consistent or inconsis-
tent with an expeditious resolution of the bankruptcy case. Courts and commentators are
not in complete agreement as to what this standard ought to be. See supra notes 246-62
and accompanying text (discussing application of Gibbs's "relatedness" test to supple-
mental bankruptcy jurisdiction).
538. See Dechert Price & Rhoads v. Direct Satellite Communications, Inc. (In re Di-
rect Satellite Communications, Inc.), 91 B.R. 5, 7 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) ("The third-
party defendants would be compelled to appear as witnesses and claims against them...
would be an aspect of Decher's [sic] defense irrespective of whether they are joined as
parties to this proceeding. Carpenter would be here as a party in any event, as he has not
moved for dismissal. It appears grossly unfair to Dechert and to Carpenter to make them
engage in litigation in a different forum which would be identical to that here if they do
not wish to do so.").
539. The facts of this hypothetical resemble Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 986,
994 (3d Cir. 1984).
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citizenship of the parties."4 The defendant brings a third-party contri-
bution and indemnification action against another drug manufacturer.
The third-party defendant files a bankruptcy petition, and as a result, the
third-party action is stayed.5 41 Because the automatic stay only relates to
proceedings against the debtor, however, the primary claim is not
stayed. 42 The third-party plaintiff then seeks to remove5 4 1 the entire ac-
tion to the district court for the district in which the third-party defend-
ant's bankruptcy case is pending, claiming that the third-party action
constitutes a "related to" proceeding and that the diversity action be-
tween the plaintiff and defendant derives from "a common nucleus of
operative fact."
In this instance, resolution of the debtor's estate may well be hampered
by an exercise of supplemental bankruptcy jurisdiction over the removed
action.5 " If the court were to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdic-
tion, litigation of the primary claim would continue in bankruptcy court
while litigation of the third-party action in the nonbankruptcy forum
would be stayed. The third-party plaintiff could file a proof of claim
against the debtor's estate based on the same allegations of reimburse-
ment or contribution made in the third-party action, but unless the pri-
mary claim is resolved in the nonbankruptcy forum before the conclusion
of the debtor's bankruptcy case that contingent proof of claim is likely to
be disallowed. 45
When supplemental jurisdiction is asserted by the plaintiff against an
additional party,546 convenience arguments may be plausible, so long as a
540. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
541. See I1 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (1988).
542. See, e.g., Wedgeworth v. Fibreboard Corp., 706 F.2d 541, 544 (5th Cir. 1983)
(automatic stay inapplicable to action against co-defendant of debtor); Pitts v. Unarco
Indus., Inc., 698 F.2d 313, 314 (7th Cir. 1983) (same).
543. See 28 U.S.C. § 1452(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) ("A party may remove any claim
or cause of action in a civil action... to the district court for the district where such civil
action is pending, if such district court has jurisdiction of such claim or cause of action
under section 1334 of this title.").
544. Procedurally this hypothetical is confusing because, in the nonbankruptcy forum,
the suit between the plaintiff and the defendant is the primary claim and the third-party
action is the supplemental claim. In the bankruptcy forum, however, the third-party
action is the primary claim, in that it is "related to" the debtor's bankruptcy case, and the
suit between the plaintiff and the defendant becomes the supplemental claim, in that it
derives from "a common nucleus of operative fact" with the "related to" proceeding.
545. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(e)(1)(B) ("the court shall disallow any claim for reimburse-
ment or contribution of an entity that is liable with the debtor on or has secured the claim
of a creditor, to the extent that . . .such claim for reimbursement or contribution is
contingent as of the time of allowance or disallowance of such claim for reimbursement
or contribution"); § 502(e)(2) ("A claim for reimbursement or contribution of such an
entity that becomes fixed after the commencement of the case shall be determined, and
shall be allowed ... or disallowed . . . the same as if such claim had become fixed before
the date of the filing of the petition.").
546. Here, the reference is to what used to be referred to as "pendent-party jurisdic-
tion." See supra notes 119-36 and accompanying text (generally discussing pendent-party
jurisdiction); see also supra notes 534-35 (discussing continuing relevance of pendent-
party jurisdiction to supplemental bankruptcy jurisdiction).
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trustee, debtor-in-possession, or other representative of the estate is a
party to the primary proceeding. For example, consider a proof of claim
asserting breach of a pre-petition contract to sell property of the estate.
Assume also that the trustee defends against the claim on the grounds
that the buyer's former chief executive officer misrepresented material
facts to the debtor, thus entitling the debtor to rescind the contract.- 7
The plaintiff-buyer then amends its complaint to join the former CEO as
a defendant. As noted above, the proof of claim "arises in" the title I 
case."4 The action between the buyer and the debtor's principal may not
"relate to" the title 11 case, however, in that any recovery in this suit
would not be from property of the estate. If the estate and former CEO
are found to be severally liable, then the CEO's liability to the buyer may
not affect the estate's liability to the buyer. Nonetheless, the two actions
clearly arise out of a "common nucleus of operative fact." Moreover, the
trustee has every interest in the two claims being determined in a single
forum. Trials in separate forums may lead to inconsistent results, and
there may be additional practical benefits to a single forum."'
Notice, however, that arguments favoring an exercise of supplemental
bankruptcy jurisdiction because it would provide legal and practical ben-
efits to the estate are equally applicable to a "related to" proceeding
brought by or against a trustee or other representative of the estate. Con-
sider a "related to" proceeding brought by a trustee or debtor-in-posses-
sion against an entity that has not filed a proof of claim against the estate,
alleging, for example, breach of contract and other state law claims. 550
The proceeding "relates to" the title 11 case in that any proceeds from its
recovery constitute property of the estate. 551 Assume further that the
defendant asserts a third-party action for indemnification or contribution
of some sort. As in the previous hypotheticals, the third-party action
probably does not "relate to" the title I I case because the proceeds from
recovery on the third-party complaint belong to the defendant and not
the estate. Still, as in the other hypotheticals, the exercise of supplemen-
tal bankruptcy jurisdiction may assist the trustee in administering the
estate because of the practical and other considerations raised above.
The policy arguments seem indistinguishable. Still, constitutional con-
cerns may cause courts to question the wisdom of such an exercise, and
547. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 164 (1981).
548. See supra notes 75-84 and accompanying text.
549. See supra notes 530-45 and accompanying text (discussing these practical
benefits).
550. Cf. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 56, 84
(1982) (involving suit by Northern Pipeline Co., chapter I I debtor-in-possession, against
Marathon Pipe Line Co., alleging breach of contract, warranty, misrepresentation, coer-
cion and duress; Marathon had not filed a proof of claim against the estate; recovery in
suit would have constituted property of estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541). For a more de-
tailed discussion of Marathon, see supra notes 398-415 and accompanying text.
551. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1988).
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stimulate Congress to enact clear statutory limitations. 5 2
In sum, the policies favoring a broad grant of bankruptcy jurisdiction
also support a limited grant of supplemental jurisdiction because, in
many circumstances, such an exercise delays the administration of the
bankruptcy estate. Whether an exercise of supplemental bankruptcy ju-
risdiction is consistent with, or contradicts, Congress' goal to facilitate an
expeditious resolution of an estate differs depending on the circum-
stances, and thus generally should be left to a case by case consideration.
Bankruptcy policies are not the only policies at work, however. Policies
generally supporting an exercise of supplemental jurisdiction also require
examination.
B. Policy Justifications Generally Favoring an Exercise of
Supplemental Jurisdiction are Subject to Countervailing Policy
Concerns in the Context of a Bankruptcy Case
Doctrines of supplemental jurisdiction traditionally have been justified
by considerations of federalism,553 fairness, and judicial economy.15 4 Ab-
sent an ability to assert supplemental jurisdiction, a plaintiff having a
jurisdictionally sufficient claim and a related jurisdictionally insufficient
claim would face undesirable choices.
First, a plaintiff could split the claims, bringing the primary claim in
federal court and the supplemental claim in state court. By splitting the
claims, the plaintiff would cause inconvenience and waste the time of
both the litigants and the federal and nonfederal judicial systems, as well
as create the possibility that res judicata and collateral estoppel issues
would arise in the later-concluded action. Second, the plaintiff could
proceed only on the federal claim in federal court, and abandon the sup-
plemental claim-an unfair result in the event the supplemental claim is
substantial. Finally, the plaintiff could join the primary and supplemen-
tal claims in a state-court action, if permitted under the state's proce-
dural rules, but this would undercut Congress' fundamental purpose in
creating a federal court system-the provision of a federal forum for the
resolution of the "cases or controversies" enumerated within Article III
of the Constitution. 555
552. See supra part III.A.2 and accompanying text (discussing these constitutional
concerns in detail).
553. Considerations of federalism both support and temper exercises of supplemental
jurisdiction. Support is found in the notion that an exercise of supplemental jurisdiction
may, as a practical matter, be necessary to effectuate a congressional grant of federal
jurisdiction. See supra notes 378-85 and accompanying text. Limitation follows from the
fact that, by definition, the supplemental claim derives from the state law claim, and that
all exercises of supplemental jurisdiction encroach on the general jurisdiction of state
courts. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
554. See McLaughlin supra note 102, at 863 ("Based on notions of fairness and judicial
economy, the doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction served an important func-
tion by allowing the court and litigants to effectively resolve all aspects of an entire con-
troversy in a single proceeding.").
555. See U.S. Const. art. III.
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Similar interests are protected when defendants seek to exercise sup-
plemental jurisdiction. Absent the doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction,
a defendant to a federal claim would be required to either abandon or
seek redress in a separate state-court action for counterclaims, cross-
claims and third-party claims having no independent basis for federal
jurisdiction. Abandonment of the defendant's supplemental claims is un-
fair because a separate action involving the supplemental claims raises
the specter of inconsistent verdicts.
The doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction is consistent with, and neces-
sary to an effectuation of, one of the primary purposes of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure: the elimination of technical, procedural barri-
ers to the joinder of related claims. 56
The important policy purposes favoring an assertion of supplemental
jurisdiction in an ordinary civil action find substantial counter-argu-
ments, however, when the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction occurs in
the context of a bankruptcy case. First, and probably most important,
the judicial economies of an assertion of supplemental bankruptcy juris-
diction are often doubtful. On one hand, the litigants to the supplemen-
tal proceeding may claim that federal adjudication of the jurisdictionally
deficient claim promotes fairness and efficiencies to the parties to the liti-
gation who are not thereby required to split the action or abandon the
nonfederal claim. In the context of bankruptcy, however, the judicial
economies the parties to the litigation may derive from an exercise of
supplemental jurisdiction must be balanced against the inefficiencies the
exercise may exact upon resolution of the bankruptcy case. By defini-
tion, the supplemental proceeding will have no conceivable effect on dis-
tributions from the estate or administration of the estate and could delay
final resolution of the estate. 57
Second, distinct from Congress' goal to provide a federal forum for the
resolution of federal claims-with its enactment of the jurisdictional pro-
visions of the 1984 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code-Congress
equivocated as to the need to provide a federal forum for the resolution
556. See McLaughlin, supra note 102, at 864. As McLaughlin noted:
In addition to these considerations of judicial economy and fairness, the doc-
trines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction also complimented the liberal join-
der policies of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and facilitated the avowed
purpose of the Rules-to eliminate procedural barriers to the joinder of claims
so that all claims related to a legal controversy could be adjudicated in a single
lawsuit.
Id
557. The supplemental claim will delay resolution of the estate because the relationship
between the original proceeding and the supplemental proceeding is required only to have
a common nexus of fact, not a perfect interrelationship of fact. The factual nexus will, by
definition, be imperfect enough to preclude a finding that the supplemental proceeding is
"related to" the title 11 case whereas the original proceeding is so related. This schism
would widen if a logical relationship standard were preferred over a "common nucleus of
operative fact" test.
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of all claims relating to a title 11 case.5s8 Legislative history is replete
with support for the proposition that in 1984 Congress was concerned
not only with the constitutionality of an exercise of the essential judicial
powers by non-Article III bankruptcy courts, but also with comity with
state courts.5 59 It added a provision in 1984 that directs district courts to
abstain from hearing a "related to" proceeding which was pending in a
state court at the time of the filing of the bankruptcy petition, which
could not have been heard in a federal court but for the filing, and which
can be timely adjudicated in the state court.56  Congress also retained a
provision permitting district courts to abstain from hearing a proceeding
"arising under" title 11, or "arising in" or "related to" a title 11 case, "in
the interest of justice, or in the interest of comity with State courts or
respect for State law." 6 ' Explicit concern for comity in the exercise of
federal bankruptcy jurisdiction stands in contrast to the discretion al-
lowed to courts in the exercise of other grants of federal jurisdiction. 62
To be sure, a concern for comity is not unique to federal bankruptcy
jurisdiction. What is distinct about Congress' concern for comity in the
context of an assertion of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction is that it has
been made explicit in the grant of jurisdiction, rather than left to judicial
determination. 63
Moreover, many of the arguments focusing on the unfairness of a fail-
ure to exercise supplemental jurisdiction may be inapplicable in a bank-
ruptcy context. The broad grant of bankruptcy jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1334(b) is original and not exclusive." Thus, nothing precludes liti-
gants from enjoying the economies which follow from joint litigation of
the primary and supplemental proceedings in a nonbankruptcy forum.165
Additionally, although the doctrine of collateral estoppel clearly applies
558. See infra notes 559-63 and accompanying text.
559. See, e.g., 130 Cong. Rec. 58891 (June 29, 1984) (statement of Sen. Hatch) ("I
have only one regret as I reflect upon this conference product.... [With] the deletion of
the Senate-passed mandatory abstention provision .... purely State law claims which do
not arise under the Bankruptcy Code are allowed to be tried in State courts. This
presents an important constitutional concern.").
560. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). For a quotation of this provi-
sion, see supra note 61.
561. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). For a more complete quotation
of this provision, see supra note 61.
562. But see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1992) (permitting district court to de-
cline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if "claim raises a novel or complex issue of
State law").
563. The differences between abstention doctrines that have developed outside a bank-
ruptcy context, and the abstention doctrines applied in bankruptcy, is a fascinating topic
which far exceeds the scope of this article.
564. See 28 U.S.C. 1334(b) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
565. But see Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 557-58 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting) (noting that the Aldinger court suggested that "the appropriateness of pendent-
party jurisdiction might turn on the 'alignmen[t] of parties and claims,' and that one
significant factor is whether 'the grant of jurisdiction to [the] federal court is exclusive,"
but that the Finley court rejected the factor as irrelevant).
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in a bankruptcy context 566 principles of res judicata may not attach in
"related to" proceedings.5 67 Thus, concerns about the fundamental un-
fairness of requiring litigants to separately litigate the supplemental claim
and the "related to" proceeding may not exist.
C. Congress Should Amend § 1367(c)s Factors to Reflect Concerns
Unique to Bankruptcy
Section 1367(c) provides that, in limited circumstances, district courts
may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, despite the grant of
such jurisdiction by § 1367(a). 68 It permits courts to decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction if:
(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,
(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over
which the district court has original jurisdiction,
(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has origi-
nal jurisdiction, or
(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons
for declining jurisdiction.5 69
The discretionary factors listed in § 1367(c) appear to be exclusive and
do not reflect factors unique to bankruptcy. If § 1367(a) is interpreted to
confer supplemental bankruptcy jurisdiction, § 1367(c) should be
amended so that it clearly covers the bankruptcy context.570
1. An Exclusive List
After Finley57' and § 1367, it would be difficult to describe the doc-
trine of supplemental jurisdiction as a doctrine of judicial discretion.
566. See, e.g., Grogan v. Garner, Ill S. Ct. 654, 658 (1991) (principles of collateral
estoppel apply to bankruptcy non-dischargeability proceedings).
567. Courts are divided as to whether the doctrine of res judicata bars litigation of
previously unasserted claims merely "related to" the title 11 case. Compare Barnett v.
Stem, 909 F.2d 973, 980-82 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that previously unasserted claims
could be barred by res judicata only if these claims would have been core proceedings in
the bankruptcy court) and Howell Hydrocarbons, Inc. v. Adams, 897 F.2d 183, 189-90
(5th Cir. 1990) (same) and I.A. Durbin, Inc. v. Jefferson Nat'l Bank, 793 F.2d 1541, 1548
n.8 (11th Cir. 1986) (same) with Sanders Confectionery Prods., Inc. v. Heller Fin., Inc.,
973 F.2d 474, 482-83 (6th Cir. 1992) (claim preclusion may in certain circumstances
attach to non-core proceedings), cerL denied, 113 S. Ct. 1046 (1993) and Sure-Snap Corp.
v. State Street Bank & Trust Co., 948 F.2d 869 (2d Cir. 1991) (same). But see In re
Kroner, 953 F.2d 317 (7th Cir. 1992) (claim preclusion applicable to subsequent non-core
proceedings as to which parties had consented to exercise of bankruptcy court
jurisdiction).
568. See supra note 39 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367 in its entirety).
569. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (Supp. IV 1992).
570. In addition, Congress should give thought to whether it intended § 1367(b)'s limi-
tation on pendent-party jurisdiction in diversity cases to apply in the bankruptcy context.
The same arguments that support a limitation of pendent-party jurisdiction in diversity
cases also support a limitation of jurisdiction over pendent-party claims related to a "re-
lated to" proceeding, since "related to" proceedings derive from state not federal law.
571. Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989).
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Supplemental jurisdiction has become a creature of statute.5 7 2 One could
argue that if Congress did not intend to codify all of supplemental juris-
diction, it would not have specified in § 1367(c) the discretionary factors
to be considered in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. It
would have left these equitable considerations to judicial discretion.
After viewing the source of supplemental jurisdiction as statutory, it is
not difficult to conclude that the factors enumerated in § 1367(c) are ex-
clusive. Moreover, this view is supported by the grammatical construc-
tion of § 1367(c) itself, in that it does not use the term "including" when
describing the circumstances under which supplemental jurisdiction can
be declined. 573
2. The List Is Peculiarly Applicable to the Nonbankruptcy Context
Most of the factors set forth in § 1367(c) can be restated to establish
more general factors to be balanced against the policy objectives of an
exercise of supplemental jurisdiction. As a result of the absence of bank-
ruptcy terms used in § 1367(c), however, the factors set forth in this sec-
tion are of little assistance to a district court seeking to determine
whether to exercise an assertion of supplemental bankruptcy
jurisdiction.5 74
For example, § 1367(c)(2) permits a district court to decline to exer-
572. See Mengler, supra note 102, at 248 (describing Finley as having "undermined the
viability of pendent claim and ancillary jurisdiction"). Mengler then identifies three op-
tions available to Congress prior to its enactment of § 1367:
First, Congress could abolish any vestiges of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction
remaining after Finley. Second, Congress instead could take the position that
the doctrines of pendent claim, pendent party, and ancillary jurisdiction are a
beneficial feature of the federal procedural system. Believing that Finley really
only eliminates pendent party jurisdiction, Congress could overrule the most
obvious implication of Finley by codifying pendent party jurisdiction. Third,
Congress could take the same favorable position on supplemental jurisdiction.
Believing, however, that Finley seriously undermines all of supplemental juris-
diction, Congress could overrule Finley by codifying pendent claim, pendent
party, and ancillary jurisdiction.
Id. at 267. Although courts were divided as to the implications of Finley on pendent-
claim and ancillary jurisdiction, see supra note 435, Congress followed Mengler's third
option, either because it agreed with Mengler or more likely, simply out of an abundance
of caution. Thus, a court could still conclude that § 1367 does not completely regulate
supplemental jurisdiction-that courts continue to hold inherent equitable authority to
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction-but this conclusion is made much more
difficult by Finley and Congress' enactment of § 1367 in reaction to Finley.
573. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (Supp. IV 1992) ("supplemental jurisdiction shall
include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties") (emphasis
added) with § 1367(c) (Supp. IV 1992) ("The district courts may decline to exercise sup-
plemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if .... "). Cf 11 U.S.C. § 102(3)
(1988) (as applied to title 11, the terms "'includes' and 'including' are not limiting").
574. Section 1367(c)(1) ("the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law"), by
contrast, is generally phrased. With this discretionary factor, there remains an issue as to
its interrelationship to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) and (c)(2) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). See
supra note 61 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1334 in its entirety). It seems anomalous that district
courts are required to abstain from certain "related to" proceedings, but are left discre-
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cise supplemental jurisdiction where "the claim substantially predomi-
nates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original
jurisdiction."57 More generally stated, this factor permits the court to
balance the judicial economy of an exercise of supplemental jurisdiction
as compared to a refusal to exercise the assertion of such jurisdiction. If
§ 1367(c)(2) were restated to comport with a balance of similar interests
involved in a bankruptcy context, it would permit the court to weigh the
effect of an exercise of supplemental jurisdiction on the efficient adminis-
tration of the bankruptcy estate, as well as its effect on an efficient resolu-
tion of the litigation between the parties.
Section 1367(c)(3) is similarly directed to a nonbankruptcy balancing
of equities. It permits a district court to decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction when "the district court has dismissed all claims over which
it has original jurisdiction, 5 76 but appears not to permit the district
court to consider the affect of a dismissal, close, or conversion of a title
11 case.57 7 A simple restatement of § 1367(c)(3) would clarify this
consideration.
Section 1367(c)(4) purports to provide to district courts generalized
authority to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. It, however,
exacts a heightened standard for consideration of factors other than
those identified in § 1367(c)(1) through (3), only permitting considera-
tion of other factors "in exceptional circumstances," and then limiting
the factors that may be considered to those which constitute "compelling
reasons for declining jurisdiction. 5 7 1 If § 1367(a) is applicable in the
bankruptcy context, Congress should amend § 1367(c)(1) through (3) to
reflect this decision, rather than leave district courts with § 1367(c)(4) as
the exclusive basis for declining to exercise supplemental bankruptcy
jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
Courts of appeals, district courts, and bankruptcy courts have too
readily accepted assertions of supplemental bankruptcy jurisdiction as
proper without recognizing that both the constitutional and statutory au-
thority for such assertions are uncertain. By raising these statutory and
constitutional questions, this Article seeks to create judicial dialogue. In
addition, it concludes that the exercise of supplemental bankruptcy juris-
diction should be curtailed, if not by courts for reasons of constitutional
or statutory infirmity, then by Congress for policy reasons. Most exer-
tion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over claims sufficiently related to such a "re-
lated to" proceeding.
575. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2) (Supp. IV 1992).
576. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (Supp. IV 1992).
577. Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2) (1988) (providing that automatic stay continues until
earliest of closing or dismissal of title I 1 case, or grant or denial of discharge to certain
debtors).
578. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4) (Supp. IV 1992).
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cises of supplemental bankruptcy jurisdiction conflict with Congress' pri-
mary objectives for enactment of the current bankruptcy jurisdictional
provision.
Congress should resolve this conflict by prohibiting district courts
from exercising jurisdiction supplemental to proceedings merely "related
to" a bankruptcy case, and by clarifying the circumstances under which
district courts should decline to exercise jurisdiction over claims related
to proceedings "arising under" the Bankruptcy Code or "arising in" a
bankruptcy case. In addition, Congress should prohibit bankruptcy
courts from exercising any supplemental jurisdiction at all.
